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Abstract: 
This thesis discusses comprehensively the issue of exploitation from a normative perspective 
specifically relating to clinical trials within developing countries using a normative definition. 
Exploitation is defined from an unfairness perspective as the unfair use of an individual 
(group of individual) by another.  In order to ease the flow of the arguments within this 
thesis, unfairness will be assessed from two different perspectives: a procedural perspective 
and an outcome perspective. The procedural perspective discusses whether the procedures 
followed when obtaining informed consent from the potential participants fulfilled the 
requirements of informed consent or failed to do so. Though the use of this approach it is 
concluded that informed consent is not a necessary condition for the avoidance of 
exploitation. Similarly, it is concluded that even if morally transformative, valid consent is 
given by potential participants, exploitation may still be lurking in the shadows of the 
interaction between the trial participants and the researchers/sponsors. The outcome 
perspective of unfairness focuses on the effect of the interaction on the parties involved 
within it and whether they benefit from their interaction with each other, are not affected by 
it, or are actually harmed as a result of the interaction. As an extension of this argument, the 
thesis will also consider the post-trial perspective of the interaction. The thesis concludes 
that post-trial access (reasonable availability) has a very narrow view of benefit and does not 
ensure that there is a fair share of the benefits between the parties involved. Instead of this 
narrow approach, a wider, post-trial benefit approach is adopted in order to prevent 
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exploitation.  Further discussion within the thesis will include, the requirements of an ethical 
review, the makeup of the review boards, and priority decision making in keeping with the 
current research ethics discussion in the literature.  
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Chapter One: Introduction: 
The performance of clinical trials necessitates the recruitment of human subjects into trials 
as trial participants. The necessity to involve human subjects in research has been well 
established a while ago. Without the involvement of human participant in clinical trials, the 
results obtained from research on animals or in laboratories cannot blindly be applied to 
human beings. Therefore new therapies have to pass through many phases before being 
approved for use by humans. This is done in order for the safety and efficacy of the tested 
agent to be proven. Usually large numbers of trial participants are recruited into phase III 
trials or clinical trials. These procedures have been mainly maintained in industrialized 
countries where regulations and rules have been put in place to monitor research involving 
humans with the aim of protecting participants from the risk of exploitation and the 
exposure to unnecessary harm from scientifically invalid or unethical research.   
One of the major problems facing researchers within industrialized countries regarding the 
recruitment of trial participants is the increasing difficulty in recruiting the required number 
of participants. This is due to several reasons. The large number of clinical trials being carried 
out in developed countries, means that many people residing in these locations are 
approached either directly by their health care providers or through advertisements to take 
part in a given trial. Secondly, clinical trials require the recruitment of larger numbers of 
participants. These two points make it harder for the sponsor to recruit the required number 
of participants within the required time frame therefore delaying the initiation and ending of 
the trial. Thirdly, the population in industrialized countries usually consumes several kinds of 
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pharmaceutical agents on a daily basis. This means that there is a greater the chance of an 
interaction between the tested agent and the other agents being used by the trial 
participants. Fourthly, because of the tight regulations established within developed 
countries, the use of placebo in clinical trials is not permitted if another effective modality of 
treatment for the same illness already exists. Fifthly, because of the many regulations within 
developed countries, there are delays in the initiation of trials. Finally, the cost of these 
clinical trials is becoming very expensive in industrialized countries. 
In an attempt to solve these problems, trial sponsors have turned to the recruitment of trial 
participants from developing countries. This increased attention of sponsors to developing 
countries is evident from the increase in the number of trials carried out in developing 
countries. For example GlaxoSmithKline increased the number of trials outside the US and 
Western Europe by 21% in 2007. Similarly, Wyeth pharmaceuticals increased its trials outside 
the US by 20% in 2006 (Petryna, 2009). This can also be seen through the increased use of 
trial participants from developing countries. According to recent industry statistics, Central-
Eastern-Europe has the highest volume of patients enrolled per investigative site (6.27),  
followed by the Asian-Pacific region (5.78), South-Central America (4.56), and Western 
Europe (3.08) (Petryna, 2009: 13).   
The term "developing countries" is generally used to indicate that the concerned countries 
have not attained a level of development considered acceptable by western countries. Hence 
the term is rejected by some countries as it indicates that they need to reach a level of 
development acceptable to the more developed countries. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the term “developing countries” will be used to reflect the level of basic needs, including 
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health care services, provided to the populations within these countries. This level is most 
commonly related to the country’s income. There are low income developing countries 
struggling to provide the very basic services to its population including many basic human 
needs such as clean water supplies and health care services. Then there are middle income 
developing countries which may have basic health care services but may have difficulties 
with other services such as clean water supplies or sanitation. Finally there are high income 
developing countries with very advanced health care services but who still struggle with the 
issue of fair distribution and ease of access to these services. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the term “developing countries” will be used to cover all the different categories mentioned 
earlier since some of the issues which will be presented later may be replicated in different 
settings such as informed consent and post-trial benefits. This means that the issues 
regarding the possibility of exploitation of these populations within a research context exists 
within all these settings.     
The shift in trial sponsors’ interests in the performance of clinical trials within developing 
countries brought certain concerns to the surface especially the issue of exploitation of trial 
participants recruited from developing countries by sponsors from more developed   
countries. These concerns focus mainly on alleged accusations that the industrialized country 
sponsors have shifted their attention to developing countries for reasons that relate to their 
own benefit. Aiding factors to this shift include lack of regulations concerning the 
performance of clinical trials within these countries, the in-availability of treatments for 
many illnesses devastating these regions, the labelling of developing countries population as 
“virgin populations” because they do not consume any or very little pharmaceutical agents, 
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and the high prevalence of certain illnesses which enables the sponsors in recruiting large 
numbers of participants into the trials within shorter periods of time compared to 
industrialized countries. The main reason why this shift in trial location became a focus of 
discussions is the labelling of developing countries populations as being vulnerable. Many of 
the developing countries are still stricken with poverty and have poor health care services. 
There is a desperate need to improve the health care settings within those countries to try 
and alleviate some of suffering. The life expectancy in developing countries is shorter than 
that in industrialized countries by a third (Halstead, 1987). Three million lives are lost each 
year because of the poor health care systems as well as other factors including poverty, poor 
health care systems, lack of access to clean safe water, and poor sanitation. (World Bank, 
2001). Almost fourteen million people die every year in developing countries from infectious 
diseases.  The sad fact is that these deaths could be prevented if people had access to basic, 
affordable medications (Watkins, 2001). However, accusation of exploitation based on the 
vulnerability of these populations, lack of regulations within developing countries, and the 
shift in location of clinical trials ignores other issues which may be used to defend this shift. 
The prevalence of some illnesses within developing countries and the lack of treatments for 
these illnesses mean that clinical trials have to be performed within these settings. Hence 
vulnerable populations have to be recruited into these trials. Furthermore, in some cases 
despite the existence of treatments within other countries, these interventions cannot be 
blindly made available to the populations within developing countries because of many 
factors. From a financial perspective, the governments of some developing countries are 
incapable of purchasing these interventions because of their high cost. Hence shorter, more 
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affordable interventions need to be made available to these populations which may justify 
the performance of trials within these settings. On the other hand, results of trials performed 
within industrialized countries cannot automatically be implemented within developing 
countries due to malnutrition for example which may render the application of the same 
dosage of these interventions within developing country populations ineffective or highly 
toxic. In addition, the lack of regulations regarding clinical trials within developing countries 
has not been instated by the sponsors of the trials, nor is the high prevalence of illnesses and 
lack of treatment options under the control of the sponsors. Furthermore, despite all the 
disadvantages that surround developing countries populations, their recruitment into trials 
does not necessarily mean that they are being harmed, are exploited, or that they will not 
benefit from being recruited into the trial. 
The accusation that the shift of clinical trials to developing countries is exploitative has to do 
more with what these trials actually focus on. Most of the trials carried out in developing 
countries and sponsored by industrialized countries do not address the health care needs of 
the developing countries or their populations. For example, about 50% of the global health 
research and development carried out in 1992 was undertaken by the private industry, 
however, less than 5% of that was spent on diseases specific to less developed countries 
(WHO, 1999). Also in the period extending from 1975 until 1997; of the 1233 drugs licensed 
worldwide, only four were developed by commercial pharmaceutical firms specifically for 
tropical diseases of humans (Pecoul, 1999). This means despite the fact that 90% of the 
global burden of illnesses exists in developing countries, only 10% of the billions spent 
annually on health research worldwide focuses its attention on what makes up 90% of 
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disease burden faced in developing countries. This is also known as the 10/90 gap (Global 
Forum for Health Research, 2000).  
In order for us to prove that exploitation actually takes place we need to be clear about the 
definition of exploitation. In fact many definitions of exploitation exist (Arneson 2001). Some 
definitions imply a net gain by the exploiter as a necessary requirement for exploitation. This 
idea is emphasized in Wertheimer’s quote of Tormey: 
"Exploitation necessarily involves benefits or gains of some kind to 
someone….Exploitation resembles a zero-sum game, viz. what the 
exploiter gains, the exploitee loses, or minimally, for the exploiter to 
gain, the exploitee must lose." (Wertheimer, 1996: 10) 
However, the simple gain or benefit of the exploiter does not imply that the interaction is 
exploitative. Indeed the effect on the other party involved in the interaction, namely the trial 
participants or their communities, needs to be considered as well. This is reflected in some 
other definitions of exploitation which relate specifically to the Kantian approach which 
views exploitation as the instrumental use of individuals as a means to an ends rather than as 
an ends in themselves. In order for us to say that exploitation occurs within interactions 
between the researchers/sponsors and the trial participants, we need to prove that the 
researchers/sponsors used the trial participants instrumentally as a means to an ends 
exclusively. This concept is also false as will be proven through later discussions.  
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According to some other definitions relating to the effect of the interaction on the trial 
participants, the exploited person must endure harm in order for exploitation to be said to 
exist within the interaction:  
"Persons are exploited if (1) others secure a benefit by (2) using them 
as a tool or resource so as (3) to cause them serious harm." (Munzer, 
1990: 171) 
However, harm is not a factor that determines the existence of exploitation within an 
interaction. This point will be further discussed in chapter three. Still other definitions of 
exploitation depend on the presence of a coercive relationship: 
"Exploitation forms part of an exchange of goods and services when (1) 
the goods and services exchanged are quite obviously not of 
equivalent value, and (2) one party to the exchange uses a substantial 
degree of coercion.” (Moore, 1973: 53) 
Although the presence of coercion within an interaction leads us to be suspicious about an 
interaction, coercion is not one of the conditions of exploitation and does not lead us to the 
automatically label an interaction as being exploitative.   
This thesis is written from a philosophical bioethical perspective to focus on the issue of 
exploitation specifically relating to clinical trials within developing countries. Although the 
issue of exploitation has been discussed extensively in the literature, this thesis will use a 
normative definition of exploitation and will define exploitation from an unfairness 
perspective. A comprehensive analysis of the topics relevant to exploitation and the ethics of 
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clinical trials in developing countries will be presented. The normative definition of 
exploitation which will be applied within the thesis defines exploitation as the unfair use of 
one individual (or group of individuals) by another. This approach will be used for several 
reasons. To begin with, there are no hard set rules when it comes to research ethics. There 
are no absolute standards which allow the performance of a given trial within one country or 
certain part of the world and prevent it in another. Hence decisions regarding the 
permissibility of any given trial within developing countries (or any other country for that 
matter) depend on moral judgements. These judgements vary between different people and 
different cultures because they are based on moral judgements which assess whether a 
certain interaction is fair or unfair. The judgement of whether a given trials is permissible 
within a certain culture or region is made by a group of people charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing trial proposals and serving as review board members. The 
decisions made by these members should focus on the fairness of the interaction between 
both the potential trial participants and their communities on the one hand and the 
researchers/sponsors on the other. If exploitation is defined as “unfair use”, it follows then 
that the assessment of whether an interaction is exploitative or not can be answered by 
assessing whether an interaction if fair or unfair. Secondly, there are social influences or 
forces that encourage or discourage the tolerance of a given act. Thirdly, there are 
differences between the beliefs and cultural norms between the sponsors of the trials (from 
industrialised countries) and the recruited populations (from developing countries). 
Furthermore, exploitation does not necessarily mean the infliction of harm on the exploited 
person, nor does it mean the instrumental use of the exploited. Also the benefit to the so 
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called “exploiter”, more specifically the researcher/sponsor within this setting, does not 
necessarily mean that the relationship between the two parties is necessarily exploitative.  
In order to justify the choice of the normative approach, clarifications need to be made 
regarding how unfairness is defined. To reach that goal, and simplify the flow of the 
arguments within this thesis, unfairness will be assessed from two different perspectives: a 
procedural perspective and an outcome perspective (Wertheimer, 2010). The procedural 
perspective, however, will be presented in a novel method. This term will not focus on the 
procedures followed for the approval of trial proposals as the title may imply. Instead it will 
be used to assess whether the procedures followed when obtaining informed consent from 
the potential participants fulfilled the requirements of informed consent or failed to do so. 
This approach is used to show that the concept of informed consent as being a necessary 
condition for the avoidance of exploitation is not true. Similarly, it is intended to show that a 
defective informed consent does not lead to the conclusion that the interaction is 
exploitative. The objective is to show that even if morally transformative, valid consent is 
given by potential participants, exploitation may still be lurking in the shadows of the 
interaction between the trial participants and the researchers/sponsors.  
The second perspective of unfairness focuses on the outcome of the interaction and whether 
the parties involved benefit from their interaction with each other, are not affected by it, or 
are actually harmed as a result of the interaction. Hence exploitation will also be discussed 
from a post-trial perspective and whether the provision of post-trial treatment or any other 
form of benefit could be provided to the participants of the trial or their communities in 
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order to prevent exploitation and ensure outcome fairness. These two kinds of unfairness 
will be discussed separately in different chapters.  
Arguments in this thesis will put forward new positions regarding the ethical requirements of 
benefits sharing and post-trial access linking them to exploitation. Further discussion within 
the thesis will include, the requirements of an ethical review, the makeup of the review 
boards, and priority decision making in keeping with the current research ethics discussion in 
the literature.  
Hence the thesis will be made up of a total of six chapters including the current one. Chapter 
two will begin by giving a definition of exploitation and will focus on exploitation from a 
procedural perspective. The chapter will discuss the doctrine of informed consent and its 
requirements. However a broader concept of the term will be used with a focus on the 
validity of the consent, the factors that may influence it and how it can be improved. 
Furthermore the chapter will look into the issue of who should provide the informed 
consent: the trial participants themselves or the community leader. This issue arises 
particularly within developing countries given the circumstances that exist within these 
countries where the community is seen as a whole and the value of the individual consent 
does not receive the same level of importance as that seen within industrialised countries. 
Also the different types of documentation or proof of agreement of the potential participants 
that may be acceptable in developing countries will be presented. The chapter aims to argue 
that the limited approach to the requirements of informed consent leaves out the essence of 
the whole process. By focusing on how much information we should disclose to the potential 
participants and how we should document the consent of the participants, instead of 
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focusing on the method of communicating with potential participants and accepting new 
ways of documenting their agreement to be enrolled into a trial, we have turned the whole 
process into a legal one instead of the purpose it was originally created for i.e. it being a 
moral and ethical requirement. The chapter will conclude that in order for procedural 
fairness to be ensured, communication between the researchers and the potential 
participants need to be improved and the level of understanding of the potential participants 
needs to be assessed. In addition respect needs to be paid to community consent which in 
some societies replaces individual consent, however enough resilience needs to be applied to 
ensure that individuals who want to opt out of the trial are not forced into participation 
through the community consent. The chapter will also conclude that even when informed 
consent is given by the potential participants, the interaction may still be labelled as 
exploitative.    
Chapter three will discuss outcome unfairness. Discussions will revolve around the different 
possible outcomes of the interaction between the potential participants and the 
researchers/sponsors and how each links back to exploitation. In order to assess the 
outcome of this interaction we need to consider all possible outcomes of the interaction and 
assess them against each other. However even after we do that we are still left with the 
question of who is the best equipped or trained to assess the acceptability of these different 
outcomes. I intend to show through the arguments presented within this chapter that the 
decision regarding the acceptability of the risks and benefits of any given trial should be done 
by the potential participants or at least by local review boards. 
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Chapter four will examine benefits that could be anticipated form the trial. This will be done 
from two broad perspectives: post-trial access and post-trial benefit. From a post-trial access 
perspective, discussions will consider the questions of who should have access to the proven 
intervention after the trial has ended, if any, based on the duties owed by the 
researchers/sponsors to the trial participants. If the provision of the proven intervention is 
seen as an action owed by the researchers/sponsors to their trial participants then we will 
have to address the issues of how long these interventions should be supplied for and to 
which population specifically. We will also need to address whether other groups within the 
community should be granted access to those proven interventions. It is intended to show in 
this chapter that the post-trial access approach views benefit from a very narrow perspective 
and may not even be practical. Hence a better approach is to adopt the post-trial benefit 
approach and include other forms of benefit which may not be directed to the potential 
participants only but may extend to include their communities.   
Chapter five will focus on the role of research ethics committees in the prevention of 
exploitation. These review boards are known by different names. Some of these names 
include: institutional review boards (IRB), independent ethics committee (IEC), ethics review 
committees (ERC), or research ethics committees (REC). For the purposes of this thesis the 
term research ethics committees (REC) will be used when referring to the research ethics 
review boards. The role of RECs in the prevention of participant exploitation will also be 
discussed. The focus will be on whether the makeup of these committees aids them in 
performing this task or not. In addition, the issue which is frequently brought about 
regarding the discrepancies between the decisions of different RECs, the factors that lead to 
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these differences, and how they could be prevented will be discussed. It is intended to argue 
that these differences in decisions between different RECs should not be seen as a wrong 
outcome. The reasons behind these discrepancies may be the input of cultural and local 
beliefs rather than the process of assessment itself.    
Chapter six will provide an overall summary of all the arguments presented within the 
preceding chapters. 
Generally the thesis aims to show through argumentation that exploitation of trial 
participants within developing countries does not exist due to the health care settings within 
these countries or due to the risk of harm they may be exposed to during the trial, but rather 
due to the lack of social value to the communities involved. My vision is that the scope of 
post-trial benefit should be widened to include reductions in the 10/90 gap. By focusing our 
attention at improving the health care services within the hosting country and gearing our 
trials towards agents with potential for curing diseases burdening these countries, we can 
help developing countries more effectively.   
Many different references will be used throughout the thesis. The selection of the references 
will based on their historical importance within research ethics, their impact on the 
advancements of research ethics, as well as the widespread recognition. 
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Chapter Two: Exploitation & Procedural 
Unfairness 
Introduction: 
The most common accusation made against trials sponsored from developed countries being 
carried out in developing countries is that they exploit the trial participants. The most general 
meaning of the word “exploitation” is the use of something or someone (usually referred to 
as the exploited), for the advantage of another, (usually referred to as the exploiter), in an 
unfair way. In a clinical trial the potential exploiters may include the sponsors of the trial, the 
researchers, the researchers’ teams, the institution where the trial will be carried out as well 
as the potential beneficiaries in developed countries. On the other hand, participants of that 
specific trial or their entire community account for the potential person or people being 
exploited.  
People tend to use the term exploitation rather loosely to mean different things. It can mean 
using someone or something for a specific purpose. For example, we can say that “the 
researcher exploits his intelligence while preparing for his clinical trial”. This statements does 
not impose any moral judgement about the character of the researcher or his actions. The 
action of using ones intelligence does not imply immoral behaviours because although it is 
driven by the benefit to the user, it does not in fact involve the use of another person but 
rather involves the use of a specific inanimate object or character. The researcher uses part 
of his own abilities in order to gain benefit. This notion is what Wertheimer defined as a 
 22 
 
morally neutral sense of exploitation (Resnik, 2003: 235). On the other hand, the non-morally 
neutral sense of exploitation refers to taking unfair advantage of someone i.e. a person. 
Within the non-morally neutral sense of exploitation, the exploiter uses the other for the 
sake of self-benefit. But the mere action of use once again does not mean that exploitation 
exists within the interaction even if it was with the intent of gaining benefit through the 
interaction. There has to be another element in combination with the use of another that 
makes us define the use itself as being exploitative. This missing element is the “unfairness” 
of that use. This is the kind of exploitation that we will be concerned with here. Hence the 
definition of exploitation which will be used throughout this thesis will be: “A exploits B by 
taking unfair advantage of B”.  
The normative approach to exploitation specifies two necessary conditions for an interaction 
to be defined as exploitative. The first condition is that the exploited person must have an 
element of desperation or the exploited person must be in a state where no options are 
available other than the exploitative interaction. Furthermore, the gain obtained by the 
exploiter must be morally problematic and motivated by taking opportunity of the unfair 
circumstances that the exploited person exists within.  
This chapter will focus on the issue of procedural unfairness. Traditionally the term 
“procedural fairness” refers to the procedures followed by RECs during the ethical appraisal 
of trial proposals, and the fairness and reliability of these procedures (Wertherimer, 2010). 
However, the term “procedural” in this chapter will be considered from a fresh perspective. 
The term will be used to consider whether the procedures and processes involved in 
obtaining informed consent fulfil the fairness criteria. The focus of the arguments will be to 
 23 
 
disprove the argument that defective consent is a necessary condition for unfairness and 
hence exploitation. Hence the chapter will focus on three perspectives relating to informed 
consent and procedural unfairness. The first perspective is that defective consent is not a 
necessary condition for exploitation. Along the same line of thought, it is emphasised that 
informed consent of individual potential participants does not mean that the interaction 
between the two can be classified as being fair and non-exploitative. Obtaining informed 
consent from potential participants is a requirement which needs to be fulfilled due to the 
ethical appraisal of trial proposals through the traditional meaning of assurance of 
procedural fairness. Through this process however, attention is focused on the type and kind 
of information that needs to be conveyed to the potential participants in order to ensure 
that no individual is recruited into a trial without their agreement. The second perspective of 
the chapter will be the essential adaptation of a shift of the researchers’ emphasis on the 
importance of communication with the potential trial participants instead of how much and 
what information needs to be disclosed to the potential participants. The third perspective of 
the chapter will be the importance of community consent. The chapter will present an  
argument that within certain societies, community consent could be taken to replace 
individual consent if the concept of individual consent does not exists within the community 
or is rejected by it. This should be done to ensure respect for the different cultural and 
societal diversities. However, certain individuals within that community may have different 
perspectives about their own consent. They may either want to be excluded from the trial 
despite of community consent or may request to be enrolled regardless of the community’s 
refusal to give consent. With these excising possibilities, the researchers should 
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accommodate for such situations. At the same time, enough attention should be paid to 
settings where oppressive regimes may prevent individuals within these societies from 
voicing their reluctance to participation in any given trial especially if the fear of social 
retribution exists. Hence while it is not always necessary to obtain individual consent, 
researchers/sponsors must respect competent refusals and ensure that the individuals have 
the opportunity to refuse. 
In order to understand this definition of exploitation and explain why the interaction 
between potential participants from developing countries and the researchers/sponsors may 
be labelled as being unfair we need to be very clear about what “unfairness” precisely 
means. 
Unfairness: 
We mentioned earlier that the general definition of non-morally neutral exploitation is the 
unfair use of one person by another in order for the earlier party to gain benefit. If 
exploitation is linked to taking unfair advantage of another person, we need to be clear 
about the meaning of the word “unfair”. Hawkins and Emanuel present two basic formations 
that make interactions exploitative (Hawkins & Emanuel, 2008). The first one they mention 
refers to situations where the terms of the interactions are themselves wrongful because 
they are degrading and unfair. The second type of exploitative interactions focuses on the 
kind of vulnerabilities that surround the exploited person and which the exploiter wants to 
benefit from. However, both these types revolve around the same issues i.e. informed 
consent and how it may be affected by external factors which may place the potential 
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participant at a vulnerable situation and lead the researchers/sponsors to take advantage of 
these circumstances for their own benefit. Hence for the purposes of the discussions within 
this chapter another classification of unfairness will be used, one which provides an easier 
and broader method for assessment of “unfairness”. This method considers two different 
perspectives of unfairness: a procedural perspective and an outcome perspective 
(Wertheimer, 2010).  
However, in order to ease the flow of the arguments, only one type of unfairness will be 
discussed in this chapter, namely procedural unfairness. Outcome unfairness will be 
discussed separately in the next chapter. 
Procedural unfairness: 
My account of procedural unfairness, as stated earlier, will focus on the procedural aspect in 
the process of informed consent within the interaction between the potential participants 
and the researchers/sponsors. Through this process, the focus becomes whether the 
potential participants are given enough information and time to consider the acceptability of 
their involvement within the interaction. To ensure procedural fairness we need to consider 
the agreement between the parties involved in the interaction. In clinical trials, the 
researchers consent to partake in their relationship with the potential participants since they 
are the ones initiating the interaction and trying to recruit participants. On the other hand, 
the participants can either agree to participate, refuse to join the trial, or be recruited 
without their knowledge. Therefore some interactions may be consensual meaning that the 
potential participants agree to interact with the researcher/sponsor. Alternatively, the 
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interaction may be non-consensual where potential participants are entered into the 
interactions without their consent or without their consent being morally transformative. 
Hence the arguments which follow in this chapter will focus on the analysis of informed 
consent, its requirements, the factors that may affect the process, and the validity of the 
consent. Furthermore, the chapter will focus on the issue of who should provide the consent 
for the individual and the role of community consent in the assurance of procedural fairness.   
Informed consent: 
Informed consent was conceptualised in western countries and instated through the 
Nuremberg Code in the wake of the Nazi camp experiments to reinforce the importance of 
an individual’s right to protect oneself from harm (Nuremberg, 1949). Since the publication 
of the Belmont report, informed consent along with REC review formed the primary 
protectors of the welfare of the potential research participants (Institute of Medicine, 2002). 
Literature refers to two different meanings of informed consent (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2009: 119). The first one focuses on informed consent from an autonomous decision making 
perspective. It as a way for people to express their autonomy and right to decide what should 
and should not be done to their bodies. The purpose of informed consent is to ensure that 
the potential participants decide whether they become enrolled into a clinical trial or to 
refuse being enrolled. At the same time it means they also retain the freedom to withdraw 
from the research at will with no penalties or retributions (Emanuel et al., 2000). Informed 
consent may be defined as the translation of a person's autonomy. However, limiting the 
definition of informed consent to a person’s autonomy means many other essential factors 
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that feed into informed consent go amiss such as the allowance of others to perform actions 
that otherwise may not be permitted. In general, one solicits consent from an individual 
before initiating the interaction with them regardless of whether this interaction is harmful 
or beneficial.  
The second meaning of informed consent refers to the social rules of consent which does not 
see informed consent as an autonomous act; but sees it through the social rules of informed 
consent. Hence if the agreement of an individual cannot be defined as an informed consent 
within certain social boundaries, it cannot be given the title of informed consent but can be 
considered as an authorization for a certain action to be taken. Beauchamp and Childress 
provide an example of a mature minor to clarify this meaning of informed consent 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2009: 119). Although mature minors may provide their 
agreement for a certain procedure or intervention, this agreement cannot legally be termed 
informed consent. Hence their agreement is referred to as an authorization by that individual 
for a specific procedure or intervention to be performed. This second meaning of informed 
consent will be discussed later on in the chapter when considering community consent.  
Informed consent is an essential requirement within clinical trials. As the name implies, the 
agreement of the potential participants has two parts. The first part is reflected in the term 
“informed”. The person requested to agree to participate requires a certain amount of 
information to make a balanced, informed decision. This provision of information is generally 
considered the responsibility of the research teams. Yet, simple provision of information 
assumes that the receiver easily understands and processes the content of the information 
being presented and rationally states a preference. This is not the case in reality. Researchers 
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are obligated to give as much information to the potential participants as they want or need 
to aid them in making the most suitable decisions for themselves.  
The second part of the term “informed consent” is “consent” or the agreement given by the 
potential participant. However to say that these are the only two requirements for the 
agreement of the potential participant and to assume that each and every potential 
participant requires exactly the same amount of information cannot be further from reality. 
Multiple other factors play a role in a person's decision making process including how they 
process the information presented to them and how they evaluate the benefits and harms 
attached with the interaction. Participant relevant issues which may influence this processing 
of information may include for example, the potential participant’s level of education, the 
availability of other options to choose from, future plans, and personal beliefs. However, all 
these factors that influence the decisions made by potential participants exist worldwide and 
are not specific to developing countries. However, given the surrounding circumstances of 
potential participants within developing countries, these factors may have greater influence 
on the potential participants being recruited from these regions. The levels of education are 
generally lower within some developing countries than industrialized countries. Furthermore, 
the beliefs about the causation of illness may differ from those held by potential participants 
residing within developed countries. All these factors will be discussed in more detail later on 
in this chapter.  
Requirements of informed consent: 
The purpose of informed consent is to ensure that the potential participants decide whether 
they want to become enrolled into a clinical trial and also retain the freedom to withdraw 
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from the research at will with no penalties or retributions (Emanuel et al., 2000). This means 
that the potential participants exercise their autonomy. More recently, some individuals have 
proposed that informed consent should provide a way for potential participants to waive 
certain ethical and legal norms for the purpose of allowing invasive research (or medical) 
interventions (Manson and O'Neill, 2007). Otherwise stated, by giving informed consent an 
individual permits researchers to do things to his or her body which may not otherwise be 
allowed outside the scope of the research, either ethically or legally. In this situation, the trial 
participants suspend their right to be treated with a known proven medical intervention, 
while the researcher gains freedom to conduct the trial without fear of legal or ethical 
repercussions. Whichever way we view informed consent, certain requirements have to be 
fulfilled before we can label the agreement of the individual potential participants’ as an 
informed one and for the interaction to be labelled as a procedurally fair one. At the most 
basic level, these include three elements: Information, comprehension, and voluntariness 
(Belmont, 1979). Other elements are favored by the medical, philosophical, and 
psychological literature and include competence, disclosue, understaning, voluntariness, and 
consent. (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009: 120). The next section will simply present these 
five requirments. This will be followed by an indepth analysis as to why these requirements 
do not reflect the spirit of the whole process.  
1. Competence: 
The basic meaning of the word competence is the ability to perform a given task. This ability 
to perform may vary from situation to situation. For example a person may be competent in 
making financial decisions, but may be incompetent in making medical decisions. Hence 
 30 
 
incompetence is limited to the area where the person is incapable of making decisions. 
Furthermore, competency may vary from time to time. So a person incapable of making 
competent decisions at a given period in time may be fully competent at a later time to make 
decisions regarding the same issue. This is because competence can be affected by so many 
factors for example illnesses whether physical or psychological, or medications. Therefore, 
generalizations about competency cannot and should not be made either within clinical 
practice or within clinical trials. Yet in order for a person to make a competent decision, they 
need to understand the information being presented to them, be able to reflect on them, 
understand the consequences of their decisions, and then give their consent. Although there 
are tools and testing methods to assess the competence of individuals, they will not be 
discussed further here. Still the assessment of level of competence of potential participants is 
not routinely done unless there are reasons to lead the researchers to question the level of 
competence. If this is done it should not be because the potential participants are from 
developing countries but because the individual potential participant displays signs of lack of 
competence.  
2. Disclosure: 
Before reaching a decision regarding any given trial proposal, and to aid them in their 
decision making process, potential participants need to become reasonably knowledgeable 
about the research proposal. The researchers and their teams hold the responsibility of 
disclosing informing the potential participants about certain aspects of the research. This 
process is aimed at helping the potential participants to make choices that fit in with their 
future plans, goals and values, and evaluate the acceptability of the risks and benefits of the 
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proposed trial. The disclosure of information helps participants to better understand what is 
being asked of them so that they may reach a decision whether to accept being enrolled into 
the trial or to decline the offer. Hence the researchers/sponsors hold the responsibility of 
disclosing certain information to the potential participants. This information typically 
includes the purpose and duration of participation, procedures to be used, reasonably 
foreseeable risks, expected benefits to participant and or society, alternatives to participating 
in research, as well as others information that the potential participants need to know about 
(Sales and Folkman, 2000). 
However, through focusing on how much information to disclose in order for the level of 
understanding of the potential participants to increase, the essence of the process itself and 
the meaning of informed consent became distorted. More information needed to be 
disclosed to the potential participants due to the increasing complexity of medicine and 
science and the procedures used within the trials. The issues of focus became risk 
management, legal protections of sponsors, and adherence to federal regulations (Institute 
of Medicine, 2002: 121). It was assumed that each and every possible potential harm should 
be disclosed to the potential participants in order for any future complaints made by the 
participants to be covered by the argument that these harms were disclosed and the decision 
of the participant was informed. Although undoubtedly, information is an important factor in 
the “informed consent” process, we still need to assess whether this approach of full 
disclosure is correct and more importantly achieves the ethical requirement of “informed 
consent”. Then it has to be decided exactly how much information should be disclosed to the 
potential participants. 
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There are different views on how much information should be disclosed to the potential 
participants. A minimal standard approach may be used where an absolute minimum amount 
of information is disclosed to the potential participants regardless of any other factors that 
may influence the consent process. The problems with this approach can be seen on two 
levels. The first level is that even the minimum required information can be too much 
information. The minimum disclosed information mentioned by Sales and Folkman can be 
perceived by some potential participants as being “too much” information especially if given 
at once (Sales and Folkman, 2000). 
At another level the problem with the minimum approach is the difficulty in sustaining this 
level of disclosure by the researchers or their teams. The difficulty in the sustainability of this 
approach is that certain individual potential participants may require more information in 
order for them to make an informed decision. They simply cannot make a decision regarding 
their enrolment into the trial with the limited amount of information provided to them by 
the researchers/sponsors. In these cases giving participants minimal access to information 
does not work or seem fair. Requiring researchers to grant participants a standard kind of 
disclosure does not, as Manson and O’Neill state: "ensure that the epistemic norms of 
successful communication are met" (Manson and O'Neill, 2007: 90). Furthermore, there is 
no agreement as to what exactly constitutes minimum required information. 
The other approach which the researchers and their teams could apply regarding the 
disclosure of information to potential participants is the full disclosure approach. Here the 
researchers and their teams tell the potential participants about each and every single detail 
within the trial proposal. This approach however also fails in ensuring that “informed” 
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consent is given by the potential participants. Giving too much information to potential 
participants could hamper their understanding rather than improve it (Jansen, 2014: 31).   
"As you keep on explaining, you come to a point where they get lost. 
The major areas dissolve out of their mind ....... they might follow you 
at first but as you keep going, you lose them .... if you talk for five 
whole minutes you will lose them." (Molyneux et al., 2004: 2555) 
Both of these approaches fail to ensure that the “informed” part of consent is incorporated 
into the agreement given by the potential participants. One study has shown that both 
potential participants and researchers place little weight on the value of informed consent 
anyway (Lidz et al., 1983). They see it as a form to be signed by the potential participants.  
The main purpose for its existence was dismissed by both the participants and the 
researchers. Furthermore, the method of presentation of the required information to the 
potential participants is also problematic. Studies have shown that the researchers 
themselves focus on certain information and tend to dismiss others. For example, Cousino 
and colleagues found that the information being emphasized within a phase I paediatric 
research included drug safety, dose findings, and dose escalation (Cousino, 2012).  
There are three different standards of disclosure which have been considered from both a 
legal and an ethical perspective. Each will be presented separately (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2009: 122). 
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2.1 The professional practice standard:  
This standard of disclosure considers that the amount of information to be disclosed to the 
patient or potential participant should be left to the discretion of the health care provider or 
the researcher. This is based on the concept that just like the best amount of information to 
be disclosed to a patient should be left to the health care providers, the amount of 
information to be disclosed to the potential participants should be decided by the 
researchers since they are responsible for maintaining the best interest of the participants 
throughout the trial. The problem with this approach is that it fails to realise that in so many 
situations whether within clinical settings or research settings there are often no standards 
for disclosure of information. There is no agreed upon amount of information that has to be 
disclosed before we can say that proper disclosure has been done. In addition, it cannot be 
ignored that certain health care providers or researchers failed to communicate properly 
with their patients or potential participants or may present them with inaccurate or false 
information. Furthermore, the approach relies purely on the reasonable character of the 
person in charge of disclosure and tends to forget that the final decision lies in the hands of 
the patients and the potential participants. 
2.2 The reasonable person standard:  
This approach to disclosure requires health care providers and researchers to disclose 
information based on what a reasonable person would need to make a decision. The amount 
and kind of information needs to be disclosed by the researchers based on the researcher’s 
estimation of what a “reasonable person” would want to know. The problem with this 
approach is that there is no clear definition of what a “reasonable person” is. Therefore, 
 35 
 
researchers need to depend on this hypothetical so called reasonable person in order to 
assess the information to be disclosed. The other issue with this approach is that studies 
have shown that 12% of people surveyed stated that they did not use the information 
provided to them by the researchers while making their decision (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2009: 123).     
2.3 The subjective standard 
This approach to disclosure requires researchers to disclose information to potential 
participant based on the informational needs of the potential participants. This standard is 
built on the concept that individuals needs for information differ, they relate to their past 
experiences, beliefs, and future plans. The down side to this approach is that the person 
providing the information needs to be knowledgeable about the needs of the person 
receiving the information. Hence the researchers need to be aware about the potential 
participant’s past history and beliefs for example. This is very difficult to apply in clinical trials 
given that the researchers do not know much about their potential participants. Still it is a 
much better approach than a standard disclosure based on the researcher’s or the 
reasonable person’s needs. Researchers could adapt this approach but with some changes. 
Instead of basing their tailored approach on their knowledge of the potential participants as 
physicians do with their patients, they could tailor their level of disclosure based on the 
questions being raised by the potential participants. This is perhaps the best approach to 
ensure that the level of disclosure is tailored towards the potential participant’s needs 
instead of adopting a rigid maximum or minimum approach.  
 36 
 
Commitment: 
Another important point which needs to be stressed during the presentation of information 
to the potential participants is the commitment expected from them. This is the last 
requirement that Manson and O’Neill talk about, and that is the commitment that has to 
exist within the anticipated researcher-participant relationship.  
The researcher’s commitment comes through their assurance and maintenance of the 
standards of their practice, maintenance of the best interests of their potential participants, 
and their action in accordance with their trial proposal. This commitment however can only 
become real when potential participants consent to their enrolment into the trial. Therefore, 
the researcher cannot commit for example to maintain the best interest of a potential 
participant who either does not agree to enrol into the trial or is excluded from the trial for 
other reasons. 
On the other hand potential participants are also believed to have certain commitments they 
have to meet prior to their enrolment into the trial. The first commitment expected from the 
potential participants is their understanding of the information presented to them by the 
researchers and their teams. The agreement of the potential participants to be enrolled into 
the trial has to be based on their understanding of the relevant details of the trial proposal. 
According to Manson and O’Neil’s opinion, potential participants cannot agree to be enrolled 
into the trial, if they base their decisions on misunderstandings, if they misunderstand the 
proposal, or if they convey their decision in an unintelligible way (Manson and O'Neill, 2007: 
93). This failure comes about even if the researchers meet their requirements and provide 
the essential required information. Potential participants are expected to agree to be 
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enrolled into the trial only if and when they understand the information being presented to 
them. Since this issue relates to comprehension and how it is assessed, this point will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Another commitment expected from the potential participants when enrolling into a trial 
according to Manson and O’Neill which relate to consent is that the potential participants 
should give their consent once they perceive that the researchers intend no malice towards 
them through harmful or wrongful actions. By communicating a decision to the researchers, 
the participants waive their ethical and legal rights not to have certain things done to them, 
provided the individuals concerned have understood the information presented. Someone 
who consents to being enrolled in a trial cannot later on claim that their enrolment itself into 
the trial or the investigations carried out as expressed in the trial proposal caused the harm.   
This consideration of harm does not include actual harms which may be unanticipated and 
inflicted upon the trial participants during the course of the trial. Furthermore, the potential 
participants have a commitment to follow through with their consent. They agree to 
participate in the given trial throughout its duration which they are informed about and they 
have to be committed to that agreement. Trial participants should not change their mind 
during the course of the trial and decide to withdraw from the trial for no obvious reasons. If 
participants were given this total freedom of withdrawal, and big numbers of participants 
decided to withdraw from the trial, then researchers/sponsors may find that these 
withdrawals affect the trial results leaving the results unreliable and un-generalizable. It is 
important to emphasise here that this limitation of withdrawal does not include all 
participants under all circumstances as this will go against the principles of voluntariness and 
 38 
 
informed consent. What is being called for is that participants’ withdrawals should be 
justified by rational reasons only. Furthermore, the withdrawal of participant data once 
analyses, especially if it will affect the trial results may not be guaranteed as well especially if 
the data has been annonymized. This ensures that there is commitment from both sides 
involved in the agreement. Both parties involved in the research have commitments, the 
researchers as well as the potential participants.  
Information sheets: 
Another issue which is related to disclosure is information sheets which are used as a method 
of conveying information to the potential participants. Anyone who has had to deal with 
information sheets knows that the average person finds theses sheets complicated and 
difficult to understand. This problem occurs frequently in developed country settings (Joffe 
et al., 2001; Mason and Allmark, 2000). Research which has focused on informed consent has 
found that they are, in general, “too high to achieve broad comprehension” (Institute of 
Medicine, 2002: 126; Briguglio et al., 1995; Grossman et al., 1994; Hochhauser, 1997). When 
considering developing countries and the issue of information sheets, other issues emerge 
including the amount of information contained within the consent forms, the language used, 
and the beliefs people in developing countries hold towards causality of disease (Lynoe et al., 
2001).  
Typically all the required information is given in the information sheet. These documents 
were adopted because of a need to protect potential participants from abuse or coercion and 
to prevent their participation in something against their will. The need to protect potential 
participants from developing countries from coercion is just as important, if not more 
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important, to emphasize as in industrialized countries. Because of all the negative 
circumstances surrounding people in these countries ranging from political regimes to grave 
poverty, accompanied by the need to instil better healthcare services in communities there, 
researchers should ensure that the potential participants being approached act freely and 
willingly when deciding to participate in a trial. Hawkins certainly agrees with this, she states: 
"even if informed consent is a Western practice reflecting Western 
values, it is worth remembering that RCTs are also a Western practice 
that reflect Western values…….It would not be surprising to discover 
that a community with no tradition of research will have had no prior 
need to develop a practice of individual consent. But it would be too 
hasty to assume that it would not benefit from having a practice such 
as informed consent in place when it begins to participate in research." 
(Hawkins and Emanuel, 2008: 27) 
First of all, information sheets are generally very long, often exceeding twelve pages (Creed-
Kanashiro et al., 2005: 926). This issue does not reside only within developing countries. In 
fact, problems associated with lengthy information sheets also surface in developed 
countries. Overly long forms tie into the sponsor’s emphasis on covering all the legal aspects 
(Flory and Emanuel, 2004). Whereas the focus of these documents should be the moral 
aspect of the informed consent process and how to simplify the information to the potential 
participants in order for them to make an enlightened decision. It should be ensured, usually 
by the REC, that information sheets do not overwhelm participants with confusing 
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information and that the document contains wording that is understandable and clear to the 
intended reader. Therefore, researchers and their teams should draft substantially shorter 
versions of these documents. 
Secondly, information sheets are usually written up in industrialized countries meaning that 
the research teams must first translate the document into the local language before 
potential participants can be expected to understand the information given to them and 
make an informed decision. Although the researchers are responsible for providing a 
translated informed consent form, the REC holds the responsibility of verifying that an 
accurate translation has occurred. Therefore, some argue that the REC within the host 
country should draft the documents for a particular trial because the REC members know 
better how to relate research information to the population concerned in an appropriate 
language and in a simple form. Adopting this practice of course may not meet standards set 
by the developed countries or receive approval from the trial sponsor because of the legal 
value of these documents in developed countries. 
The researchers may have to resort to local translation offices and deal with inevitable 
problems arising from literal translation whereby the essence of the information does not 
necessarily get properly reflected in the final document. As a result, the potential 
participants may miss some of the essential information deemed important for their 
understanding of the research. Asking an expert from the industrialised country or someone 
from the research team in the developing country where the trial will be performed to 
review the translation may resolve the problem. Another recommendation aimed at reducing 
the risk of losing meaningful information involves the translation of the documents initially 
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from English to the other language and then back to English again. Any misrepresented, 
inaccurate, or totally missed information should become apparent in the final translation. 
Furthermore, the potential participant should receive all the essential information verbally 
and in writing (and perhaps in other forms like video tapes, if available) in a language that is 
easily understood by a lay person or a non-scientifically oriented person.  
3. Understanding: 
The next step in the informed consent process is the assessment of the level of 
understanding of the potential participants. Studies have shown that potential participant 
understanding of the information presented to them varies considerably. For example one 
study showed that despite the fact that the potential participants stated that they were 
happy about the informed consent process, three fourths of the participants did not know 
what unproven intervention means while one fourth of the participants thought that the 
purpose of the trial was to benefit them directly and not future patients or populations (Joffe 
at al., 2001). How well participants understand the information presented to them by the 
researchers or their team is influenced by many factors. Before analysing the factors that 
may affect the understanding of the potential participants, we have to specify exactly what 
level of participant understanding should be accepted by the researchers and their teams. In 
extreme situations, the highest level of understanding could be required where potential 
participants are required to understand every single detail about the trial and its processes. 
However in such cases, the goal itself may not be realistically attainable. No single potential 
participant will completely understand each and every aspect of the proposed trial. If this 
approach is acquired, the researchers/sponsors may face extreme difficulty in recruiting the 
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required number of participants not because none of them understand the trial proposal but 
because the threshold of level of understating has been set too high to be achieved. This also 
means that large numbers of potential participants may be excluded from the trial for that 
same reason.  
Alternatively, lower levels of potential participant understanding may be acceptable. Hence 
the question we need to answer is: Can we accept enrolling potential participants who 
understand only part of the proposal, or understand the general essence of the proposal but 
who still fail to grasp certain aspects of it? People make choices and understand information 
from subjective bearings based on so many factors such as their values, future plans, and 
mindsets at the time of decision making. As long as the potential participants understand 
that they agree to participate in research rather than see the trial as an offer of treatment, 
recognise their right to accept or refuse participation, and know the kind and level of risk 
involved, then assessing the level of understanding becomes the responsibility of the 
individual participant. 
Getting key messages across to a participant demands proper communication between 
individuals involved rather than the simple telling of certain information. Disclosure without 
further focus on the needs of the potential participant assumes that the recipient of the 
information takes in and understands all that is presented, which is not always the case. The 
level of understanding of information varies from one person to another due to several 
factors that may have direct relevance to a potential participant such as his or her beliefs, 
anxiety, ignorance about certain facts, or lack of knowledge of the consequences of certain 
actions. External factors affecting the level of understanding might include for example 
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ambiguities in the use of terminology where certain terms can be applied in different 
situations with different meanings, or interpersonal distinctions exist in the way terms are 
interpreted e.g. the term randomization. Therefore, different people will receive the same 
information in different ways. Some of the factors thought to influence a person’s 
comprehension include his or her rationality, level of education, and beliefs regarding the 
causation of illness. Each of these factors will be discussed in further detail below.  
3.1 Rationality: 
Rationality is the possession or utilization of reason or logic to analyse information and reach 
a decision about a specific situation. However, rationality occupies a much broader space 
than logic. Logic is the process of reasoning. It is “concerned with analysing the patterns of 
reasoning by which a conclusion is properly drawn from a set of premises, without reference 
to meaning or context” (Collins English Dictionary, 2003). Rationality, on the other hand, 
includes other aspects such as past experiences, beliefs, and expectations. According to 
Sanford Encyclopaedia of philosophy, rationality is: “the general human capacity for 
resolving, through reflection, the question of what to do” (Sanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy). Humans can only make rational decisions that fit in with their own personal 
values and future plans and can visualize how a scenario will play out for them only when 
given sufficient information about the situation in the first place (Verastegui, 2006). 
However, rationality does not depend on information entirely in each and every situation. 
Rationality entails assessing the best outcome based on the circumstances and situations 
surrounding a person. Therefore, a person can make a rational decision without possessing a 
 44 
 
lot of information. Acquiring information is just one of the aspects needed to make a rational 
choice (Savulescu and Momeyer, 1997). Other factors that come into play in reaching a 
rational decision include entering into a rational argument and having rational beliefs.   
The rationality behind any given decision is not judged by agreement or disagreement with 
the presenter of the information. The refusal or acceptance to participate also does not 
justify placing the rationality of that person under suspicion. The rationality of the decision is 
based on the person's perspective of what he or she believes is good for himself or herself 
according to a number of factors outside the information provided by researchers. These 
factors may include employment, future plans, and family circumstances. Respecting a 
person’s choice or autonomy includes the respect for his or her decision which may seem 
irrational to another but makes perfect sense to the person making that choice.  
In developed and developing countries alike, people of adult age with full decision making 
capacity may be assumed rational except when certain conditions apply that reduce the 
individual’s decisional capacity such as an illness affecting cognitive abilities. Therefore, if 
people in developing countries are assumed rational, then they will make rational decisions 
dependent on receiving appropriate information and their personal values and future plans, 
among other factors.  
3.2 Level of Education: 
It is assumed that the higher the level of education possessed by an individual, the easier it 
may be for the researcher to achieve good communication with that person and 
consequently, the more likely he or she will understand and process the information being 
presented. I do not believe that a higher level of education guarantees better 
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comprehension, nor does illiteracy mean a lower level of comprehension. Issuing a blanket 
statement suggesting all populations in developing countries are poorly educated has no 
foundation. The problems faced by the researchers in developed countries regarding the 
comprehension level of potential participants may parallel those within developing countries 
if we consider only level of education and the way it affects command of knowledge. 
Admittedly, a potential participant with a higher level of education may have a broader level 
of knowledge and may understand some of the concepts of the trial more easily than the 
potential participant with a lower level of education. However, this does not lead us to 
conclude that the later does not understand the information or that his or her level of 
understanding will not increase when proper explanation is performed by the researchers or 
their team. In such cases what is required from the research team is a simplified provision of 
the information and more tailored sessions to ensure that the potential participants 
understand the information and the basic concepts of the trial. Hence, from the point of view 
of an individual’s comprehension, a low level of education although perhaps influential, does 
not necessarily hinder understanding of the material presented. It only means that in this 
case, the researchers and their team need to put in an extra effort to ensure better 
communication with potential participants by providing the information in a simple 
understandable fashion.  
3.3 Beliefs about causation of illness: 
Some people in developing countries maintain nonconventional beliefs about the causes of 
illness and methods of treatment. They may believe for example that traditional 
interventions are more effective than medical interventions or pharmaceutical agents. Some 
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populations see illness as evil work caused by spells or magic (Carteret, 2008). One can 
clearly see how this kind of belief system can affect informed consent and the understanding 
of information presented to potential participants. In such cases the researcher may have a 
harder time explaining the purpose and goal of the research to the potential participants 
(Truog et al., 1999: 149). It has to be stated though that the existence of these beliefs does 
not mean that the potential participants will not understand what is being presented. Rather 
it implies the need for a more comprehensive approach by the researchers and their team to 
ensure that the information is understood by the potential participants.  
Another potentially complicating issue which links to the beliefs of the potential participants, 
and relates to the health care system existing within those countries, is the perception of the 
role of the health care providers and the interaction between the members of the public with 
the health care providers within developing countries. People living in developing countries 
see contact with a health care provider as an opportunity for treatment. The concept of 
interacting with the health care provider, in the role of a researcher, with the aim of being 
recruited into a trial does not exist. The idea of research does not enter into their culture. 
The members of the public see the interaction with the health care providers as an 
opportunity for receiving treatments. They do not perceive that a heath care provider may 
take on another role which may not provide direct benefit to the individual person. This point 
will be discussed in more detail later on in chapter four when discussing the confusion 
between the physician-patient relationship and the researcher-participant relationship. Still 
the understanding of the potential participants cannot be said to remain stagnant. It may be 
improved through the efforts of the researchers and their team. How much information they 
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provide, and how much effort they put into its simplification and the assurance of 
understanding of the potential participants has a major impact on the level of understanding 
of the potential participants.  
4. Voluntariness: 
Voluntariness is generally evaluated in the context of the presence of adequate knowledge, 
absence of psychological compulsion, and absence of external constraints (Feinberg, 1973: 
48). However, Beauchamp and Childress only consider external constraints in their analysis 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2009: 132). Through this focus on external constraints of factors 
that may have an impact on the voluntariness of the decision made by the potential 
participants three have the most influence. These include deception, coercion, and 
persuasion.    
Deception and manipulation: 
In some circumstances the researcher/sponsors may decide not to disclose all the relevant 
information because they fear that giving out too much information may frighten the 
potential participants and lead them to decide not to take part in the trial. This leads the 
researchers/sponsors to withhold certain information in order to encourage participants to 
accept being enrolled into the trial. This sometimes occurs when the clinical trial is 
complicated and contains too many technical steps. Therefore, the team avoids under-
recruiting by concealing some information which may actually influence a participant’s 
choice. This act is also known as manipulation: to adapt or change something to suit one’s 
purpose or advantage (Free dictionary). This argument of withholding certain information 
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from potential participants for fear of under-recruitment is not supported by evidence from 
the literature. Furthermore, by performing such an action and by leading the potential 
participants to make certain choices, the voluntariness of the decisions made by the 
potential participants is questioned but not its rationality. The potential participants made 
certain choices based on the information being presented to them. Although these decisions 
may be rational, the simple fact that the potential participants may make different choices if 
they had access to further information means that the choices made under manipulation and 
deception are not voluntary ones and hence fail from a procedural fairness perspective.   
Coercion: 
Coercion means to compel someone to act against his will by intimidation or threats (Freed 
dictionary). According to Hawkins and Emanuel, coercion has two elements. The first is the 
set of options available and the second is the interference by others (Hawkins and Emanuel, 
2008: 25). It is perhaps the second element which is more important within the interaction 
between the researcher/sponsors and the potential participants. Do the researchers 
interfere with the choices made by the individuals, threaten them, or intimidate them in 
order to make them agree to participate in a trial? Although one could make up a scenario 
where the researcher intimidates the potential participants into participation by mentioning 
that they would become worse off if they refuse to enrol, this does not take place in reality. 
The researchers have no input or influence on the existing conditions within developing 
countries, they do however present offers to the potential participants who under the 
existing circumstances may see them as very attractive and irresistible. However, it does not 
mean that the researchers/sponsors coerce the participants by simply offering them a 
 49 
 
chance to improve their situation. Even when someone's available choices are narrowed 
significantly he or she may still reach an informed voluntary decision based on the limited 
information available at the time the decision is made. 
Persuasion:  
Persuasion is the change of a person’s belief through the influence of another’s arguments. 
The influence that occurs has to be done through the use of reason rather than emotions. 
Although in the majority of interactions between the potential participants and the 
researchers, the arguments presented by the researcher and their teams would have an 
impact on the opinions of the potential participants, the problem with this point is that its 
results may be inconsistent especially within issues related to health care. Where a certain 
argument may have a positive impact on a particular potential participant’s opinion, the 
same argument may hinder the decision making process when presented to another 
potential participant.   
Having presented the factors that may influence the voluntariness of any given potential 
participant; we need to now focus on the issues of whether populations of developing 
countries can act voluntarily or not. The governments in many developing countries have 
very limited resources and this is reflected most obviously in the kind of services provided for 
the populations within those regions. Health care is often one of the areas showing shortages 
of resource. Many of the basic medical therapies for conditions that affect the population do 
not exist or there are very few available options. 
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The health care systems existing within developing countries lead us to wonder if people who 
agree to participate in clinical trials do so because they want to help their community, or 
because it is the only way they can get any kind of health care services. Desperately ill people 
who have no hope of receiving any kind of treatment from their own government will seek 
any opportunity for help, which brings the issue of voluntariness into the discussion. To know 
whether individuals within developing countries are capable of making voluntary decision we 
need to first look at the concept of vulnerability and proceed from there. In a broad sense 
vulnerability means: 
"Vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or absolutely) 
incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may 
have insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or 
other needed attributes to protect their own interests." (CIOMS, 2002: 
44) 
So, by definition, people in developing countries are likely to be defined as vulnerable. They 
have less power than the researchers/sponsors coming from the west and face shortages of 
basic health care services. Therefore, it is perhaps more appropriate to question why 
researchers choose vulnerable populations in the first place. Researchers usually carry out 
studies anywhere and enrol their populations with the aim of benefiting that specific 
population. They seek to find a treatment option that best suits the population concerned. A 
clinical trial aspiring to help people in developing countries must recruit its participants from 
that particular setting because the research population has to represent the people destined 
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to benefit from the results; i.e. the participants will have to come from what are termed 
vulnerable populations. 
Assuming this to be the case then we need to assess whether vulnerable people can make a 
voluntary choice. Indeed many argue that vulnerable people cannot provide voluntary 
consent because of their specific circumstances. Emmanuel presents one such argument: 
"You can tell a person [in a poor developing country] that this is 
research, but they hear that they have a chance to get health care. 
How can you put them in that position and then say they are giving 
informed consent?" (Emanuel et al., 2005: 336) 
Emmanuel’s quote highlights the absence of voluntariness in these situations. Rothman also 
argues that: 
"Abject poverty is harsh enough without people having to bear the 
additional burdens of serving as research subjects." (Rothman, 2000: 
92) 
I would argue differently. Having many choices or fewer alternatives to choose from does not 
define the voluntariness of a given decision. Although a difference exists between having no 
treatment option and having few options to choose from makes the person’s decision easier 
to reach, potential participants can still make informed voluntary choices despite these 
restrictions. The first scenario where few alternative interventions exist somehow parallels 
the situation in other countries and is not peculiar to developing countries. Potential 
participants invited to take part in a trial can make a choice regardless of whether the 
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treatment is superior to the existing alternative. If we assume that a state of equipoise exists, 
then even the researchers do not know the outcome of the trial. What the potential 
participants are asked to do is the acceptance to be enrolled into a trail to prove the 
effectiveness or superiority of the new intervention in comparison with existing ones. Hence 
the issue is not whether many, or few, options are available outside the scope of the trial. 
The issue is about the freedom of choice made by these potential participants. Many people 
have had to make health related decisions or choices when few options existed for them. 
Pace argues along these same lines. She argues that many of us have had to make a choice at 
some point in our life where our options were restricted. She states:  
"We have all made decisions when we felt our choices were 
constrained or defined by the situation or the needs of those 
surrounding us, and yet we could still make a voluntary choice." (Pace 
and Emanuel, 2005: 12) 
I agree with Pace and believe that there is a difference between having constrained choices 
and being coerced or forced to do something we do not want to do. Most importantly, a 
potential participant makes a choice that is free from any external pressures, coercion, or 
deception. Therefore, decisions made in the absence of these external factors can be 
assumed to be fair at least from a procedural perspective.  
The second scenario, where no treatment options are available to the population, raises 
more concerns. People in developing countries without existing treatments who are 
approached by researchers asking for their consent to participate in a trial may perceive 
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volunteering as the only way to get treatment for their illness. For many desperate 
individuals enrolling seems like a better option than refusing to participate when no other 
treatment alternatives exist. These potential participants agree to be enrolled into the trial 
despite the chance of them being allocated in the placebo arm of the trial. They enrol in the 
study with the hope of receiving therapy and being placed in the active arm of the trial. In 
reality, however, this hope of being placed within the active arm of the trial may also be a 
hidden wish of potential participants within developed countries as well. Emanuel seems to 
think that because people in some developing countries have no access to health care 
services that they are simply incapable of giving informed consent. However, Emanuel’s 
argument is mistaken. Although his views may apply to some potential participants, it cannot 
be generalised to all populations. It cannot be assumed that all poor people lack the capacity 
to give voluntary informed consent because of deficiencies in health care services. Taking this 
stance would leave a large proportion of potential participants out of the equation, even 
those within the developed part of the world. To prove the wrongness of the link between 
the lack of options and the voluntariness of the choices made by potential participants, a 
parallel scenario from a clinical situation will be presented. Within some medical conditions, 
only one treatment option may be available for the patient. This treatment option may or 
may not carry a high risk of failure or complications. In such cases the patient’s decision to 
accept this single option cannot be defined as involuntary provided that enough information 
has been provided to the patient and the choice was reached without external forces. In such 
cases it would be difficult to argue that the decision made by the patient is an involuntary 
one. If we did, then we would be arguing that voluntary consent can only be achieved if 
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several options are available to choose from. This would be a very difficult argument to 
defend not to mention the unrealistic approach it is taking. The reality of the matter is that 
even when we say that only one option exists, we are forgetting that the alternative is 
refusing that option. The patient may still choose not to go ahead with the treatment option. 
The same argument applies to clinical trials. Even if no options of treatment exist outside the 
scope of the trial, the potential participants’ decisions cannot be defined as involuntary 
blindly and for the simple reason of the in-availability of further options. These potential 
participants may still refuse to participate in the trial. Participants in developing countries are 
desperate for treatment. Agreeing to participate in the research by giving consent gives these 
people some hope of improving their situation. As Hawkins points out: 
"Given the non-ideal background conditions under which people find 
themselves, there should be a very strong presumption in favour of the 
principles that would allow people to improve their situation if they 
give appropriately robust consent, if doing so has no negative effects 
on others." (Hawkins and Emanuel, 2008: 84) 
Using Hawkins point of view to contradict Rothman’s earlier arguments opens the question: 
because of the abject poverty that people in developing countries suffer from, is it fair to 
deny them access to what may be the only chance they have at improving their 
circumstances and receiving the benefits of a clinical trial? According to Hawkins, the 
unfairness lies in denying potential participants the potential benefits of the trials and not 
the other way around. Despite the harsh circumstances surrounding vulnerable populations, 
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these people can still reason and assess their options. Participating in research may be the 
only perceived route for receiving any kind of treatment even if given for only a short period 
of time, and the person may still make an informed voluntary choice in this case. 
Furthermore, if the trial itself is intended for the benefit of these vulnerable populations, 
there is no alternative but to recruit them as participants into the trial. The best approach 
would be the assurance of their understanding of the information being presented to them 
and the nature of the trial. We all face difficult situations in which we have to make choices. 
This does not mean that we reach our decisions involuntarily.    
Citizens of developing countries become regarded as vulnerable when their situation 
deprives them of so many basic services taken for granted by people living in the developed 
world; yet implying that it is better not to let these people choose freely whether to enrol in 
a study that might benefit them, or harm them in some cases, is difficult to justify. Rather 
increasing the available options gives people more space to exercise their right to choose or 
their autonomy. Vulnerable people can make a voluntary decision even when only a few 
choices or one choice exist.  
Perhaps a larger obstacle to the voluntariness of the decisions made by the potential 
participants is the nature of physician-patient relationships existing in developing countries. 
The way this relationship is perceived within developing countries may present a bigger 
stumbling block for researchers. The relationship between the patient and the health care 
provider within some developing countries health care setting still takes on a paternalistic 
tone. The necessity to get informed consent does not exist in some developing countries. 
People in these countries still view the health care provider as an all knowing individual and 
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rarely question the decisions made by their doctors. In fact it is considered inappropriate to 
question a doctor (Molyneux et al, 2004: 2551). Other factors which prevent people from 
asking question include trust and fear of the health care providers (Molyneux et al, 2004: 
2553). Cases where consent is taken and grounded by patient signing a form may hardly 
classify as an informed decision. Such individuals receive very little or no information; they 
are given the form to sign and that is it. No questions are asked and certainly no information 
is volunteered from the health care provider. The potential participants feel it inappropriate 
to question health care providers and fear repercussions from doing so such as abandonment 
and termination of treatment. This barrier may be hard to break down and voluntariness 
sustained when the potential participants view the researcher or health care provider as the 
one who knows best.   
5. Consent: 
The next step in obtaining informed consent is the signing of the informed consent form. 
Once the participants understand the information at a level acceptable to them, and the 
researchers and their teams are satisfied that the potential participants understand the 
information presented to them, the potential participants then grant the researchers 
permission to enrol them into the trial. Usually, a written form of consent is taken, an 
approach particularly applied by sponsors from developed countries that worry about the 
legal more than ethical requirements of the consent process. Another study showed that one 
out of seven participants admitted they did not even read the consent form before signing it 
(Getz and Borfitz, 2002). Hence the same arguments made about information sheets and 
how shorter versions should be drafted and the assurance that the essential information 
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existing within the document, or its essence, does not get lost during the translation also 
hold for the consent forms. Also, studies have shown that potential participants find consent 
forms containing tables and more white spaces easier to understand (Sales and Folkman, 
2000). However, the circumstances in developing countries make adopting an “in writing 
only” approach to consent difficult. People in developing countries who are living under the 
rule of oppressive regimes may see signing a form, especially in a language they do not 
understand, as a threat. Some individuals may have lost some important property such as 
land or a house in the past as a result of signing a form (Creed-Kanashiro et al., 2005). So 
even if these individuals accept being enrolled in a trial, asking them to sign a form may 
actually cause them to change their minds and to refuse to be enrolled into the trial. But do 
we really need to impose such strict rules? Does informed consent mean only written 
consent? The written type of informed consent may serve well enough for those individuals 
who have no objection to signing the informed consent form. However, other options may 
be made available for those who feel uncomfortable with signing documents. I believe that 
other ways of proving that the individual gave his or her voluntary informed consent can be 
just as effective. In some cases, an individual may consent verbally instead of in writing, 
forms of ensuring this verbal consent may include videotaping the whole process or audio 
taping it. Although videotaping represents an unconventional way of obtaining agreement to 
enrol into a trial, it may help potential participants from developing countries feel less 
threatened by removing the need to sign a form. Furthermore, videotaping the process of 
informed consent could reveal the depth of communication undertaken by the 
researcher/sponsor whereas a written consent does not.  
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Also, when the review board insists on examining participant consent, video tapes show clear 
evidence of the individual himself giving the consent, whereas the REC members have no 
way of knowing whether a signature has been forged on a written consent form. There is no 
way that the review board would have the resources or the ability to check the authenticity 
of each and every signature. Therefore videotaping informed consent can be as effective as 
written consent. 
Validity of Consent: 
 Through the focus on how much information should be disclosed to the potential 
participants, and the legal requirements of informed consent, the most important ethical 
essence which is the validity of that consent, was somehow forgotten. To say that the 
researchers/sponsors’ sole responsibility is to disclose information to the potential 
participants falls short of all that is required from the researchers, their teams, and the 
sponsors. The issue has to be the assurance that the individual potential participant 
communicates and deliberates with the researchers. This communication and deliberation 
process ensures that the concerns of the potential participants and questions receive 
adequate answers which aid them in reaching an informed valid consent.  
The researcher should focus on communication rather than the simple dispensing of 
information to ensure that participants really understand what they are getting themselves 
into. I particularly like the argument presented by Manson and O’Neill because it helps us 
understand the importance of communicating with the potential participants rather than just 
disclosing a standard type and amount of information to them (Manson and O'Neill, 2007). 
They suggest that in order for proper communication to take place between the researcher 
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and the potential participant, both parties should recognise certain obligations. The 
researchers and their teams must communicate information that is intelligible, and true or 
honest. Furthermore, the information presented needs to be relevant to the audience 
(potential participants), and the researchers have to commit themselves to certain actions 
but only if consent is given by the potential participants. 
This approach complements the initial approach to informed consent even if it stems from a 
different understanding of the need for informed consent. They are basically saying that in 
order for potential participants to better understand the information presented to them, the 
researchers and their teams have to target their audience properly. If the information 
presented is irrelevant to the participants then they will stop listening and consequently 
misunderstand what is being said to them or refuse to be recruited into the trial. Therefore 
the trial itself has to be relevant to the potential population in order for the information 
being presented to be relevant and easily understood by the potential participants. In order 
to achieve this goal, a tailored approach to communication, rather than disclosure of 
information, is the most reasonable one. This approach takes into consideration the 
variations in the needs of the potential participants. In this approach the researchers provide 
a certain amount of information to all the potential participants including the major 
procedures, potential risks, benefits, and alternatives in simple forms. At the same time the 
option of providing further information in greater detail is still made available to the 
potential participants (Institute of Medicine, 2002: 124). The suggested approach is that the 
researchers and their teams tailor how much extra information is disclosed and how much 
more detail and explanation is offered to the potential participants depending on the 
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participants demand or need for extra information. Individuals who seek further details 
about the research by asking a lot of question deserve to receive answers to their queries 
from the researchers or their teams. Yet, potential participants not wanting more 
information should not be forced to receive further details that may confuse them rather 
than help them make a decision. This does not mean that their level of understanding of the 
information provided to them should not be assessed. All it means is that the focus should be 
on communication and mutual understanding rather than two unilateral actions of disclosure 
and reception of information (Atkinson, 2000; Coulter, 1999).  
“Ideally, the disclosure of information during the informed consent 
process takes place as a bilateral process involving an exchange of 
questions and answers between a research participant and research 
investigator. This interplay is an important and potentially challenging 
process, as it requires the person obtaining consent to gauge the 
appropriate level of language and technical detail suitable for the 
participant’s understanding” (Institute of Medicine, 2002: 124) 
Therefore, the real pressure is on the researchers and their teams to present just the right 
amount of information to each individual to aid him or her in reaching a sound decision. An 
individual's need for further information may become clearer when the potential participant 
asks for further details. This approach parallels the approach used in clinical settings where 
patients have individual requirements for information and further information is provided 
based on individual needs. 
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Through this communication process, the information being provided to the potential 
participants has to be presented in an easily digestible and comprehendible form for the 
audience at hand i.e. presented in an appropriate language, and given in small bits and in 
different ways. Providing a lot of information to the potential participants at once may lead 
to confusion or misunderstanding of the information being presented. Therefore, asking 
potential participants to read and understand all the information presented to them in one 
session is an unrealistic request. Participants should be given adequate time to consider 
whether they want to participate in the trial plus be given more sessions to fully grasp and 
understand the goals and merits of the trial, its risks and benefits, and how participants are 
to be divided among the different arms of the trial. This increased interaction between the 
potential participants and the research team will help ensure that all the concerns of the 
potential participants are adequately addressed.   
Furthermore, only factual information about the trial should be presented. This third point 
perhaps goes without saying. Only true and honest information should be presented because 
consent based on false information falls short of being informed, not to mention that it 
would be classified as being deceptive to the participants. But, what helps convince potential 
participants that they are being fed true information? The receiver of the information or the 
potential participant has to assume that the presenter or the researcher is an honest person 
who is only presenting true claims, unless compelling reasons exist to suspect otherwise. To 
help in this aspect, the knowledge that an REC has seen, assessed the research, and approved 
it may also in certain cases, enhance participant trust regarding the truthfulness of the 
information being presented. Therefore, an element of trust must exist between the 
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researcher and the potential participant, although this may not come easily given the history 
of research involving human subjects. 
Hence the focus should be on the communications process between the researchers and 
their teams and the potential participants. To improve this communication and aid the 
potential participants in reaching a decision that fits in with their plans, goals, and values, we 
need to understand the factors that may have an impact on this process i.e. factors which 
may hinder the communications process or improve it.    
This is an issue which has been recently presented by Jansen but through a fresh perspective 
(Jansen, 2014). Although her hypothesis, which relies of the mindset theory, focuses on 
participants who agree to participate in early phase cancer trials, it could easily be adopted 
on broader perspective to include other trial participants. She argues that these participants 
adopt different “mindsets” prior to their agreement to be enrolled into the trial and after 
their agreement.  
The basic concept is that we humans are planning beings and set goals for ourselves. We take 
on a deliberative approach in order to set our plans and we adjust our actions in order to 
achieve our goals (Jansen, 2014: 26). The hypothesis builds on the concept that people have 
two different mindsets which emerge through the “deliberation mindset” and through the 
“implementation mindset”. It was discovered through the work of Gollwitzer that these two 
processes use different assessment processes.   
“People who ponder a goal decision (i.e. to either pursue Goal A or B, 
or to pursue either Goal A or stay passive) develop a deliberative 
mindset that allows them to accurately assess whether a desired 
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outcome can be controlled by their actions or not, whereas people 
who are planning the pursuit of a chosen goal develop a mind-set that 
fosters illusionary optimism with respect to controlling this outcome” 
(Gollwitzer, 2003: 261) 
Hence, people have two different mindsets when going through deliberation and after they 
have made a decision. Similarly, potential participants have two mindsets. What is interesting 
is that the processing and perception of information and capability to analyse this 
information differs between these two mindsets. In the deliberative mindset, potential 
participants are more capable of receiving information and assessing the risks and benefits of 
the proposed trial in order to reach a decision. However, in the implementation mindset, 
potential participants focus on methods of reaching the goal they have selected. Hence at 
this mindset, potential participants tend to underestimate the levels of risk involved and 
overestimate the level of benefit not only to future populations but also direct benefit to 
themselves including the possibility of cure. Therefore, we can say that people are more 
likely to make accurate estimations about risk and benefit when they are in the “deliberative 
mindset” rather than the “implementation mindset”. Hence according to Jansen’s hypothesis 
the researchers and their teams need to ensure that the potential participants are in fact in a 
deliberative mindset when they are presenting information to them regarding trials where 
the potential participants are required to make a decision. This has to be ensured so that the 
potential participants do not underestimate the levels of risk anticipated from the trial,   
overestimate the levels of expected benefits, nor do they make decisions based on false 
perception of information which may not necessarily fit in with their plans and goals. In order 
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to achieve this, researchers and their teams need to ensure that the potential participants 
are in a deliberative mindset. This is based on the findings of Gollwitzer and colleagues who 
found that there can be an influence on the mindsets, meaning that they may be induced by 
asking a person to think about an important aspect in their lives such as their families or their 
jobs. Their second finding relate to mindsets being generalized across situations. This means 
that if a person is set into a deliberative mindset in one situation, they will remain within that 
mindset even if their attention is turned to another unrelated matter. Thirdly they noted that 
mindsets tend to stabilize over time (Jansen, 2014: 31). The concept is that once individuals 
enter into a mindset they tend to continue to make decisions within that mindset. Hence 
researchers may help set their potential participants minds within the deliberative mindset 
prior to engaging with them in the process of disclosure and requiring them to make a 
decision. This, according to Jansen can be done by asking potential participants at the 
beginning of an interaction to think about the process they use when making decisions 
regarding their families, changing jobs, or buying a car. Once their minds are set within the 
deliberative mindset, their understanding of the information and their appreciation of the 
levels of risks and benefits involved would improve. 
Still there are factors that relate to the potential participants and which may hinder 
communications and lead to the misunderstanding of the information being presented to 
them. These are what Jansen refers to as the “therapeutic error”.  
“Patient-subjects enrolled in early-phase cancer trials appear to be 
making a mistake. They have, or at least appear to have, a distorted 
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view of their own susceptibility to risks and benefits” (Jansen, 2014: 
26) 
Although Jansen focuses on early phase cancer patients in her article, these factors may exist 
within other potential participants including those within developing countries. This 
therapeutic error may be caused by three different causes: therapeutic misconception, 
unrealistic optimism, and therapeutic misestimation. Each of these will be discussed 
separately (Miller and Joffe, 2012; Horng and Grady, 2003). 
Therapeutic misconception: 
Potential participants often base their decisions of being enrolled into research because they 
equate the role of the physician with that of the researcher. Potential participants often 
confuse the physician-patient relationship with the researcher-participant relationship. The 
misconceptions that surround the roles of the physicians and the researchers create 
problems. For example, a study which asked participants who agreed to be enrolled into 
trials for the reasons for their agreement, found out that the most common given reason was 
therapeutic benefits (Jansen, 2014: 25). Another study by Jenkins at al. found that within 
meetings held between the researchers and potential participants, the conversation focused 
on prognosis in 21% of the entire cover station time (Jenkins, 2011). These results reinforce 
the misconceptions the potential participants may have and emphasise the equation 
between the roles of the physicians and the researchers. Therefore it is important to clearly 
differentiate between the physician-patient relationship and the researcher-participant 
relationship.  
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Physicians act with the individual patient’s best interests at heart; they promote the best 
intervention for their individual patients because they have a fiduciary relationship with 
them. They are required to provide the best available intervention to that patient and to 
advance the individual patient’s health according to acceptable medical standards. Through 
this role, the best interest of the patient should take utmost priority and physicians are held 
legally as well as morally liable if they fail to place the patient before all other interests, 
including their own. The same level of fiduciary relationship and rapport does not necessarily 
apply to the researcher-participant relationship. Researchers are in a moral contractual 
relationship with the participants and their goal is to answer a scientific question, generate 
generalizable knowledge, and benefit future patients (Saver, 2009). The individual person’s 
interest is valuable as far as the researcher respects the participants, obtains their informed 
valid consent, and assures their wellbeing throughout the trial. The provision of treatment to 
the individual participant for the improvement of their health status is not a direct goal 
despite the fact that it may come about through the use of the tested intervention or agent 
or through the more intensified medical follow ups and investigations offered through the 
trial. Although, researchers are not obliged to give participants proven interventions, the 
researcher still has the moral duty of keeping the best interest of participants as a priority. 
This can be achieved by protecting the participants during the trial and reporting adverse 
events when they occur. Also, they are supposed to compensate trial participants for 
damages or harms sustained as a direct result of their participation in the trial. Having said 
that it still stands that researchers still do not have a duty to directly enhance the health of a 
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single participant since they aim at a much broader scope of interest, namely that of future 
patients and populations.    
The goals of the trial are reached by testing trial interventions on participants and comparing 
the outcomes with those of other interventions or sometimes with a placebo arm as a means 
of resolving any uncertainty existing in clinical practice, i.e. equipoise. In many instances, the 
researchers may also be physicians by profession. This means that some of the participants 
enrolled into the trial may also be patients of that physician taking on the role of a 
researcher. This does not necessarily mean that the same duties owed by the physician to 
the patients are directly transferred to the researcher-participant relationship. It has to be 
admitted that the researcher/physician may have a difficulty in fulfilling this responsibility 
attached to his or her different and sometimes competing roles and there may be tension 
between the two, but this is not our concern here and will not be further elaborated. The 
focus of the discussion is the duty owed by the researcher to the trial participants. 
Furthermore it has to be noted that many researchers are not physicians in which case the 
non-physician researchers become exempt from providing benefits to their participants while 
physician-researchers are required to provide the proven intervention. This view is 
problematic since we cannot allow researchers to get away with conduct unpermitted for 
physicians and vice versa. Regardless of professional status, the researchers should answer 
their research questions, or at least generate new information that may become useful in the 
future by ensuring the best interest of the trial participants and giving them their due 
respect.  
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Right from outset the physicians and researchers follow two clear and distinct courses of 
action, but these two paths cross when it comes to interactions with patients or potential 
participants and their goal to benefit regardless of whether this benefit is directed at the 
individual patient or collective future patients. The main difference lies in the researcher’s 
and participants’ shared knowledge that the benefits of trials are directed at others rather 
than self. This issue could be overcome if this is stated directly to the potential participants at 
the time of recruitment. They have to know that they are not receiving treatment for their 
illness and that they are not being treated. They are merely helping the researchers in 
generating new knowledge and proving which intervention is more effective than the other. 
Potential participants agree to enrol into a trial based on information provided to them by 
the research team, which in part should explain how research seeks to answer a specific 
question regarding a given intervention. Particular reference should be made to the fact that 
the treatment of the trial participants is not one of the immediate purposes of the given trial. 
Admittedly, this understanding may present difficulties especially because of existing health 
care services within some developing countries, when the participants have no chance of 
receiving the intervention through other means or access to alternative health care services. 
Having said that, the external existing factors complicating the relationship should not stop 
researchers from explaining the trial concepts to the participant nor does it inhibit potential 
participants from understanding the terms of their participation. Furthermore, the external 
existing factors do not imply that the physician and researcher assume the same 
responsibilities.  
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Therapeutic optimism: 
Therapeutic optimism refers to the distorted assumption held by potential participants about 
the risks and benefit of the trial. Potential participants think that they are more likely than 
others to benefit from their participation in the trial. At the same time they may 
underestimate the level of risk involved from the same participation. This relates back to the 
potential participants being in the implementation mindset and how researchers should 
ensure that the potential participants are in the deliberative mindset to avoid this 
downplaying of the risks and over optimism about the direct benefits. Since this has already 
been presented earlier it will not be discussed further here.  
Therapeutic misestimation: 
This kind of error on the part of the potential participants refers to their failure to 
understand the estimated level of risks and benefits. They may have a poor understanding of 
the probability of risks taking place. This does not relate to the mindset the potential 
participants are within at the time of deliberation but may be due to simple failure in 
understanding. This could be more related to the kind of information actually being 
presented by the researchers and their teams to the potential participants. Hence the 
problem may be improved through the presentation of the information which should be 
done in a simple, easily understandable form which is intended to help the potential 
participants in grasping the chances of risks occurring.  
 Hence an improved level of understanding whether in developed or developing countries 
could be achieved and potential participants can develop an improved level of understanding 
 70 
 
when exposed to prolonged explanations carried out over a period of time and involving 
more sessions. This approach gives participants time to properly evaluate relevant 
information and have their questions answered. Admittedly, applying this course of action 
takes longer than the analogous process in developed countries; however, it is not a mission 
impossible. If the researchers and their teams put in enough effort, and present the 
information in simple language using if necessary and available, different forms of 
communication such as written documents and video tapes, then the level of understanding 
of the potential participants should improve, at least with regards to that specific clinical 
trial. Some researchers have set out to prove this concept. One study which looks specifically 
at methods aimed at improving understanding of potential participants in developing 
countries reports the following: 
"Our findings indicate that the standard consent process of a single 
meeting between investigator and volunteers might be insufficient, 
and that new techniques should be developed to improve the 
informed consent process." (Fitzgerald et al., 2002: 1301-2) 
Another study which solicits opinions of researchers, both from developed and developing 
countries, who carry out their clinical trials in developing countries and questions how they 
face the challenge of making participants, understand (Newton and Appiah-Poku, 2007). One 
of the researchers questioned within this study says: 
"If you think they are willing to be part, and they do not understand, 
then you have to continue the dialogue until both of you are happy 
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that everything has been understood." (Newton and Appiah-Poku, 
2007: 152) 
Another researcher within that same study states: 
"I hold the view that following a period of explanation, a series of 
questions should be asked in simple language or key points to check 
whether they have understood." (Newton and Appiah-Poku, 2007: 
152) 
Yet another states regarding the challenges faced when trying to make patients understand 
within developing countries:  
"It is not only illiterate people who have problems understanding this, 
even educated people have the same problem and so you have to go 
to great lengths to explain what you are about, otherwise you might 
think that you have consent when in actual fact you do not have 
consent."(Newton and Appiah-Poku, 2007: 153) 
By expressing their opinions the researchers are perhaps stressing that participants need to 
understand all information presented to them. This may not happen in some cases yet, the 
consent given in these cases may still be classified as being a valid consent; for example, 
when a potential participant deems some information irrelevant to his or her decision to 
enrol into a trial, then that information should not be forced on that particular participant. 
The participant may still make an informed, valid decision under these circumstances 
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because as mentioned earlier, people’s decisions originate from a multitude of factors and 
are not based solely on information received from the researchers and their team. Therefore, 
asking all participants to fully understand all information presented to them in my opinion 
creates an impossible informed consent process.   
One way of measuring how well potential participants understand the material presented is 
to hold interviews where researchers ask participants’ questions that test their level of 
comprehension and make sure they have no misconceptions attached to their decision. If the 
potential participants show that they understand the basics of the trial then asking for their 
informed consent seems fair. If however, the potential participants show misconceptions, for 
example if they still see the trial as a means of treatment, then the research team should 
schedule extra meetings with those potential participants until these misconceptions are 
removed. When these potential participants demonstrate an improved level of 
understanding during a follow-up interview then they may be enrolled into the trial at that 
time. However, researchers reserve the right to politely dismiss those who continue to 
misunderstand the essence of the trial and prevent them from participating (Coletti et al., 
2003). 
Therefore, the comprehension of potential participants can improve by researchers and their 
team devoting more time and effort into making participants understand the whole purpose, 
process, benefits and risks of the research at hand (Flory and Emanuel, 2004; Gilman and 
Garcia, 2004). Furthermore, innovate methods could be used during the presentation of the 
trial information, for example flow diagrams to explain the risks and benefits (Wood, 2001).  
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Further points which researchers need to assure that participants understand include the 
duration of participation and availability of treatment in the post-trial period. These points 
need to be made clear to the trial participants prior to their enrolment into the trial. 
Although the importance of these points may not come to the surface except at the end of 
the trial, it is essential that potential participants are aware that their participation in the trial 
and therefore reception of certain medical interventions are linked to their enrolment into 
the trial only and will not be continued once the trial has ended. As stated earlier, certain 
populations link contact with health care providers as a chance of cure and do not 
understand the concept of research. In these circumstances it is important for researchers 
and their team to clarify the difference between the roles of the researchers and the 
physicians as well as the cessation of the provision of the treatment at the end of the trial. 
Presenting this information at the beginning of the interaction or during the discussion stage, 
stresses the importance of that information to the potential participants.   
Furthermore, it is wrong to assume that information to potential participants may only be 
provided verbally. The same information may be provided in written form or any other form 
which the researcher/sponsor deems appropriate. This provision of information through 
different means provides more chance to the potential participants to understand the 
information being given to them and hence a better chance of achieving valid consent rather 
than simple consent. 
After being provided with the required information, potential participants should then be 
given the time to digest and understand the material originally presented during the 
discussion sessions (Cox, 2002).   
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Community consent: 
Under this heading it is sometimes argued that prior to the initiation of the trial, the 
community has to be involved and briefed about the trial and the consent of the community 
should be obtained regarding that trial. Rules of the FDA and NIH include the consultation of 
the community prior to the initiation of a given trial within a specific community (FDA, 1997, 
NIH, 1996). This is seen as a positive approach which is beneficial to researchers/sponsors, 
the potential participants, as well as the trial itself. The importance of this approach becomes 
much more important when the researchers/sponsors are not members of the community or 
are not familiar with the customs or preferences of that specific community. The NBAC 
states: 
“Researchers should consult with community representatives to 
develop innovative and effective means to communicate all necessary 
information in a manner that is understandable to potential 
participants.”(NBAC, 2001: 3.5) 
Although this is an important step to undertake, it is not the focus of our discussion in this 
chapter. Hence community involvement in the assessment of the appropriateness or 
acceptability of a given trial to a certain community will be discussed in further detail in 
chapter five when discussing the role of the RECs and the involvement of the community 
where the trial is to be carried out. Further discussions here will focus on the replacement of 
individual consent by that of the community representative or leader. 
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It is well accepted that adults in industrialised countries with decisional making capacities 
must give their own consent to participate in any kind of treatment including interventions 
associated with research (Emanuel et al., 2000). Informed consent is grounded into respect 
for person as per the definition of the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research which defines it as:  
“Respect for person incorporates at least two basic ethical convictions: 
First of all, the individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, 
and second that persons with diminished autonomy and thus in need 
protection are entitled to such protection” (Belmont report, 1979).  
Autonomous individuals are those capable of making decision on their own without 
interference or hindrance from others. They act as moral, rational agents (Levine, 1991). This 
approach is reflected in several documents including the NBAC: 
“Where culture or custom requires that permission of a community 
representative be granted before researchers may approach potential 
research participants, researchers should be sensitive to such local 
requirements. However, in no case may permission from a community 
representative or council replace the requirement of a competent 
individual’s voluntary informed consent” (NBAC, 2001: 3.7) 
The approach taken by these documents is that community consent should be viewed as an 
important step in the recruitment process since it has its own advantages however, 
community consent should never replace the informed decision of an individual participant. 
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Individual autonomy should be considered as a value on its own, and emphasise the role of 
researchers and their team in ensuring that participants make decisions suitable for them 
through the process of counselling. Therefore, the view is that the research team should 
regard community consent as an initial step in the informed consent process and not as a 
true consent on its own. However this approach does not necessarily show respect for 
person within all cultures and it may not even accomplish its purpose within all cultures 
within developing countries.   
Since we have mentioned earlier that developing countries form a heterogeneous group of 
communities and populations, it is understandable that their views regarding personal 
autonomy and respect for an individual’s decision will be different as well. Some 
communities respect this autonomy and a person has the right to make his or her own 
choices. Within these communities, the researchers will have no problem in obtaining 
individual consent. In other communities however this is not the case.  
In some societies within developing countries, the community holds a key value. The 
individual person’s being is defined by his or her belonging to the community. The individual 
person exists in terms of their family, clan, and whole ethnic group. This has been observed 
by some writers, for example Mbiti, quoted by Veatch, who states: 
“Only in terms of other people does the individual become conscious 
of his own being, his own duties, his own privileges and responsibilities 
towards himself and towards other people. When he suffers, he does 
not suffer alone but with his corporate group: when he rejoices, he 
rejoices not alone but with his kinsmen, his neighbours and his 
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relatives whether dead or living .... Whatever happens to the individual 
happens to the whole group, and whatever happens to the group 
happens to the individual. The individual can only say ‘I am, because 
we are, and since we are, therefore, I am’ ” (Veatch, 2000; 349) 
Within these communities the individual’s identity is born through the group he or she exists 
within. Hence an individual’s life is not considered a personal property but is rather owned by 
the group. The person is seen as a “link in the chain uniting the present and future 
generations” (Veatch, 2000: 349). Therefore health is the concern of the whole community 
and its preservation by the individual is expected for the good of the group. Individual 
consent has no meaning. Tribal or community consent; or the consent of a single person on 
behalf of many others is taken as the norm in these settings where community as a whole is 
valued more than individuality (Moodly, 2002). In yet other places, the husband consents on 
behalf of his wife because her consent is simply not recognised. Therefore, beneficence, as a 
principle has more value than individual autonomy. When it comes to health care, although 
health is highly valued, the good of the group or community is weighed against the needs 
and interests of the individual. The provision of health is not directed at the elimination of 
disease from a single person perspective but rather focuses on the individual’s whole 
including his or her role and involvement within the community. It is perhaps understandable 
then to note that within these societies individual autonomy and ability to act independently 
is limited by the importance of communalism. There is interdependence between the 
members of these communities and an individual has certain obligations towards that 
community. An individual who disregards the role of the community is regarded as anti-
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social. This does not mean that an individual does not have an independent personality and a 
certain degree of autonomy within such communities does exist. However this autonomy 
should not fall outside the traditional norms of the community. A person is expected to 
conform to communal decisions. At the same time, the community restricts the actions of a 
certain individual if his or her actions are considered to be against his or her own good. In 
other words the community may exercise paternalism when the good of the individual 
contradicts the more important good of the community.     
These cultural differences may make it very difficult to take individual consent. In an attempt 
to balance between demanding individual consent and completely dismissing it, the CIOMS 
proposed: 
“Where individual members of a community do not have the necessary 
awareness of the implications of participation in an experiment to give 
adequately informed consent directly to the investigators, it is 
desirable that the decision whether or not to participate should be 
elicited through the intermediary of a trusted community leader” 
(CIOMS, 2002: article 15) 
Sometimes, a research team intending to carry out their research in a particular community 
within a developing country makes first contact with the community leader. Obtaining the 
consent of the community leader may be seen as a positive approach because it may serve as 
an outreach to the community. The community may gain improved understanding of the 
research when the researchers/sponsors as well as the research team hold several meetings 
 79 
 
with the community leaders to explain the details of the research. This in turn shows the 
community that the researchers and their team respect the community, which may reflect 
positively on the cooperation given by the community towards the researchers in the end. As 
Diallo states:  
"There are thus intrinsic ethical reasons, such as the need to respect 
communities, for adding community permission to individual informed 
consent guidelines as a requirement for ethical research involving 
communities. There could also be instrumental ethical reasons to add 
this requirement; community permission could enhance the individual 
informed consent process, perhaps improve enrolment, and decrease 
adverse effects of the research on community values." (Diallo et al., 
2005: 256) 
Presenting the trial through this process may actually help in the recruitment of participants 
for the research. Once the leader of the community understands and supports the research, 
selling the idea to other members of the community becomes an easier task and potential 
participants may become more encouraged to enrol into the trial. This step in and of itself is 
not problematic since it aims at providing more information to the community through the 
person representing it. Problems do arise however when community consent is seen as 
having sufficient importance to replace the necessity to obtain individual consent.  
After obtaining community leader agreement for the involvement of individuals within the 
trial, researchers may still need to provide certain information about the nature of the trial 
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and its procedures to the community members or the potential participants. However, 
certain individuals may not want to receive such information. They may believe that since the 
leader gave his consent, then there is no need for them to give their agreement as well. 
These individuals should not be forced to receive undesired information especially if it is 
perceived as defying the leader’s instructions. Objections to this approach to informed 
consent focus mainly on the first meaning of informed consent presented earlier by 
Beauchamp and Childress and the autonomous authorization of the individual. However 
what we should be focusing on is the second meaning of informed consent which is the social 
rule of consent. Individual consent is not authorized by the community and may not even be 
appreciated by the individual potential participants themselves. The social rule of the 
provision of a community leader of consent on behalf of the members of that community 
may be acceptable. Empirical data shows that individuals within developing countries are not 
as interested in making decisions for themselves as theorists assume (Degner, 1992; Ende, 
1989). This is not to say that the authorization of the individual potential participant should 
not be obtained since there may be individuals within the community who may not want to 
be recruited into the trial. 
A process which could make sure that the participants still receive enough information about 
the trial could be the holding of an open meeting with the community in the presence of the 
community leader where information is presented to the community members about the 
trial in the presence of the research team. This event could also be taken as an opportunity 
to answer questions which may arise and to clarify certain points regarding the trial. Some 
writers argue that even when tribal consent is obtained, individual consent can be acquired 
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later on in the process (Barry, 1988). Although individual autonomy is considered essential 
especially in clinical trials in industrialised countries, it is not necessarily seen that way within 
certain communities. Members of a certain community who are not accustomed to giving 
their own consent may view the insistence on individual consent as an insult to their leader. 
In such cases, cultural respect should be expressed by accepting the differences in the 
perception of the importance of individual consent within different communities. The 
insistence on individual consent may lead to the failure in the recruitment of potential 
participants into potentially beneficial trials especially in socially valuable ones. The 
anticipated health benefits are of more value than the individuals exercising their personal 
freedom and providing their consent. Within these special circumstances, the researcher 
could submit a proposal to the REC outlining the intention to obtain only community leader 
consent and the justifications for waving individual consent. At the same time the local REC, 
if it is in charge of reviewing the trial proposal, as will be argued for later in chapter five 
should be understanding of the circumstances and allow for such alterations.  
Having said that, certain objections may be anticipated regarding the acceptance of 
community consent on behalf of individual members of that community and hence the 
research team needs to ensure that community consent is truly representative of the choices 
of the community members. The easier scenario to be presented is where the community 
has a benevolent leader, then the decision made to enrol the community members into a 
given trial may in fact be in the best interest of the community members. Alternatively, a 
more problematic scenario, from the perspective of the researchers may exist where a 
dictator community leader exists who may not consider the best interest of the community 
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member and may force the community members into trials that they do not desire to be 
enrolled into. In such instances, the research team has to ensure that the community 
members authorize their participation in the trial and are not merely forced by the 
community leader. One method of ensuring potential participants’ authorization could be 
the settings of private discussions between the potential participants and the research team 
member on individual basis. These discussions could be done at the time of initial assessment 
of the potential participants in order to avoid suspicions being raised by the community 
leader or other community members which may reflect negatively on the concerned 
potential participants. These discussions have to be done by the original research team 
rather than be designated to a trained local research team member. This step is essential 
because in cases where discussions are held with local team members, the fears that the 
potential participants may have from rejection of participation may still exist and their 
agreement to participate may not be a true choice. The fear that potential participants may 
have from the dictator leader may still exist when dealing with a local research team 
member. The same fear of transmission of the information shared between the potential 
participant and local research team member to the community leader and the fear of 
consequences of refusal to participate in the trial may prevent the participants from sharing 
their true decisions with the local research team members. Of course this fear may still exist 
when discussions are held with the original team members, however the research team must 
strive to eliminate, or at least reduce, sources of force or pressure that may affect the 
potential participants’ choices.  Through these private discussions, the research team may be 
approached by certain members of the community who do not want to participate in the 
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research but lack an ability to voice their concerns in public. These cases may exist regardless 
of the type of community leader the research team is dealing with. In such cases the research 
teams hold the responsibility of making sure that these individuals’ speak freely and express 
their opinions without fear of being overheard and perhaps punished for their opinions, or 
for disobeying community leader orders. The research team should exclude these individuals 
from the research and should not force them to enrol into the trial. The justifications 
presented to the community leader for this exclusion could be based on scientific reasons 
rather than the declaration of the individual’s refusal to participate.  
The biggest challenge to the research team however is the assessment of the kind of 
community leader they are dealing with and his relationship with the community members in 
order to assess whether the decision made are in the best interest of the community 
members or not. However, the best interest of the potential participants and social value 
should have been assessed during the review process by the local REC. 
Getting a trial underway could escalate into something more problematic in cases where 
leaders withdraw community consent after it has been provided or refuse to grant 
permission for a trial in the first place. Both situations present challenges to the 
researchers/sponsors and may have disappointing outcomes for the researchers/sponsors. In 
cases where a community leader provides initial consent but then later decides to withdraw 
that consent or permission, then that decision should be made known to the participants 
(Diallo et al., 2005). Many of the participants may decide to withdraw from the trial based on 
the community leader’s withdrawal. However; there may still be members within the 
community who would want either to be enrolled into the trial even if the community leader 
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refuses the trial proposal or those who want to continue their participation in the trial after 
the withdrawal of the community leader‘s consent. If these members are willing to 
participate in the trial, despite the social consequences of their participation and regardless 
of the difficulties they may have with their community, then these members should not be 
denied access to or be excluded from the trial on the basis of the community leader’s 
decision 
If on the other hand, the community leader refuses to grant permission or consent in the first 
place, then researchers will face a much bigger challenge. Admittedly, the researchers can 
anticipate a much bigger challenge in recruiting the required number of participants into the 
trial and may decide to do their research in another place where it will be perhaps easier to 
convince locals of the trial merits. Although individual autonomy holds high importance the 
researcher’s autonomy should also be valued. If a researcher feels he or she will experience 
an easier time recruiting participants and conducting the trial in another community then the 
trial should move to that community provided that the participants are recruited based on 
scientific need rather than convenience alone.  
Hence, community consent should be viewed as an important step in the recruitment 
process because dealing directly with the leaders may help researchers better understand 
the trial’s value to the society, improve participant understanding about the trial and may 
even increase enrolment.  
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Conclusion: 
This chapter discussed procedural fairness from the perspective of assurance of procedural 
aspects of informed consent. The highlights of the chapter included several points. The first 
one was the emphasis on the importance of communication between the researchers and 
their teams and the potential participants rather than the amount and content of 
information being presented.  Another point of emphasis within the chapter included the 
assurance of the researchers and their teams that the potential participants are in a 
deliberative mindset during the negotiations or information presentation process, the 
provision of information in different forms and the adaptation of new methods of 
documentation of individual consent. The importance of community consent within certain 
communities within developing countries has also been presented with attention being made 
to certain exceptional individual cases where the potential participants may not agree with 
the community leader’s decision.  
Informed consent is an integral part of fairness to the potential participants. The assurance of 
fairness through informed consent comes in the form of assuring procedural fairness while 
obtaining informed consent from the potential participants. Although the informed consent 
process is a thorny one especially in developing country settings, accomplishing an 
acceptable level of potential participant understanding could still be achieved, but perhaps 
with some extra effort on the part of the researchers and their teams. Although poverty, 
vulnerability, poor access to health care services, and low levels of educations may act as 
large obstacles in the process of obtaining informed consent, an acceptable level of 
understanding can be achieved despite these obstacles.  
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Informed consent should be viewed as a process rather than something the researchers and 
their team expect to accomplish in one step. However the many other issues faced by 
researchers in developing country settings further complicate the process. The procedure in 
its entirety involves inviting the potential participants to the trial, providing them with the 
needed information, explaining the information to them over several sessions using different 
methods, giving potential participants time to consider all the information they have 
received, and finally respecting the individual's decision whether to participate or to decline 
participation.  
More importantly, and before the provision of information to the potential participants, the 
researchers need to assess the mindset of the potential participants and ensure that they are 
in a deliberative mindset. This ensures that the potential participants do not underestimate 
the level of risk or overestimate the level of benefit expected from the trial. Still some 
misconceptions held by the potential participants need to be directly addressed such as the 
therapeutic misconception. Other misconceptions may be indirectly addressed by the 
awareness of the researchers themselves about the kind of information they emphasize 
during the disclosure and communication process.  
Furthermore, the method of documentation of the potential participant’s agreement may be 
given in forms other than writing. In some cases verbal, witnessed, and videotaped consent 
by reliable sources could replace the written form. This approach may hold special 
importance to potential participants in developing countries living under oppressive regimes 
who see signing in general as a threat to their safety and property. Overall, the validity of the 
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consent should be the focus of the researchers and their team rather than the signature of 
the consent forms. 
Finally, within some developing countries, community consent bears more weight than 
individual consent. In these situations, the researchers and the sponsors should respect the 
cultural differences that exist within these societies and not to try and force the western 
standards of individual consent as a necessity.   
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Chapter Three: Outcome Unfairness 
Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the second kind of unfairness: namely outcome unfairness. The 
discussions within this chapter will focus on the anticipated end results on the parties 
involved within the interaction. These effects may include benefit, harm, or no effect on 
either or both parties involved. The chapter will conclude that the acceptability of the 
potential harms associated with any given trial proposal are best assessed by the potential 
trial participants and/or the communities involved. In addition, the tools for the assessment 
of these harms will be provided. On the other hand the benefits of a given trial need to be 
assessed from different perspectives. It will be shown through this chapter that in order to 
label a trial as a being beneficial, the social value of that trail needs to be assessed in the first 
place. The chapter concludes that despite the possibility that interactions between 
researchers/sponsors and potential trials participants may be beneficial, there may still be a 
need to prevent these interactions from taking place based on the strategic intervention 
argument which states that even mutually beneficial interaction may be prohibited on the 
basis that non-exploitative interaction be promoted.  
Outcome unfairness looks at the effects of the interaction on both parties involved. This is 
what Hawkins and Emanuel refer to as degrading wrongful interactions. Within clinical trials 
the interaction between researchers and potential participants may harm, benefit, or have 
no effect on either party. In order to assess the risks and benefits of that interaction we need 
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to either assess them from an ex-ante perspective or an ex-post perspective. The ex-ante 
perspective requires us to assess harm and benefit from the perspective of the researcher or 
the potential participants before the interaction is initiated. This means we need to assess 
anticipated outcomes of harms and benefits. On the other hand, the ex-post perspective 
requires us to assess harm and benefit based on actual results of harm or benefit at the end 
of the interaction. However before we decide which perspective we are going to adopt in 
order to assess the outcome of the interaction between the researchers and the potential 
participants, we need to be clear about the goals and aims of clinical trials in the first place.  
Research is defined as a “systematic investigation designed to develop or contribute to 
generalizable knowledge. (LO, 2010: 7). Hence by definition, research is primarily intended to 
benefit future patients by generating new scientific knowledge and not the participants of 
the trial directly despite the fact that some of the trial participants may benefit directly from 
their enrolment into the trial. What is expected from the researcher/sponsor is that the trial 
be done in a scientifically valid method in order for the findings to be valid and for the 
knowledge to be disseminated to others such as physicians, scientists, and future patients in 
order for them to benefit from that knowledge.  
The participants recruited into the study experience risk ranging from minimal (for example 
inconveniences and intrusion of privacy and confidentiality) to more serious medical 
complications. The question posed by the research cannot be answered except after the 
study is complete and the harms or benefits are at best anticipated and not known with 
certainty. This is why harms are referred to as potential harms and benefits as expected 
benefits. They are not guaranteed. Hence the best assessment of the outcome of either 
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benefits or harms would be from an ex-ante perspective. Since we are considering clinical 
trials and whether they should be approved or not, I will focus my discussion of outcome 
unfairness from an ex-ante approach.    
By focusing on the outcome of the interaction we need to assess the effect of the interaction 
on each of the parties involved within the interaction. In referring back to the definition of 
exploitation, taking unfair advantage of someone means that there has to be some form of 
benefit to the exploiter. Indeed some definitions of exploitation imply a net gain by the 
exploiter as a necessary requirement for exploitation such as. Wertheimer’s quote of Tormey 
mentioned in chapter one. Although I agree that the researcher/sponsor must gain from the 
interaction with the participants, not all interactions which benefit the researchers/sponsors 
are balanced by a loss on the part of the participants. The benefits the researchers/sponsors 
gain from the interaction may take a variety of forms. Although financial gain is the most 
obvious and discussed as a form of benefit to the researchers/sponsors, it is certainly not the 
only kind of benefit. Generating new information, publishing trial results, acquiring patency 
rights, and obtaining academic recognition are some of the researcher/sponsor benefits that 
may result from their interaction with the participants. This benefit may be unfair if it is 
obtained through the unfair taking advantage of the participants or when the 
researcher/sponsor gains an unfair or excessive share of the benefit when compared with 
the benefit to the participants or when there is an unfair division of the benefits between the 
parties involved. It has to be emphasized though that we are not talking about even division 
of the benefits between the parties involved; rather it is the fair division of the benefits that 
is important. This point will be further discussed in more detail in chapter four which focuses 
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on post-trial benefits. However, even if we assume that the researcher/sponsor always 
stands to gain from the interaction with the trial participants, the interaction itself cannot be 
labelled as being unfair simply due to this benefit. Hence a detailed look at the effects of the 
interaction on the trial participants also needs to be done.   
Effects on participants: 
 It is anticipated that the interaction between the participants and the researcher/sponsor 
has one of three possible outcomes on the participant, each of which will be discussed 
individually: 
No effect: 
During a “no effect” type of interaction, otherwise referred to as "harmless parasitism", the 
researcher/sponsor benefits from the interaction while the participant experiences no affect 
whatsoever (Feinberg, 1990). They neither benefit nor are they harmed by the interaction. 
To illustrate the point consider a person (A) following the taillight of another person (B) while 
driving during a foggy night. Here (A) benefits from his interaction with (B), (B) does not 
consent to (A's) actions, and we assume that he is not bothered by (A's) headlights. In clinical 
trials however, such cases rarely take place because the interaction commonly entails some 
kind of harm or benefit to the participants. Hence this anticipated outcome of the interaction 
will not be further discussed.  
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Harmful effects: 
Harm or risk in its broadest definition means the harm or injury occurring as a result of 
participation in a trial. The term “risk” may be used in two different ways (Iltis, 2005). From 
an absolute perspective, the term “risk” is used as a number representing the probability of 
some event occurring. In another sense “risk” may be used to define the character of a risk 
and address questions like: What harms are possible? Are the risks temporary or permanent? 
How much damage would they cause? Etc. It is the second meaning of the term “risk” which 
concerns us here.  
Risk takes on many different forms, and should not remain narrowly associated with physical 
harm only. Other forms of harm to potential participants may include psychological, social, as 
well as economical harms. The level of risk can also range from minimal to severe. Some 
definitions of exploitation take the infliction of serious harm on the participants as a 
necessary condition for exploitation to exist within an interaction (Munzer 1990). There are 
several reasons why this definition is incorrect. The first reason is that the definition links 
between exploitation and serious harm so exploitative only exists if the participants are at 
risk of serious harm. This is not true since some exploitative interaction may only expose 
participants to minimal harm but may still be labelled as exploitative. Also, not all risk is 
ethically problematic. Some forms of serious risk may have ethical acceptance whereas some 
lower risk studies may not be ethical. 
The second reason for rejecting the serious harm argument is that harm itself is not always 
present within exploitative interactions. In some exploitative interaction, the participants 
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may anticipate benefiting from their recruitment into the trial. In this case, despite the fact 
that the potential participants will not be harmed, the interaction may still be considered as 
exploitative. 
When harm does exist within an interaction, the harm has to be a direct result of the 
participation within the interaction. In the “harmful effect” type of interaction, the 
participants become harmed through their interaction with the researcher where the 
interaction makes them worse off. To understand what worse off really means, we need to 
adopt the ex-ante perspective mentioned earlier. Therefore, when we say that the 
participants are “worse off” we mean that their status at the end of the interaction is 
expected to be worse than their initial status prior to the interaction with the 
researcher/sponsor. If the participants’ situation or condition deteriorates as a direct result 
of their participation in the trial, then they are harmed by that interaction. On the other 
hand, in some situations, if the participant’s condition remains the same, before, during, and 
after the trial, then apparently the participant does not sustain harm. For example, 
participants of the AZT trial who were allocated within the placebo arm of the trial were at 
risk of harm of transmission of the HIV infection to their foetuses however this harm does 
not exceed the harm that exists outside the scope of the trial. Similarly, the Surfaxin trial 
participants allocated within the placebo arm of the trial may be harmed through their 
exposure to the illness itself, however that harm does not exceed the harms the same 
participants are exposed to outside the scope of the trial. However the participants involved 
in the placebo arms of both trials stand to benefit from the medical services and 
examinations offered to them throughout the course of the trial.  
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It is also important to point out that the harms suffered by the participants may come about 
as a result of the deliberate actions of the researchers and not through the participation 
within the trial or the medical condition being investigated. In some cases, the researchers 
may deliberately hinder the improvement of the condition of the participants. This deliberate 
prevention of improvement could be considered as a form of harm. The best example of such 
a situation is the Tuskegee Syphilis study where the researchers not only deceived the 
participants by making them believe they were being treated for a certain medical condition, 
they also prevented them from receiving effective treatment for their condition when it 
became available (Jonsen, 1998). The harms inflicted on the trial participants not only 
included their deception and failure to provide effective treatment when it became available 
but also included harming them through their prevention from obtaining effective treatment 
outside the scope of the trial.   
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between the harms directly caused by the 
enrolment within a trial and the deterioration of the condition of people excluded from the 
trial. While the first category is said to be harmed by the trial, the same cannot be said about 
the second group. Although there may be some deterioration within the condition of the 
excluded populations, this is caused by the conditions that exist outside the boundaries of 
the trial and not by the trial itself. These specific conditions exist regardless of enrolment into 
the trial and hence, the excluded individual is not made worse off as a result of the exclusion. 
Hence the harm to the potential participants is not a factor which could lead us to label an 
interaction as being exploitative. There are other factors which play a role in this analysis 
which will be discussed later on in this chapter.  
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Beneficial effect: 
Although it may be difficult to comprehend, some exploitative situations may benefit the 
participants in a similar way to the benefit of the researchers/sponsors.  
"Exploitation can be entered into voluntarily, and can even in some 
sense, be advantageous to the exploited party." (Levine, 1988: 66)  
The benefits to trial participants may take different forms even when assessed from an ex-
ante perspective. It is necessary to assess the expected benefits to participants with 
relevance to the participant’s situation prior to the interaction. Within clinical trials 
participants in developing countries benefit from trial enrolment because they receive 
treatment for an illness they suffer from, or they gain access to health care services that may 
improve their health status. 
So, from an ex-ante position, those involved in the interaction experience an improved status 
when compared to their situation outside the scope of the interaction. In some cases, the 
participants’ anticipated benefits far exceed those expected for the researchers. A person 
who receives treatment for a life-threatening condition will regain his or her health, a 
priceless gift for most people if not all. The researcher stands to gain materially and morally, 
but humans attach far more value to good health.  
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Types of exploitative interaction: 
Applying what has been said so far about the effects of the interaction on the parties 
involved and anticipating either the existence of the participant’s consent or its absence four 
different possible combinations of these factors are generated (Wertheimer, 2010: 201): 
1. Harmful non-consensual interactions 
2. Harmful consensual interactions 
3. Mutually beneficial non-consensual interactions 
4. Mutually beneficial consensual interactions  
To further understand the difference between them, a detailed discussion of the different 
possibilities will be given below. Due to the similarity between the harmful interactions, 
whether consensual or non-consensual, the discussion will combine the two kinds of harmful 
interactions in one section. The same will be done for mutually-beneficial interactions.   
Harmful (non) consensual interactions: 
We have defined harm as the risk the participants are exposed to as a result of their 
participation in the trial and it can range from minimal to severe harm. Risk can be defined as 
minimal when the probability as well as magnitude of the risk remains at an equivalent level 
or is lower than those risks encountered in daily life, or while performing ordinary physical or 
psychological examinations or tests (Wendler and Miller, 2007). It is generally accepted that 
a vulnerable individual incapable of consenting to trial participation should not be exposed to 
risks that exceed a minor increase over minimal risk. However there is a lack of international 
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regulatory agreement concerning the acceptable level of risk to which adult participants with 
decisional capacity may be exposed to. 
The proposal put forward by Wendler and Miller offers a comprehensive and clear stepwise 
approach for assessing ethical acceptability of various risks within trials (Wendler and Miller, 
2007). This method offers more insight into acceptable trial conduct than the traditional 
approach of classifying research into either therapeutic or non-therapeutic. In the latter case, 
therapeutic trials get approved when they satisfy clinical equipoise whereas “non-
therapeutic” trials may receive approval even when they do not serve the best interests of 
the participants. This traditional type of approach suffers from a too rigid differentiation of 
trials based on two types of research which in reality may be hard to distinguish. The fact 
that any therapeutic research has non-therapeutic components adds an additional level of 
complexity. Wendler and Miller call this proposed method the “net-risk test”, which includes 
three steps: 
1. Identifying the net-risk interventions: 
The initial step entails identifying the individual interventions within the proposed trial. The 
risk-benefit profile of each intervention is assessed by comparing its risks with potential 
clinical benefits for participants. Also the risk-benefit profile of the proposed interventions is 
compared with the available alternatives outside the scope of the trial. In some cases 
alternative interventions may not exist. If the assessment shows that the risk-benefit profile 
is at least as favourable as that of another available intervention, then there is no net-risk. 
However, if the risk-benefit profile comes out less favourable than existing interventions 
then conclusions point to a net-risk. According to Wendler and Miller “the magnitude of the 
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net-risk is a function of the extent to which the intervention presents increased risk, or 
decreased potential benefits compared with available alternatives.” (Wendler and Miller, 
2007: 484). For example the AZT trial, involves comparing the active agent (AZT) with 
placebo. If we focus on the active arm of the trial, then the risks of this specific intervention 
may include lack of effectiveness. On the other hand the risks associated with placebo use in 
the trial include risk of transmitting HIV infection from mother to foetus, as well as death 
from the illness and superimposed infections.  
According to Wendler and Miller we must compare the risks of these two interventions with 
the alternative available interventions (Wendler and Miller, 2007: 484), a situation which 
creates two possible scenarios depending on how we apply the term available intervention. 
Within the first possible scenario we compare the trial with the available intervention within 
the developing countries for the prevention of HIV transmission. In these settings no 
intervention exists for the treatment of this condition and therefore the risks to the 
participants in the placebo arm of the trial are equal to the risk which the rest of the 
population, outside the scope of the trial, are exposed to. The benefits however, include the 
reduction in the maternal-foetal transmission of HIV meaning a reduction in the number of 
deaths. Therefore the net-risk presented by the AZT trial, in this scenario, is at least as 
favourable as that of the available intervention and the trial will have no net-risk.  
The second possible scenario would require us to compare the AZT with the available 
intervention in more developed countries, namely the ACTG 076 protocol. The effectivness of 
the ACTG 076 has been proven through previous trials and its use has been implimented 
within more developed countires. The participants enrolled into the active arm of the trial 
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where ACTG 076 would be provided to them, will be at a much lower risk of being exposed to 
harm or the transmission of HIV infection from mother to foetus. On the other hand, the risk 
to the participatns receiving the target agent (AZT) will be at a higher risk of transmission of 
the illness given that the effectiveness of this agent has not been proven yet. Still this does 
not mean that the participants who receive AZT are exposed to a net-risk given the 
alternatvies available outside the dimension of the trial. As mentioned earlier, no treatment 
modality exists within some developing countries to prevent the transmission of HIV from 
mother to foetus. Hence even when enrolled participants receive the AZT, they are better off 
than the population outside the scope of the trial if AZT proves to be effective. On the other 
hand, if the AZT does not prove to be effective, then the enrolled participants have the same 
risk of maternal to foetal transmission of HIV as the general population within the same 
settings. This leads us to conclued through using Wendler and Miller’s identification of the 
net-risk that whether we use placebo or ACTG 076 that there is no net-risk within the trial.  
Similarly, the assessment of the Surfaxin trial’s net-risk assessment requires first identifying 
all the interventions that are included in the trial. Investigators choose two interventions for 
use in the Bolivian trial arm, Surfaxin and placebo. The effectiveness of Surfaxin equals other 
existing effective interventions available for the treatment of RDS, and it is considered a low 
risk treatment. The placebo arm of the trial however poses significant risk to the trial 
participants, including the risk of death. However when we compare the two arms of the trial 
with existing interventions within Bolivia, we find out that no interventions were available for 
the treatment of RDS at Bolivia at the time the trial was intended to be carried out. So the 
risks to the trial participants, even those in the placebo arm were not increased compared to 
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risks afforded by available intervention within that setting. Hence there is no net-risk in the 
Surfaxin trial as well. 
2. Assess the net-risk interventions: 
The next step in risk assessment considers whether social values gained from the trial 
outweigh risks posed by the net-risk assessment. Hence, a study with a low net-risk, but also 
without social value may not be approved, whereas a study with a net-risk that also offers 
social value could receive approval. If we apply this to the AZT trial we can see that the trial 
would add a very important social value. This social value is represented in the reduction in 
maternal to foetal transmission of HIV infections whether we are considering a placebo or an 
active controlled trial. However, since the placebo arm of the trial bears no net-risk then the 
placebo controlled trial will add greater social value given that the ACTG 076 has been rated 
too expensive to be made available for the population by their governments even prior to 
the initiation of the trial. There is no point in proving its effectiveness or superiority to AZT. 
We know even before designing the trial that ACTG 076 is more effective than AZT. What 
would re-proving this point provide to the target population? The aim of the AZT trials is to 
find a shorter, effective, and more affordable course of an anti-retroviral agent which would 
prevent or reduce the transmission of HIV infection from mother to foetus. The relevant 
research is very much needed because limiting maternal to foetal transmission of HIV is vital 
for preventing needless suffering and death. The information gained would help immensely 
towards improving health care in the population intended to benefit from the trial in the first 
place. Hence considering the social value, the AZT trials, and the discussions in the previous 
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section, we reach the conclusion that the placebo controlled AZT trial is the better option 
especially since no net-risk exists and the anticipated benefits are high.  
The Surfaxin trial on the other hand is different. There are many available pharmaceutical 
agents for the treatment of RDS all of which are effective, but expensive. Although it could be 
argued that since there are no alternative modalities of treatment within Bolivia for RDS, 
then the use of placebo is justified. However, because the results of the trial were never 
intended to benefit the research population i.e. the infants in Bolivia, this argument loses its 
strength due to the lack of social value. The results of the research were intended to benefit 
infants in developed countries only. The trial does not satisfy the social value criteria. 
Therefore, the risks of the trial are not balanced by the social value of the trial.  
3. Assess the net cumulative risks: 
Finally, the total or cumulative risk of the research as a whole warrants consideration. 
Although some interventions may present low net-risks individually, their cumulative risk 
may not meet acceptable standards. Therefore, the trial’s cumulative risk should be taken 
into consideration. The Institute of Medicine also stresses the importance of this step by 
stating: 
"Research may involve several different procedures that may involve 
minimal risk or burden individually, but that may present more than 
minimal risk when considered collectively." (IOM, 2004) 
Within the AZT trial, while looking at the overall risk imposed by all interventions within the 
trial we can see that a cumulative risk exists for the transmission of HIV infection from 
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mother to foetus, which may be labelled as excessive. The same could be said for the 
participants enrolled in the placebo arm of the Surfaxin trial. However, once again, the risk to 
the participants in both trials does not surpass the risks they are exposed to outside the trial 
considering the available interventions within the local setting. 
Although Wendler and Miller offer a clear stepwise analysis of risk, the approach fails to 
define what "excessive risk" means. Many problems crop up during a risk assessment. For 
example, sometimes insufficient knowledge about the potential risks associated with a trial 
makes clear judgement difficult. At best, these risks can be labelled as "anticipated". 
Furthermore, other unforeseen risks may occur while the trial is taking place and these 
surprises may cause shifts in the risk: benefit ration, and possibly result in the termination of 
the trial if they are serious enough. It is also difficult to standardize risk assessment because 
individuals evaluate risk in different ways based on their own knowledge and experiences. 
Many factors may cause assessment variations including misconceptions, lack of information, 
or most commonly differences of opinions about the foreseen discomforts associated with 
an intervention.  
There is no consensus as to what constitutes acceptable risk to adults with decisional making 
capacity. Societies usually allow such adults to participate in high risk activities if their actions 
benefit society in general for example fire fighters. Individuals who agree to take on such 
high risk professions do so knowingly and accept the risks. In addition, the benefits gained 
from these professions, ranging from pay to moral reward, lead to a reduction in the net-risk. 
This combination justifies the acceptance of the concerned individuals to the risks involved 
with their choices. By analogy, we can allow other individuals with the same decisional 
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capacity to undertake excessive risks as long as social values (net gain) justify the risks or 
reduces the net-risk. Some potential participants may consent to participate in trials with 
high risk whereas others may refuse to participate in trials with minimal risk. This individual 
preference gains official status in the form of valid informed consent. We have to emphasize 
however that once potential participants are given the responsibility of assessing risk, 
researchers have to ensure that they are in a deliberative mindset to avoid distorted 
perception and assessment of risks and benefits.  
Non-consensual interactions are disrespectful and since respect is shown through the 
allowance or non-interference with the person’s autonomy or decision making, then these 
interactions can be defined as unfair from a procedural perspective since they fail to initiate 
the process of obtaining valid informed consent from the individuals in the first place. 
However, there are certain exceptions such as observational studies where the knowledge of 
the individual participants about the trial may lead them to alter their behaviour. In such 
cases, the consent of the individual may not be obtained prior to the initiation of the trial; 
however the participants deserve to know that they had been part of a trial and the purpose 
of it at the end of the trial. Other instances where obtaining consent from the potential 
participants may be waived are trials aiming to recruit non-autonomous individuals. Also, in 
trials focusing on emergency situations where the consent of the individual cannot be 
obtained at the time may fail in the requirement for informed consent. This does not mean 
that these trials are disrespectful for the participants rather they are seen as exceptions to 
the rule. However even then the exception has to be justified and approved by the REC.  
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Within normal types of trials obtaining the consent of a person shows respect to that person 
by allowing them to choose what they believe to be the right decision. Considering all that 
has been mentioned earlier, it becomes clear that informed, valid consent should take 
precedence in such cases and the individuals themselves should assess whether they want to 
take on the risks or not.  
Mutually advantageous (non) consensual interactions: 
Once again the focus here is on two aspects of the interaction, the consent of the individual 
and the outcome of the interaction. Non-consensual interactions, except within restricted 
situations amount to unfair treatment and therefore exploitation. On the other hand, the 
outcome of the interaction here is beneficial to the participants and therefore, does not fit 
the criteria for unfairness from an outcome perspective. Within such interactions participants 
themselves actually benefit from their participation. This benefit is translated into the 
improvement in their health status. They also give their consent for the enrolment within the 
interaction. Yet these beneficial interactions are not cleared from accusations of being 
exploitative despite the potential benefit to the trial participants.  
Although the lack of benefit within the interaction may make us more suspicious about the 
interaction, the existence of benefit does not mean that the interaction is non-exploitative. 
Therefore, even with the potential of benefit to the trial participants, the interaction itself 
cannot be said to be non-exploitative. There is still a missing link. It could be anticipated that 
an argument which defends the allowance of consensual mutually advantageous interaction 
could be brought forward. This argument could state that since participants have consented 
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to mutually advantageous interactions then we have no business prohibiting them regardless 
of whether the trial is to be carried in a developing or a developed country. What this line of 
argumentation fails to recognize however is that although consent is important, it does not 
exclude exploitation from an outcome perspective. Otherwise we would not have classified 
unfairness from a procedural and outcome perspectives. Informed consent is important and 
hence the distinction between consensual and non-consensual interactions between 
participants and researchers/sponsors. A situation where both parties agree to be involved 
within the interaction and provide informed consent represents one form of consensual 
interactions. In cases where participants give their informed consent to be enrolled into a 
trial, exploitation may still exist, unless we are arguing that a person can never consent to 
take part in exploitative interactions. This is apparently not the case since many exploited 
individuals or groups may consent to the exploitative interaction.       
Arguments more relevant to developing countries and exploitation revolve around the 
concept of the harsh circumstances that surround those participants. These argument state: 
potential participants are already surrounded by harsh circumstances and their participation 
in a mutually advantageous interaction may be the only gateway to benefit, so why would we 
want to deny these individuals of such a chance. Still arguments against the prohibition of 
mutually advantageous interactions stem from the perspective that these interactions, 
always benefit the participant, perhaps more than the researcher/sponsor in some cases, 
therefore the prohibition of these interactions would deny the participants such an 
opportunity. The counter argument to both of the previously mentioned arguments 
supporting mutually advantageous interactions can be realized if we focus our attention on 
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the circumstances that led to the interaction between the potential participants and the 
researchers/sponsors in the first place. By arguing that we should allow mutually 
advantageous interactions between researchers and potential participants, we are ignoring 
the fact that it is exactly those harsh circumstances existing within developing countries that 
escort the researchers/sponsors to do their research on those vulnerable populations. If 
those harsh circumstances did not exist in the first place, the researchers/sponsors would 
have done their research somewhere else. Given the fact that it is the vulnerabilities of the 
participants from developing countries that lead to their recruitment into the trial in the first 
place, we need to consider this part of the situation. Therefore even if we ensure that the 
participants gain from their interaction with the researchers/sponsors, we still need to 
consider the exploitation part of the interaction and whether we need to prohibit such 
interactions even if both parties consent to the interaction and benefit from it.     
However, even with the potential benefit to the participants the interaction itself may still be 
unfair from different perspectives. Several arguments are presented to suggest the 
prohibition of even mutually advantageous exploitative interactions. These include: dignity 
and degradation, Kant’s Universal law formulations, paternalism, prophylactic argument, and 
the strategic intervention. Each of these will be discussed individually in the following 
section.  
Dignity and degradation: 
Dignity connects with the idea that humans have certain fundamental needs, desires and 
attributes. Thus, to treat someone with dignity means recognising and respecting their 
needs, desires, and attributes. When talking about human dignity, we cannot avoid turning 
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to Kant’s doctrine of “Respect for persons”. Kant claimed inconsistency between treating an 
individual as a free and rational being and using them only as a means of satisfying ones 
goals, for to do so denies their dignity and autonomy. This analysis links to Kant’s 
instrumental use. He believed that people should never simply be used only as a means to an 
end, but rather deserve at the same time to be treated as ends in themselves. He states: 
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an 
end, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1785: 30) 
The meaning of the injunction to treat and regard people not merely as means but also as 
ends, suggests that we ought to value people rather than see them as useful instruments for 
achieving personal goals. To decide whether the researchers/sponsors use potential 
participants instrumentally; we need to prove that they indeed use them as mere 
instruments. This use “as a means” relates to the concept of co-modification where one party 
uses the other as an instrument according to the acceptable processes of the marketplace. If 
we look at it this way, then according to the marketplace norm, both parties involved within 
the interaction use each other for their own benefit. The researchers/sponsors use the 
participants to answer their research question and generate knowledge. On the other hand 
the participants use the researchers to gain some benefits as well whether in the form of 
health related benefits that they may not be able to have access to through regular health 
care services or moral benefits through their knowledge of benefiting future populations if 
their participation is based on altruistic reasons. Due to the nature of mutual use, both 
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parties should bargain for the best outcome for themselves within that interaction. 
Researchers/sponsors bargain to gain the maximum benefit through the shortest period of 
time. On the other hand, research participants bargain to maximize their own benefit which 
may be directed to themselves as potential participants or directed to others for example 
future populations or communities. It can be seen then that both parties involved in the 
interaction are using each other for some form of gain. This instrumental use however does 
not mean that either party does not give the other party the respect owed to them. 
Researchers/sponsors use trial participants as a means to an end and at the same time treat 
them as ends in themselves. The same can be said regarding the trial participants, they use 
the researchers/sponsors as a means to an end but at the same time treat them as ends in 
themselves. Hence there is no instrumental use within the interaction.  
If there is no instrumental use of the participants, then can that same interaction be 
degrading to the potential participants? The use of participants as means by the 
researcher/sponsor is not in and of itself degrading. If it were then the use of any person 
with the aim of benefit to oneself would be labelled as being degrading. For example the use 
of a plumber would be instrumental and degrading since he is hired with the aim of benefit 
to the person hiring him. In order for us to prove that an instrumental use is degrading we 
need to prove that the party being used is disrespected or believed to hold lower moral 
worth than the other party.  Through the process of hiring the plumber or recruiting 
participants into a trial, the individuals being used may still be valued for who they are. This 
mutual use of others through their consent does not represent disrespect to them as rational 
beings. From a Kantian perspective one can only demean or degrade another person if he 
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displays lack of respect for their equal moral worth. He does not however view the 
interactions stemming from the inequalities of power as lacking in respect for the person as a 
moral being. In order for a person to degrade another, that person has to view the person 
being used as holding lower moral worth than others. In other words we need to prove that 
the researchers/sponsors view the potential trial participants from developing countries as 
having lower moral worth than other potential participants from more developed countries. 
This may be related to their race, ethnic background, or social status for example. Therefore, 
interactions are degrading not because of the existing imbalance of power between the 
researchers/sponsors and the participants or their communities or because of the mere 
benefit to the researchers/sponsors from that interaction. Hence for us to label these 
interactions as degrading we need to prove that the participants from developing countries 
are viewed as having lower moral worth than participants from more developed parts of the 
world.  
Several points need to be outlined which may be seen as reasons to support the argument 
that researches/sponsors degrade trial participants. To begin with there is the issue of shift 
of trials which would never receive approval within developed countries to developing 
countries. Does the fact that these types of trials would never be approved within   
developed countries mean that the trials are degrading to the participants from developing 
countries? Different circumstances exist within developing and developed countries which 
may sometimes force the researchers/sponsors to make certain alterations to the trial 
designs to better serve the communities within developing countries and to ensure social 
value. Furthermore the lack of regulations within some developing countries regarding 
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clinical trials or the possibility of recruitment of the required number of participants within a 
shorter period of time due to the high prevalence of a given condition does not lead to that 
conclusion either.   
Secondly, if we accept that certain circumstances may justify alteration to trial proposals to 
aid in answering the trial questions, can we say that if the trial results are intended for 
distant populations, other than those recruited into the trial, that the interaction is degrading 
to those participants from developing countries. If we did, then all research involving human 
participants will be labelled as degrading since research in general is performed for the 
benefit of future patients and populations rather than the direct benefit to the trial 
participants. All research aims at generating generalizable knowledge for the benefit of 
future populations regardless of where they reside. The results of trials performed in 
developed countries are sometimes applied in clinical practice within developing countries. 
Does this mean that the participants from developed countries were degraded? Certainly 
not, these participants may benefit from the trial results as well as future populations or 
people residing within other countries or even continents. However, given the vulnerable 
status of populations within developing countries, their enrolment within trials has to be 
justified. It has to be ensured that their recruitment into the trial is necessary in order to 
answer the research question and that they are not merely recruited for the convenience of 
the researchers/sponsors. Vulnerable populations in general should not be recruited into 
trials except where there is an anticipated benefit to them at the end of the trial. There 
should be some anticipated benefit directed either towards them or their communities. 
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Degradation and the view of participants as holding lower moral value can be seen through 
the failure of the researchers/sponsors in obtaining consent from the potential participants 
or if consent is obtained through manipulation, deception, or coercion as has been discussed 
in chapter two. If we take the Surfaxin trial as an example, we can see that a placebo 
controlled trial would never be approved in more developed countries in the first place due 
to the availability of many alternative effective agents for the treatment of ARDS. The setting 
within Bolivia is different. There are no treatment options available making the use of 
placebo controlled trial a valid option for the researchers/sponsors. Furthermore, the 
location of the trial was selected based on the high prevalence of the disease within that 
setting, a point which we have stated earlier does not mean that the participants recruited 
into the trail are being degraded. In addition, there is no reason for us to believe that the 
researchers/sponsors view the trial participants’ as holding lower moral value. Informed 
consent has been obtained from the trial participants’ guardians, a procedure which shows 
that the trial participants were respected as rational moral agents. There has to be another 
aspect which prevents us from approving this kind of a trial. This will be further discussed 
when we talk about social value. 
Kant’s universal law formulation: 
Further along the Kantian line of argumentation, the universal law is used to argue against 
the instrumental use of people. The first of Kant’s categorical imperatives is the universal law 
formulation which states:  
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“Act only according to the maxim by which you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law” (Rachels, 1999: 133) 
What Kant is saying is that we should act through a maxim where we accept that our actions 
become the law of nature. The real test to Kant was whether we could will for our actions to 
become a law of nature which would be applied to oneself as well as others. The best 
example used usually to clarify this concept is that of deception. In order for deception to 
work, the universal law has to be that of honesty. People fall for deceptive proposals because 
they assume that the person requesting any given action is honest. If they knew beforehand 
that he was deceiving them, if deception was a universal law, they would not agree to the 
interaction and refuse the requested proposal. Therefore if deception became a universal 
law it would be self-defeating. However, this line of thought fails before it is even initiated 
since we have stated earlier that there is no instrumental use of trial participants through the 
alterations of trial proposals to better suit the local setting. We have also argued in the 
earlier section that the mutual use of the researchers/sponsors to trial participants and vice 
versa does not mean that the researchers/sponsors are using the participants instrumentally. 
Research itself is willed to be a universal law where certain people are exposed to risk for the 
benefit of future populations. Yet this line of thought does not justify the prevention of 
mutually advantageous consensual interactions between the researchers/sponsors and the 
trial participants.  
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Paternalism: 
Paternalistic prohibition of certain interactions stems from the concept of protecting 
participants from entering into interactions which do not advance their own interests. 
Although this may apply in some situations it would be difficult to justify prohibiting all 
advantageous interaction based on paternalism alone. For example mutually advantageous 
exploitative interactions where the participants actually stand to benefit even if they are 
exploited cannot be justifiably prohibited based on paternalism alone.   
Prophylactic argument: 
This argument is not one of the strong arguments for the prohibition of mutually 
advantageous exploitative interactions in my opinion. It is based on the idea that not all 
interactions between the researchers and participants are beneficial to the participants and 
in some cases informed consent may not be “informed” or valid. Therefore, it would be 
better to prohibit all such interactions in order to prevent the participants from being 
exposed to harm. Its aim is to prevent exploitative interactions. The weakness in this 
argumentation is that it does not actually justify the prohibition of mutually advantageous 
exploitative interactions. It calls for the prohibition of all interactions because of the risk of 
harm that these interactions potentially hold within them. It does not concentrate on the 
prohibition of interactions that actually cause harm and permit those that do not. This is 
important to state since we are trying to justify the prohibition of interactions which are in 
fact going to benefit the participants. If all interactions between potential participants and 
researchers should be prohibited based on the concept of potential harm to the participants 
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then no clinical trial, starting from phase I trials, would be approved since all trials at all levels 
entail some sort of risk to the participants. Furthermore, the assessment of the acceptability 
of harm should be done by the potential participants and not external members. This specific 
point has already been discussed earlier in this chapter and the assessment of the 
acceptability of risk should be left in the hands of the potential participants. 
Strategic intervention: 
This concept is presented by Hawkins and Emanuel as well as Wertheimer. The basic idea 
behind the strategic intervention is the promotion of non-exploitative interactions though 
the prohibition of exploitative ones. Wertheimer states: 
"Whereas paternalistic interventions override the individual's 
preferences, strategic interventions serve to help enable a person get 
the result that she already prefers but cannot obtain without such 
intervention." (Wertheimer, 2010: 216) 
In such cases, the aim of prohibiting, even mutually advantageous exploitative interactions is 
to allow for a non-exploitative interaction to take place. By prohibiting exploitative 
interactions between the researchers/sponsors and participants, we instead encourage 
researchers to enter into non-exploitative interactions with the participants. Although we 
have stated earlier that the redirection of trial results to other populations is not the problem 
per say, the health care settings within developing countries, how health is valued, and the 
spread of life shortening illnesses within developing countries make certain exceptions 
necessary.  
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Health is considered one of the basic human goods without which people cannot live a 
thriving life. To this affect Rawls states: 
“primary goods..... are things which it is supposed a rational man wants 
whatever else he wants ...... With more of these goods men can 
generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions 
and advancing their ends, whatever these ends may be” (Rawls, 1999: 
79) 
Others, like Daniels argue that health becomes a special kind of good as a result of the unfair 
distribution of healthcare services and the importance of health to individuals (Daniels, 
1985). Therefore, someone’s need for treatment for an illness is the same regardless of 
where they reside. Given this classification of health as a special kind of good and the 
devastating illnesses causing unnecessary preventable deaths within developing countries, it 
is better to focus trials performed within these settings on the needs of those populations 
and on finding treatments for those illnesses. Hence, the argument becomes the need to 
maximise the benefits to those worse off in the interaction.  
Based on this approach trials are usually divided into responsive and non-responsive trials. 
Non-responsive trials are those which recruit trial participants from developing countries 
with the intention of redirecting and applying the benefits of the trial to other better off 
countries. Responsive trials are those which recruit participants from a given location with 
the aim of benefiting these participants or future populations within that same geographical 
location or those who suffer from the same medical condition. I think there are two different 
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issues that need to be clearly distinguished from each other in order for the assessment to be 
precise: the degradation of the participants and the social value of the trial. Social value 
refers to the value of the trial to the community or the population which the trial is recruiting 
from. Hence a trial may be defined as being responsive if it has social value and non-
responsive if no social value is anticipated. On the other hand degradation, as we have 
discussed earlier, refers to the way that the moral worth of the participants is viewed.  
Responsive trials are performed with considerations of the needs of the trial participants and 
with the goal of benefiting them in the end. For example the AZT trial was performed in 
order to find out the effectiveness of shorter courses of ACTG 076 due to the very high 
incidence rates of this devastating illness within the Sub-Saharan African region. The 
participants within the trial were recruited into the trial with the aim of benefiting them as 
well as their communities at the same time therefore it was a responsive trial. One could 
anticipate an argument against the AZT trial to mention that since the trial failed to make 
available the intervention to the population recruited at the end of the trial, then it failed to 
fulfil its social value perspective. This argument is not a valid one. The aim of the trial at the 
time of proposal was to find a less costly, shorter course of the intervention which would be 
affordable to the population being investigated for the prevention of maternal to foetal 
transmission of HIV infection and has reached that goal. It lowered to cost of the intervention 
significantly from $800 per person to $80 per person. By achieving this goal, the trial did 
answer its research question and fulfilled its social value goal. The fact that the local 
government within some developing countries still considered this cost to be too expensive 
compared to its expenditure does not mean that the trial has failed in its responsiveness 
 117 
 
from a social value perspective. The failure from the government to afford the intervention 
comes from a financial point of view at a post-trial stage. Furthermore, referring back to the 
analysis of the social value and its assessment from an ex-ante perspective, we can see that 
the researchers/sponsors did not know that even after lowering the cost of the treatment 
that the cost would still be too high for the local government. This was not known to the 
researchers at the beginning of the trial. Hence it can be seen that there may be other 
reasons which could render responsive trials unable to meet their goals or to fail in other 
aspects for example when the requirements of informed consent are not met. From a social 
value perspective, the AZT trial is a responsive trial.   
On the other hand the Surfaxin trial aimed to prove the effectiveness of a new agent for the 
treatment of a life threatening illness affecting infants without any consideration to the 
improvement of the health care status within Bolivia. The trial did not aim to make available 
a treatment for this life threatening condition within that setting, nor did it aim at lowering 
the high cost attached to these interventions in order to aid the local authorities to afford 
these interventions and therefore make them available to their populations. The whole 
benefit of the trial was anticipated to be directed to future patients within the better off, 
more developed countries. Although I have argued that this does not count as an act which 
would degrade the participants within the trial, the trial’s failure to consider the social value 
of the population leads us to prevent it in order to encourage better more socially valuable 
trials.   
Hence the aim of the strategic intervention is the prevention of the socially valueless trials in 
order to promote socially valuable ones. It is the lack of attention of the trial sponsors to the 
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devastating illnesses that are so widely spread within some developing countries that lead us 
to argue that there has to be a focus on the social value of these trials to the specific 
population within these developing countries. We need to prevent trials recruiting 
participants from developing countries with no social benefit in order to encourage trials that 
have the potential of social value.   
To better understand the strategic intervention, let us consider Wertheimer’s scenario 
assuming that placebo-controlled trials cost less than active-controlled trials and furthermore 
that trials performed within developing countries are less expensive than those carried out 
within the United States which may be due to several factors one of which is the prevalence 
of the illness within that region. In general, four options are available to the researchers: 
1. A placebo-controlled trial in the US 
2. A placebo-controlled trial in a developing country 
3. An active-controlled trial in US 
4. An active-controlled trial in a developing country 
Given that option (1) rarely becomes available to researchers because placebo-controlled 
trials are not allowed unless no other method of treatment exists, three other options are 
left. The performance of placebo-controlled trials within developing countries, option (2), 
may be acceptable in certain circumstances and cannot be placed under the category of 
exploitative interactions blindly. Given the non-existence of treatments for some of the 
illnesses devastating some of these regions, it may become necessary to perform a placebo-
controlled trial. The distinction of whether such trials are exploitative (or not) depends on 
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their social value. For example, going back to the Surfaxin trial, the use of placebo is not 
problematic because of the use of the placebo itself instead of an active agent given that no 
alternative treatments exist within the trial setting within Bolivia. The problem with the trial 
is the lack of value the trial is anticipated to provide to the society. The target population of 
the post-trial benefits was that within developed countries, there was never any intention of 
performing the trial in Bolivia with the aim of benefiting that society or any other developing 
countries where no treatments are available for this life threatening condition. Hence, 
placebo-controlled trials may be classified as exploitative depending on the social value of 
the trial. Active-controlled trials, option (3) and (4), may be seen as being balanced since they 
both compare the tested agent with an active one. Between these two options, Wertheimer 
argues that researchers/sponsors will choose to do the trial in the United States i.e. they will 
choose option (3). I disagree with Wertheimer. Given the market driven nature of 
performance of trials especially by for-profit sponsors, I think that researchers/sponsors will 
choose option (4) and opt to do the trial in developing countries due to the lower cost of 
running the trial there. However, given that no treatment options are available within 
developing countries health care settings, the use of active-controlled trials will cause more 
problems especially if the more expensive agent turns out to be more effective. We have 
mentioned earlier that among the reasons for the in-availability of effective treatments 
within developing countries is their high cost as is the case with the AZT trial. Less expensive 
effective treatments need to be made available. Choosing option (4) is not practical within 
developing countries unless a treatment modality is in fact available within that setting.   
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Therefore we have three options: placebo-controlled trial (with social value) in a developing 
country, active-controlled trial in the United States, and active-controlled trial in a developing 
country. In addition, given that placebo-controlled trials are less costly than active-controlled 
trials, I argue that researchers/sponsors will choose option (2). The strategic intervention 
requires us to prohibit exploitative interaction such as socially invaluable placebo-controlled 
trials in developing countries.   
On the other hand, if we assume that the cost of carrying out a trial in the United States is 
less expensive than in developing countries the situation changes. The options available to 
researchers will again be the four presented above. This time however, option (1) is not 
plausible because placebo-controlled trials are not allowed in the United States when other 
proven medications for the treatment of a specific condition are already available. We are 
once again left with the same three options and I would argue that researchers would still 
choose to perform their trials within developing countries, option (2), since placebo-
controlled trials cost less than active-controlled trials. Applying the strategic intervention 
here means that we prevent socially valueless placebo-controlled trials within developing 
countries in order to promote socially valuable placebo-controlled trials. This rationale 
follows the strategic intervention as presented by Wertheimer. It could be anticipated that if 
the strategic intervention is applied then some researchers/sponsors will simply take the trial 
somewhere else. Should this happen developing countries populations will lose the 
opportunity to benefit from the trial. Although this may be true in some cases, the aim of the 
strategic intervention is to prohibit interactions which are exploitative and promote those 
which are less exploitative. An example which is used by Hawkins and Emanuel will help 
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clarify the issue. Labour unions prohibit the agreement of individual labourers to low wages 
because they want to promote better wages for all labourers (Hawkins and Emanuel, 2008). 
Hence, if we apply the same principle to clinical trials within developing countries and all 
mutually advantageous consensual socially valueless interactions are prohibited, this will 
promote better option i.e. non-exploitative, socially valuable interaction. 
Exploitation of communities: 
A community is defined as a group of individuals who share some common features like 
culture, language, geographical location, religion, political authority, disease etc., and who 
regard themselves as part of the same group, distinct from others who do not share these 
features (Gbadegesin and Wendler, 2006). However, the characteristics that are most 
commonly used to recruit communities into clinical trials most include culture, political 
authority, shared resources, and self-identification (Weijer and Emanuel, 2000). 
Like individuals, communities may be exploited; however the exploitation of communities 
differs from that of individuals (Gbadegesin and Wendler, 2006). To begin with communities 
cannot be exploited through the exploitation of their individual members for example; the 
exploitation of individual participants from Bolivia in the Surfaxin trial does not mean that 
the community as a whole has been exploited. Secondly, the interaction itself has to rely on 
the community’s resources. These resources may be in the form of physical resources such as 
health care facilities or non-physical resources such as the use of the approval processes that 
exist within the community. Furthermore, we have to focus on the reasons for the selection 
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of certain communities for example certain cultural beliefs or characteristics within that 
community, existing health features, or due to simple discriminatory behaviours.  
 So how do we protect these communities as a whole from exploitation? All the criteria that 
make interactions unfair to individual participants from an outcome perspective also apply to 
their communities. The same imbalance of power between the researchers and the 
communities exists as mentioned earlier and they may be unable to refuse certain 
interactions based on funds provided in other areas. The interaction itself may have one of 
three effects on the communities. In this framework communities become regarded as 
harmed, benefited, or unaffected through their interaction with the researchers/sponsors. 
No Effect: 
The interaction between the communities and researchers/sponsors may have no effect on 
the community itself especially if the researchers/sponsors do not utilize any resources from 
the community. However, the interaction between the researchers/sponsors and the 
communities rarely has no effect whatsoever on the community. Some community resources 
may be utilized by the research team such as health care facilities, laboratories, or 
professionals. Hence, we cannot say that the community interaction with the 
researchers/sponsors will have absolutely no effect on that community.  
Harmful effects: 
The community may be harmed by its interaction with researchers/sponsors through two 
possible routes. It may be harmed through the utilization of existing community resources 
such as existing clinics and through the use of its health care providers. In some cases, this 
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harm may have a big impact on the health care services of the community especially where 
these resources are scarce in the first place. However, as we stated earlier, the acceptability 
of harm should be assessed by the community itself or representatives from that community 
just like potential participants are required to assess the acceptability of the potential harms 
of the trial. Furthermore, the analysis of harm to the community has to go through the net-
risk analysis as was done for the individual participants from identification of the net-risk 
interventions, assessment of net-risk interventions, and assessment of cumulative net-risk. 
The assessment though has to focus on the harms to the community rather than those 
anticipated for individual participants.  
1. Identifying the net-risk interventions: 
Once again the first step required us to identify individual interventions within the proposed 
trial, assess their risk-benefit profile, and compare them with the available alternatives 
outside the scope of the trial. If we return to the AZT trial and the Surfaxin trial, the 
interventions available within the trials include an active agent (AZT or Surfaxin) and placebo. 
The use of either of these interventions may harm the community through the use of its 
resources, health care facilities, and health care providers. The risk however is not high given 
that no treatment option is available outside the scope of the trial. Another form of harm to 
the community could come to life through more expenditures for the treatment of the 
potential participants should the interventions not prove effective. However this risk does 
not exceed the risks that exist outside the scope of the trial. The anticipated benefits to the 
community include the training of its health care providers and in the case of the AZT trial, 
the availability of a more affordable treatment option for a disease that devastates the 
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community and its members. Hence both trials do not have a net-risk given that the trial is at 
least as favourable to the community as the available intervention prior to its interaction 
with the researchers.   
2. Assess the net-risk interventions: 
When we shift to the social value of the trials, different outcomes come to life. The AZT trial 
has potential social value through the lowering of the cost of intervention used for the 
treatment if an illness that is affecting large numbers of its populations and which causes 
unnecessary annual deaths. This potential benefit outweighs the risks the community is 
expected to shoulder through its participation within the trial. On the other hand, the 
Surfaxin trial proposed no social value and hence has a net-risk.  
3. Assess the net cumulative risks: 
The cumulative risk of the AZT as well as the Surfaxin trials is justified through the 
assessment of its risk. The cumulative risks equate to those risks outside the boundaries of 
the trial.    
Benefit: 
A community may enter into an interaction with the researcher while anticipating different 
types of benefits such as the improvement of existing health care facilities or the 
establishment of new ones, the gain of medical equipment, or the training of health care 
providers. The community may also anticipate saving health care costs due to the lowering of 
the cost of some of the intervention or the improved health of the individuals within that 
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community which leads to reduced expenditure. Despite the existence of benefit to the 
community, exploitation may still exist within the interaction of the researchers/sponsors if 
the community it is interacting with or certain features within that community are viewed to 
have lower moral value than other communities. Furthermore, it is important to reemphasize 
that the benefit to the communities is assessed based on whether the community receives a 
fair share of the benefits at the end of the interaction compared to those gained by the 
exploiter. This point will be the focus of chapter five when we discuss post-trial benefits.  
Conclusion: 
Exploitation is a term that tends to be used rather loosely to describe actions and behaviours 
that we feel are immoral. I focused the analysis in this chapter on outcome unfairness which 
assessed exploitation based on the end result and how it affects the parties involved within 
the interaction. The chapter presented a focus on outcome fairness from both the individual 
potential participant and community’s perspectives. All possible outcomes were considered 
including no effect, benefits, and harms. A tool for a detailed assessment of harm was 
presented and the delegation of assessment of acceptability of these harms was given to the 
potential participants or communities themselves. Furthermore, the chapter presented 
arguments for the justification of the prohibition of mutually advantageous consensual 
exploitative interactions.  
The interaction between the participants and researchers/sponsors may affect both parties 
but because the participants are the ones considered more vulnerable within that 
interaction, a much larger proportion of the discussion has focussed on them. As with any 
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interaction between two parties, the participants may not be affected at all by that 
interaction, they may be harmed by it, or they may in fact benefit from their interaction with 
the researchers/sponsors from an ex-ante perspective.  
However, even when considering the outcome of an interaction, I have suggested that the 
assessment of harm and its acceptability within an interaction should be done by the person 
or community being exposed to the harm and not by others. Certain individuals may accept 
high levels of risk whereas others may not accept entering into interaction with even minimal 
risk. I have also argued that mutually advantageous interaction may be prohibited even if 
fully informed consent is provided by the participants themselves. My argument to support 
this prohibition relies on one main concept: the strategic intervention. This approach strives 
to promote non-exploitative interaction through the prohibition of exploitative ones. 
Through the arguments presented, we have concluded that instrumental utilization and 
Kant’s universal law do not justify the prevention of mutually advantageous consensual 
interactions or clinical trials given that the whole aim of the performance of clinical trials is 
the generation of generalizable knowledge for the benefit of future patients or populations. 
It has also been argued that just like individual participants, communities may become 
exploited through the interaction with the researcher/sponsor. I have argued that there is no 
instrumental use within clinical trials as both participants and researchers/sponsors use each 
other mutually, each to enhance their own benefit. Furthermore I argued that in order for 
degradation to be present, we need to show that the researchers view trial participants as 
having lower moral worth than participants from developed countries. This did not become 
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evident through argumentation as due respect was given to participants through the process 
of informed consent and respect for the decisions of the participants.  
The next chapter discusses the post-trial stage and what is owed to trial participants (if 
anything) by the researchers. The chapter will also look at the issue of a fair share of the 
benefits and how it can be achieved.  
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Chapter Four: Post-Trial Benefits 
Introduction: 
The chapter will focus on benefits at the end of the trial and how to ensure that each party 
involved within the interaction benefits fairly. The arguments will conclude that post-trial 
access or reasonable availability takes on a very limited approach to the anticipated benefits 
to trial participants and their communities. A more productive way would be to adopt a post-
trial benefit approach. This approach takes into consideration a much broader view about 
post-trial benefits to trial participants and their communities which include direct, collateral, 
and aspirational benefits. This broader view of post-trial benefit aids in the improvement of 
the existing circumstances within these communities. With that same purpose in mind, a 
global research tax is presented. This is a form of taxation which should be implemented on 
all for-profit industrial research sponsors performing trials within developing countries. This 
global research tax is implemented through the deduction of a certain percentage of 
sponsors’ profits. This money is then directed towards improving the settings within these 
developing countries. The implementation of this whole improvement process should be 
done through a monitored and supervised process under the umbrella of either the United 
Nations or the World Health Organization. This supervisory role is essential to ensure that the 
funds obtained through the global research tax are being directed and utilized for their 
intended purposes.  
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After the trial results are obtained and the trial is terminated, the sponsors shift their focus 
towards marketing the intervention and making a profit, with the end result being that the 
proven intervention becomes available on the market (Black, 2001). From an outcome 
perspective of fairness we have to assess whether the parties involved within the interaction 
all benefit in a fair way or not. In order to do this we need to look at the different forms of 
benefit at the end of the trial. This chapter will focus on the kind of benefits that are 
generated from the trials, how they are distributed among the different parties involved, 
how these parties relate to each other, the kind of duties, if any, owed by each party to the 
other, and whether exploitation exists within such circumstances and how it may be 
minimized.  
Benefits: 
Benefit is the enhancement of the well-being of an individual. The researchers/sponsors 
benefit is most commonly represented in monetary terms. Global pharmaceutical sales 
reached $712 billion in 2007 (Petryna, 2009: 2). Sponsors perform trials to test their new 
agents, evaluate old agents for a new purpose, obtain or extend patency rights for an 
intervention, and ultimately make a profit. These profit driven industries strive to reap 
financial gain through marketing products. Achieving rights to market the product however, 
can only happen once the sponsors have secured approval from the appropriate local 
authorities.   
Investigators also stand to benefit from the trial results in many other ways. They can 
become famous by publishing the results, receive academic recognition for their work that 
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leads to pay raises, obtaining an academic title, and perhaps entertain monetary rewards or 
other forms of rewards from the sponsors. In the United States alone about one-quarter of 
US researchers reported accepting significant rewards from pharmaceutical industries 
including financial rewards, sponsored speaking engagements, positions on advisory boards 
and equity holdings (Boyd and Bero, 2000). In discussing potential beneficiaries however, we 
have left out the most important party involved in the trial, the people who made the trial 
possible, the participants, their communities, and the beneficiaries of the drug once 
marketed.   
Benefits to trial participants: 
Benefit to trial participants can be evaluated from different perspectives. From a broad 
perspective, benefit can incorporate several forms that the trial participants may enjoy. King 
identifies three broad categories of benefit arising from research (King, 2000: 333). The first 
one is the direct benefits that the trial participants experience due to the intervention being 
received during the trial. The second benefit, which she calls collateral benefit, refers to the 
benefit gained even if a participant is allocated in the placebo arm of the trial and does not 
receive the active intervention. These collateral benefits include medical examinations as 
well as medical tests that the participants have to go through which may lead to an 
improvement in their health status and may not be available to the trial participants outside 
the scope of the trial. The third category of benefit is what King calls aspirational benefit 
which is experienced by the community and future patients from the results of the study. 
The alternative route of viewing benefits to trial participants takes on a very narrow view of 
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the issue and usually focus on the direct benefits to the participants (Lurie & Wolfe, 1997: 
337) or the increase in collateral benefit (Shapiro and Benatar, 2005: 31). When considering 
direct benefit the discussions usually focus on the provision of the effective treatment to the 
trial participants once the trial is terminated. This is also known as post-trial access. For the 
purposes of the discussions in this thesis, the benefit that participants receive will be 
discussed under two broad headings: post-trial access and post-trial benefit. Each of these 
perspectives will be presented separately.   
Post-trial access: 
Post-trial access refers to providing the proven intervention to trial participants once the 
study has ended. This approach is intended to assure that trial participants are not exploited. 
This is also referred to within some documents as reasonable availability. This section will 
discuss the effectiveness of this approach and will further analyse, and show the weakness of 
the arguments used to support it.   
Reasonable availability: 
Some international guidelines, view a reasonable availability approach as the best way of 
ensuring that participants have post-trial access to the proven intervention and hence 
ensuring benefit to the trial participants. The Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) states: 
"In general, the research project should leave low-resource countries 
or communities better off than previously or, at least, no worse off. It 
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should be responsive to their health needs and priorities in that any 
product developed is made reasonably available to them, and as far as 
possible leave the population in a better position to obtain effective 
health care and protect its own health. (CIOMS, 2002: 12) 
Some believe that adopting the reasonable availability approach by giving the proven 
intervention to research participants represents the sole route for minimizing exploitation 
and benefiting trial participants (Hawkins and Emanuel, 2008). Although this approach may 
reduce instrumental use of trial participants and likelihood of exploitation by ensuring that 
trial participants benefit at the end of the trial, or at least receive some proportion of the 
benefit, this approach has its own limitations. Furthermore the approach is not a practical 
one as will be shown below. 
The main limitation of reasonable availability is its focus that benefit to potential participants 
only exists through the provision of a proven intervention at the end of the trial. Although 
this may be a form of assurance that trial participants receive some form of benefit at the 
end of the trial, that very narrow view of benefit is the source of limitation of the argument 
itself. Assuming that procedural fairness has been ensured through the process of informed 
consent, and assuming as well that the participants know the duration and terms of 
participation within the trial, then it has to be assumed that the agreement of the 
participants to be enrolled into the trial was based on the knowledge that they will not 
receive the proven intervention at the end of the trial. Although it is true that through the 
provision of the proven intervention we may be closer to assuring outcome fairness since the 
participants will actually share with the researchers/sponsors some of the benefits of the 
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trial, the weakness of the reasonable availability argument lies much deeper than this 
superficial layer. Problems with the reasonable availability approach surface once we take a 
closer look at the practicality and feasibility of its application.   
The first argument against reasonable availability uses the narrow view of benefit to prove 
the difficulty with the application of this approach. Reasonable availability depends on 
demonstrated product efficacy. This approach can only work in the context of positive phase 
III trials where one intervention is proven more effective than another existing intervention 
or placebo. If reasonable availability views non-exploitation of trial participants only through 
the provision of the proven intervention, this means that individuals who participate in 
positive phase III trials where an intervention proves to be effective may be treated fairly by 
the researchers/sponsors as they will be provided with the proven intervention. On the other 
hand many other trial participants including phase I, phase II and negative phase III trial 
participants gain no benefit whatsoever and are therefore exploited from an outcome 
perspective because no proven intervention can be provided to the trial participants after 
the trial has come to an end. This approach is problematic since positive outcome from phase 
III trials showing effectiveness of an agent occurs rather infrequently (Djulbegovic et al., 
2000, Chalmers, 1997). Therefore, focussing solely on the provision of the proven 
intervention means we are depriving negative phase III trial participants of all other forms of 
trial benefit. The same line of argumentation would be difficult to defend if a trial did not end 
with proving one arm of the trial as being superior to the others. In these circumstances, the 
participants will be left without the provision of a proven intervention and will therefore, 
according to the argument presented through reasonable availability, be exploited. This 
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inability to provide the proven intervention however came about through no fault of the 
researchers/sponsors. There is simply no proven intervention to be provided to the 
participants. Furthermore, and even if we reserve reasonable availability for phase III trials, 
there is no guarantee of a benefit in the form required by reasonable availability. If equipoise 
truly exists at the beginning of any trial, then there is no way of knowing which arm of the 
trial will prove effective (Freedman, 1987). The whole aim of the trial is to assess the 
effectiveness of the tested intervention against other proven interventions or placebo. In 
some cases this effectiveness may not be proven and there may be no proven intervention to 
be provided to the trial participants. How can we apply reasonable availability when the trial 
agent proves ineffective? This approach requires ensured access to the proven product, yet 
in negative phase III trials none exists.  
I think that because of this very narrow concept regarding benefit to the trial participants, 
the labelling of exploitation has been attached to many trials where a proven intervention 
has not been provided to the participants once the trial has ended. Reasonable availability 
sees provision of the proven intervention to the trial participants as the only way for the 
assurance of non-exploitation or fairness to the trial participants.  
This argument is not entirely true though since phase I and II participants may gain other 
forms of benefit which may be worth more to them than the provision of the proven 
intervention but reasonable availability does not recognize these forms. In reality benefit to 
trial participants could come in different forms. The knowledge gained from phase I and II 
trials does not come in the form of an agent that can be marketed or be made available to 
the public. Yet it cannot be denied that the knowledge gained through these trials and 
 135 
 
information generated is very valuable and may lead to the initiation of further research 
which may in the end come in the form of a proven intervention. However, the immediate 
participants of these early trials do not gain access to this proven intervention. Reasonable 
availability therefore excuses phase I and II trial sponsors from providing benefits to the 
participants due to the absence of a proven intervention. Those individuals recruited as 
phase I, II, and negative phase III trials, who helped sponsors collect the information needed 
for phase III trials and with advancing our knowledge do not stand to gain any benefit 
whatsoever after the trial has ended. 
Another weakness to the demand for post-trial access is the assumption that the approval of 
the placement of any given proven intervention on the market lies within the hands of the 
researchers/sponsors. This assumption fails to recognize the reality of the complicated and 
lengthy process that the proven agent has to go through prior to it being approved by the 
appropriate authorities. In industrialized countries, the pharmaceutical company applies 
through the appropriate authority to register their product and get the green light for 
marketing their agent once a clinical trial has ended. This process can take some time 
because the regulatory authority has to review the trial results and judge whether claims 
made by the sponsor about the effectiveness of the intervention hold. Sponsors can expect 
delays from the time the results of the trial are obtained until the time the intervention 
actually goes to market for several reasons. In some cases, the regulatory authority may not 
find the results convincing based on statistical data, and as a result ask the sponsors to 
confirm the results through another clinical trial. However, this should be an infrequent 
incident especially if due care was exercised through the approval process and the scientific 
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validity was scrutinised. Secondly, the results of the clinical trial may be inconclusive. The 
intervention has to show either superiority over placebo, the preferred method of 
comparison by many sponsoring agencies, or at least prove to be as effective as other 
established interventions for the same medical condition before the product can be 
permitted to be placed on the market. When the results are inconclusive, the regulatory 
authority may insist upon the sponsor carrying out yet another round of testing in perhaps a 
different location, meaning that the participants have to await new test results before being 
given post-trial access to the required intervention. Therefore, to insist upon 
researchers/sponsors to guarantee the availability of any intervention prior to its approval 
may prove difficult in cases where the official agency responsible for approving interventions 
refuses to authorize the agent. This is a problem faced by sponsors in developed countries as 
well as developing countries.  
Similarly, sponsors do not have the authority to instruct ministries of health in developing 
countries, or any other location for that matter, to make a specific intervention part of their 
public health plan. This is a decision that can only be made by the appropriate authorities 
depending on societal needs and future plans. The most a sponsor can do is inform the 
appropriate authorities about the intervention and guide them to its appropriate use. The 
final decision has to come from the developing country itself. The AZT trial is the best 
example for the failure of the assurance of post-trial access as well as the inability of the 
researchers/sponsors to force the local authorities to provide the proven intervention to 
their populations.   
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There are several other arguments usually used to defend post-trial access. These include the 
expectations of the trial participants, abandonments, prevention of instrumental use, and 
justice of reciprocity. Each of these will be discussed separately. 
Expectations of participants: 
In defence of post-trial access, it is sometimes argued that trial participants expect continued 
access to proven intervention once the trial has ended. Hence if that expectation is not 
fulfilled the interaction is labelled as being unfair or exploitative. This claim can hardly be 
considered as a general rule since trial participants may base their expectation on unrealistic 
or false information or misconceptions. To show the evidence of such expectations let us 
consider an example of a multicentre trial testing a drug for the treatment of Parkinson’s 
disease (Amgen case). This trial was terminated by the sponsoring company for safety 
reasons despite the fact that some patients reported improvements in their condition (Saver 
2009). The termination of the trial was justified by the researchers to be due to safety 
reasons. The participants launched a lawsuit against the company to demand continued 
provision of the intervention by the manufacturer of the tested agent.  
The expectation of the participants regarding the provision of the proven intervention is not 
valid for two reasons. The first one relates to the consent of the trial participants to enrol 
into the trial with prior knowledge regarding the expected period of participation and the 
provision of interventions once the trial has ended as discussed earlier in chapter three. To 
ensure that the participants are not exploited from a procedural perspective, the terms of 
the moral contract between the participants and the researchers/sponsors have to be very 
clear from the beginning regarding the provision of the proven intervention once the trial has 
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ended. This approach may minimize the expectations of the participants regarding the 
continuation of the provision of medical interventions after the end of the trial.  
The second and perhaps more difficult factor relating to the expectation of the trial 
participants to receive continued access to interventions relates to the mistaken equation 
between trials and clinical care. Participants may believe that their participation in trials 
automatically qualifies them to receive the proven intervention. This of course is a false 
impression or misconception held by some. Confusion about the nature of the researcher-
participant relationship in comparison to the physician-patient relationship represents the 
other form of misconception leading to false expectations by participants. This form of 
therapeutic misconception has already been discussed in chapter two and hence will not be 
repeated here. Suffice it to say here that the two roles of physicians and researchers do not 
have the same goal nor are the same duties owed by the physicians and the researchers to 
the patients and trial participants respectively.   
Researchers however do owe their participants the duty to ensure their informed and valid 
consent is provided as well as ensuring their safety throughout the trial. Relating more to 
outcome unfairness which is the focus of the discussion, expectations of the participants or 
the sponsors alike do not qualify as an argument for or against the provision of the proven 
interventions. If participants expect to receive a certain level or type of benefit especially if 
clear information has been provided to them through the communication process with the 
researchers and their team, the fulfilment of that expectation does not mean that the 
interaction between the researcher and the participants is a fair one. Furthermore, the 
expectation or demand of the participants may be based falsely on the principle of 
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autonomy. Participants may believe that one of the elements of their freedom is to make 
such demands. However even in clinical settings, autonomy is not absolute and may be 
restricted under certain circumstances. Situations where the autonomy of individuals may be 
restricted include for example situations where their demands are based on misconceptions, 
impose risk on others, or the demands are unrealistic. Hence expectations of trial 
participants do not form a firm basis for the demand of post-trial access. 
Abandonment: 
According to this view, researchers abandon their participants once they have finalized their 
trial and obtained their needed results. The trial participants therefore sustain loss because 
they no longer receive the active agent. Furthermore, the trial participants lose the extensive 
medical services and follow-up which they enjoyed during the trial period.  
The abandonment argument fails to recognize two points, the first is that the loss the 
participants allegedly suffer from is not something imposed by the researchers, but rather 
arises naturally when allowing participants to return to their original state prior to their 
participation within the trial. Although this initial state may be inferior to the participant 
status within the trial, it does not come about as a direct result of the researchers’ actions. 
The researchers do not make the participants worse off. Rather, the circumstances 
surrounding the trial populations cause this reversion to their initial state. Furthermore, 
there are several other kinds of benefits which the participants may gain at the end of the 
trial other than the proven intervention. The improvement of the status of the trial 
participants may come about regardless of the provision of the proven interventions. 
Improved local health care services and training of local health care providers may also lead 
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indirectly to the improvement in the health status of the participants. Hence researchers may 
provide alternative options at the end of the trial which may indirectly improve the health of 
the participants.   
The abandonment argument also fails to recognise that researchers and participants have 
entered into a moral contract with each other. This contract states that the trial participant 
agrees to enrol into a trial and receive an intervention associated with one of the trial arms 
for a specified period of time. At the end of this period, the moral contract or relationship 
between the two parties ends. The participants’ informed valid consent shows that they have 
chosen to enrol with a knowledge of all that will happen at the end of the trial. This brings 
the issue of procedural fairness into the focus of the argument once again. The simple 
obtaining of the signature of the participants on a piece of paper is not the goal of procedural 
fairness. Rather it is the quality of the information being presented to the participants, the 
communication between them and the researchers, and their comprehension of that 
information is of importance here. The research team needs to disclose the duration of 
participation to potential participants at the outset within the information sheets and 
emphasize this information through the communications session. It has also been argued in 
chapter two that the level of comprehension of information has to be assessed by the 
researchers prior to the enrolment of the participants into the trial. If this is ensured, the 
ending of the contract also means the end of the relationship between participant and 
researcher and not abandonment.  
Admittedly, there may be instances where trial participants agree to the enrolment into a 
trial despite the fact that they know they are being exploited i.e. mutually advantageous 
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consensual exploitation. This may be linked to two issues, the first one relates to the issue of 
the agreement of trial participants to be enrolled into the trial due to the external 
circumstances that they live within. However, I have argued in chapter two in relation to 
procedural fairness that despite of these existing factors within the environment where the 
trial participants live within, this fact alone does not mean that they did not understand the 
information being presented to them, nor does it mean that their agreement was irrational 
or non-voluntary. Secondly, I have argued in chapter three that despite the fact that 
exploitation may in some circumstances be agreed to by the potential participants; it does 
not mean that the particular interaction should be allowed. However these arguments 
related more to the social value of the trial rather than focusing on the consent of the 
participants. Hence, this argument will not be further discussed here as I do not see it as 
having an implication on the discussion at hand.  
When the demands are made for information sheets to contain certain information and for 
researchers to ensure proper communication and the understanding of that information by 
the potential participants; it cannot be argued at the same time that the 
researchers/sponsors should continue to provide the proven intervention after the 
designated time frame. Arguing that the researchers/sponsors should continue to provide 
the proven intervention at the end of the trial places unfair demands on the 
researchers/sponsors. Researchers/sponsors enter into a relationship with the trial 
participants based on the same terms that the participants have agreed to. They are required 
to perform certain duties within a specific period of time. To demand that they extend the 
duration of their commitment and provision of interventions for the mere reason that the 
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participants feel abandoned at the end of the trial in unfounded. Although the 
researchers/sponsors are the more powerful within the interaction, placing unreasonable 
demands on them is also unfair and may be labelled as being exploitative of the 
researchers/sponsors.  
Furthermore, and assuming that the abandonment argument holds, post-trial access 
demands should be directed at the researchers or their institutions because they form one of 
the contracting parties whereas in reality, the researchers as well as institutions do not have 
the power, authority, or financial capability to supply trial participants with the proven 
intervention. The only authority capable of supplying the proven intervention is the sponsor 
of the trial or the pharmaceutical company. Yet, trial participants have no rightful claim to 
receiving proven intervention directly from the pharmaceutical company because in reality 
participants never enter into a legally valid contract with the sponsoring party. This specific 
point was challenged in the United States courts through the Amgen case which was 
presented earlier (Saver, 2009). After the termination of the trial for safety reasons, the 
participants launched a lawsuit against the company to demand continued supply of the 
intervention. Their claim was based on promises made in the informed consent document 
assuring participants post-trial access. The court ruled that because no contract existed 
between sponsors and participants the latter could not claim access to the drug from Amgen.  
“In this complex web of contractual relationships, there were, 
importantly, no direct agreements between Amgen and the subjects, 
and so the subject’s breach of contract against Amgen failed” (Saver, 
2009: 422).   
 143 
 
Therefore, the only authority capable of supplying the intervention remains outside the 
contract. Furthermore, the court ruled that despite promises made in the informed consent 
form assuring the participants about post-trial access to the proven intervention, these 
promises were not unconditional and subject to change in the event of trial termination for 
scientific reasons such as efficacy and safety. These loop holes make it almost impossible for 
participants to demand post-trial access from sponsors directly. This is perhaps why some 
international guidelines encourage the discussion and specification of post-trial benefits prior 
to trial approval. In addition, the participants presume receiving a continued supply of 
proven intervention whereas I have argued earlier that the contract between the researcher 
and the participant should be very clear regarding the provision of the proven intervention at 
the end of the trial. This presumption once again stems from confusion between the roles of 
the researcher and physician and misconceptions concerning the respect for autonomy. Even 
if we assume that physicians and researchers play similar roles, physicians are not required to 
give in to patients’ demands, or provide unproven interventions for their patients. The 
respect for autonomy means respecting the choices of patients or trial participant and 
allowing them to choose options suitable to them. However, this freedom is not absolute and 
may become restricted justifiably under certain circumstances. Furthermore, the provision of 
post-trial access to trial participants only reinforces the misconception held by members of 
the public that place the physician-patient relationship at an equal level with the researcher-
participant relationship.  
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Instrumental use: 
To use someone instrumentally is to utilize them for the sole purpose of reaching one’s goal 
without respect or regard for their own needs, or without them benefiting at the end of the 
interaction. To prove that researchers/sponsors use the participants instrumentally we need 
to prove that these points actually exist within the interaction. Although we have argued in 
chapter three that there is no instrumental use of participants by the researchers given that 
the interaction is mutually advantageous and that they both use each other in order to gain 
benefit, we need to focus the discussion of instrumental use here from the post-trial 
perspective. There are many different accounts of respect (Feinberg, 1975; Hudson, 1980). 
Broadly speaking, respect is owed to all people regardless of any other factors for example 
characteristics or social value. Perhaps the most influential discussions about respect have 
mainly revolved around the Kantian perspective which argues that respect is owed to 
persons because they are rational beings. The categorical imperative demands that we: 
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or the person of any other, never simply as a means but always 
at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1785/1996: 4: 429). 
The respect owed to those rational individuals, according to Kant, is unconditional because 
they have an intrinsic worth or dignity. It is because of this dignity that humans are not to be 
used as mere objects. The unconditional requirement for respect is built on two main 
features, that of their ability to determine ends and their ability to act autonomously (Wood, 
1999; Korsgaard, 1996; Hill, 1997). The ability to set ends is based on the person’s capability 
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to use rationality and reasoning to make decisions whereas their ability to act as autonomous 
individuals relates to their ability to make choices freely that will fit in with their future plans 
and therefore life.   
The respect of the researchers/sponsors to the participants is represented on two main 
levels, prior to their enrolment into the trial and after enrolment. Prior to enrolment, 
participants are respected through the assurance of procedural fairness where they are 
provided with certain information and given the freedom to choose whether to enrol into the 
trial or not. After enrolment, the respect to the participants is represented in the 
researchers’/sponsors’ respect for the confidentiality of the participants, and informing them 
of any adverse events that may unexpectedly occur during the clinical trial. Participants 
should also feel free to withdraw from the trial if needed, and should not be forced or 
coerced to continue their participation in the clinical trial.  
The lack of benefit at the end of the interaction is perhaps the most commonly used point to 
support the argument of instrumental use of the trial participants. This argument focuses on 
the outcome fairness of the interaction between the researches/sponsors and the 
participants. If viewed from a post-trial access point of view, which is based on the provision 
of proven interventions, all other forms of benefit that the trial participants actually gain 
through their interaction with the researchers/sponsors are excluded. The participants of the 
trial receive extensive health care services and attentions only through their involvement in 
the trial. Other members of the community do not have access to the same level of health 
care services. This aspect within itself is a huge benefit to the participants and in some cases 
may lead to the improvement in their health status. Participants also frequently receive 
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continued services once the trial has ended. Otherwise stated, additional trial effects come 
into play which may benefit participants. Their interaction with the researchers/sponsors is 
not exploitative, from an outcome perspective at least, since some form of benefit does exist. 
Having said that, the interaction itself may still be defined as exploitative even with the 
benefits being provided to the trial participants as has been discussed in chapter three since 
some exploitative interaction may actually benefit the exploited party.  
Justice of reciprocity: 
The phrase “justice of reciprocity” implies that people who participate in an action deserve to 
benefit from it; for example, trial participants who commit their time and effort into the trial 
as well as their acceptance of the risks entailed within the trial should receive a fair share of 
the benefits that are generated from the trial.  
“Each person who benefits from the contributions of others in a 
cooperative enterprise in which that person participates owes 
something to those other contributors, and they, for the same reason, 
owe something to these individual, but only insofar as that individual is 
a contributor.” (Buchanan, 1990: 229). 
Reciprocity entails that benefit to both parties involved should be ensured through the 
distribution of the net benefit. Sponsors benefit immensely, especially in positive clinical 
trials but mostly in a financial manner. What we need to look at is how the participants’ 
collateral benefit could be labelled as being a fair share. There are several ways through 
which the participants of the trial may benefit and for the purposes of this section they will 
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be divided into monetary benefits and health benefits each of which will be presented 
separately.   
Monetary benefit: 
One way of ensuring reciprocal justice to trial participants in the post-trial period could be 
the provision of monetary rewards. The problem attached to such an approach is that it 
could promote undue inducement. It is usually agreed that monetary rewards should be of 
such a small amount in order for them not to form a reason for the participants to agree to 
enrol into the trial. However, given the vulnerability of the individuals within some 
developing countries and the health care settings, even small amounts of financial rewards 
may take on an undue inducement form. Furthermore once this behaviour of providing 
monetary rewards to trial participants becomes standard practice, the potential participants 
will start to expect financial reward for their services. Hence potential participants may 
accept to become enrolled into trials only with anticipation of pocketing money even if it was 
of little value to the researchers/sponsors.  
Furthermore, adding a monetary reward to the trial participants means an increase in the 
total cost of the trial to the researchers/sponsors. This could hamper establishing 
interventions effective for illnesses that devastate these areas. If researchers/sponsors are 
attracted to developing countries due to the lower cost of the trial within these settings then 
by increasing the cost of running the trial within developing countries we may be causing 
researchers/sponsors to shy away from carrying out trials in developing countries. Instead 
researchers/sponsors may find it more cost effective to conduct their trials in places where 
no such demands exist. 
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Health benefits: 
Health benefits to the trial participants may take different forms. The benefits may come 
about as a result of the provision of interventions through the trial or through the intensified 
health care services; follow up, medical care, and tests that these participants receive during 
their participation within the trial. Hence the participants may actually benefit from their 
participation in the trial through the improvement in their health status. Does this kind of 
benefit count as a fair division of the net gain at the end of trial between the parties? In 
order to answer this question we need to specify whether justice of reciprocity specifies that 
the benefits gained by the parties involved within the interaction have to come at the end of 
their interaction in order for justice to be served. However, this is not the case. The fair 
distribution of the benefits does not specify the time frame within which these benefits 
should occur nor does it specify that the duration of existence of these benefits and whether 
they could be permanent or temporary benefits.  Furthermore, it does not call for an equal 
division of the profits between the researchers/sponsors and the trial participants, but rather 
a fair division of the benefits.  
The answer to whether this benefit experienced by the participants during their participation 
within a trial counts as a fair share of the benefits lies within how health itself is viewed. We 
have argued in chapter three that health is considered as a basic human good without which 
people cannot live a thriving life. The improvements in the health of the trial participants 
whether it comes during their participation within a trial or at the end of it, does not change 
the fact that there has been an improvement in their primary need. An improvement in 
health may be a priceless goal to most humans especially those who are facing difficulties in 
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receiving basic health care needs. The importance of this benefit gains more value when 
compared to the benefits made by the researchers/sponsors which most commonly take the 
form of financial gains. Therefore, because of the value attached to health, the benefits 
gained by the participants could be classified as a form of post-trial benefits regardless of 
their timing.  Hence, in principle justice of reciprocity is admirable and could be used to 
enhance the benefit of the trial participants, but to focus on it in the context of post-trial 
access alone ignores many other aspects of benefit aimed at enhancing participant 
outcomes. This point will be further discussed in the post-trial benefit section. Yet, several 
other issues which relate to post-trial access need to be discussed including the duration of 
access and the population which deserves to receive post-trial access.  
Duration of access: 
The provision of the proven intervention may be one of the methods of minimizing 
exploitation within the researcher-participant interaction. However; the provision itself gives 
rise to some concerns which in my view weaken the argument as it shows the failure of the 
concept in the prevention of exploitation of trial participants. Trial sponsor usually supply the 
proven intervention to the trial participants in the post-trial period anywhere from a couple 
of months to a couple of years, leaving us with the question: what happens after that time? 
Asking researchers/sponsors to continue supplying participants with the proven intervention 
as long as they need it seems superficially like a logical answer. However, this kind of support 
fails to happen in reality and is unfair for the researcher/sponsor. To begin with the 
researchers/sponsors fail to commit for this provision of the proven intervention for long 
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periods of time. To prove the failure of this approach, we will use a known case form Brazil 
which exemplifies the situation.   
Pharmaceutical companies in Brazil found a loop hole within the healthcare system within 
the country (Petryna, 2009: 144-146). Although initially the pharmaceutical company 
supplied the participants with the proven intervention these sponsors approached research 
participants and informed them about their right to receive treatment from the state for 
their illnesses since health is viewed as a right and the country is obligated to provide the 
intervention to the population. The sponsors then told participants to sue the state with the 
aim of forcing the state into purchasing and providing an intervention for a specific 
population. Many participants won these law suits and the state was forced to purchase 
expensive interventions from the manufacturer who was earlier known as the sponsor of the 
trial. Where does this money come from? It is the health care system within the state that 
suffers immensely, particularly in the areas of preventive and primary health care. Money is 
pumped from government resources to purchase these expensive drugs (some of which may 
cost around $2000 per patient per month) instead of supporting other development projects 
within the healthcare system. This form of post-trial access, usually affecting a small group of 
the population, appears unjust because it creates an unbalanced burden on other patients 
who either fail to receive health care services or suffer from delays in access to needed 
healthcare services although they are entitled to them (Saver, 2009). Therefore, we may 
conclude that in addition to the provision of proven interventions not falling under the duties 
of the researchers/sponsors which has been argued for earlier, forcing sponsors to supply the 
proven intervention to the trial participants makes the situation worse for the health care 
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system we are trying to improve. In addition this approach fails to prevent the exploitation of 
trial participants. 
On the other hand, to demand that the researchers/sponsors supply the proven intervention 
to the trial participants at the end of the trial also places unfair demands on the 
researchers/sponsors. The researchers/sponsors are required to endure extra expenses in 
cases of successful or positive trials. They already put a lot of money into any given trial, even 
if with the intention of making much more money at the end. If developing countries inject 
too many demands of expenditures from sponsors, the sponsors in turn may decide it is not 
worth doing their research in developing countries. If They may stand a better chance of 
coming out ahead by carrying out their research in a developed country rather than 
developing countries even if it means carrying out trials for “me too’ drugs or trials for minor 
conditions. If these demands are only made for trials being performed in developing 
countries and not industrialized ones, then the researchers/sponsors will shy away from trials 
which may in the end turn out to be much more costly than initially intended. The developing 
countries lose out in this case because the aim of performing the trials within developing 
countries is to find cures for illnesses that cause many unnecessary deaths within these 
populations. Furthermore, the sponsors will make every effort to shift the cost of providing 
the intervention to another authority, most likely the health care authority within the 
developing countries, even when they agree to supply the intervention and absorb the 
necessary production costs. This practice in return harms the developing countries rather 
than promote a net benefit.   
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Who should have access? 
A couple of pathways could be considered when discussing who should have post-trail 
access. It could be argued that only trial participants should have access to the proven 
intervention. While a much broader view could be taken to argue that the whole population 
which suffers from the same illness must receive the proven intervention once the trial has 
ended. Each category will be discussed separately. 
1. Participants of the trial: 
Deciding whether participants in both arms of the trial should gain from the results once the 
trial has ended stems from the principle of fairness and the ides of loss or abandonment. The 
latter two have already been discussed in detail in the earlier section hence only fairness will 
be discussed here. 
The principle of fairness requires that we treat like cases alike and different cases differently. 
Each participant agrees to carry the burden of the trial without knowing which arm he or she 
will be assigned to at the time of enrolment. Therefore in principle, all trial participants 
should be viewed as similar cases and should receive equal benefits once the trial is over. At 
the same time, to hold that treating like cases alike through their provision with the proven 
intervention does not necessarily mean that outcome unfairness has been taken care of. For 
the interaction to be fair from an outcome perspective, the participants need to receive a fair 
share of the benefits generated from the trial. The fairness of this division of benefits does 
not translate only into the provision of the proven intervention. Other forms of benefit could 
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be provided to the participants and they would still lead us to conclude that there is fair 
division of the benefits. These will be presented while discussing post-trial benefits.   
2. Whole population:  
It could be argued that post-trial access should include those who were willing to participate 
in the trial but were excluded by the researchers/sponsors. This notion reverts again to the 
concept of fairness: treating like cases alike. However, people who have participated in a trial 
and those excluded from it cannot be defined as like cases. Those who actually participated 
in the trial and carried the burdens of the trial cannot be put in the same category as the 
nonparticipants or the general population. It has been discussed earlier that trial participants 
who had a contractual relationship with the researchers/sponsors have no entitlement to 
post-trial access. How can we then justify post-trial access to individuals who were never in a 
contractual relationship with the researchers/sponsors in the first place. They were not 
exposed to the risk of harm from the trial in order for them to claim that they have to have 
access to the proven intervention. The general population cannot be said to be like the trial 
participants and cannot be said to be deserving of post-trial access. 
Furthermore, it has to be emphasized that the insistence on post-trial access whether to trial 
participants or whole populations reaffirms the misconception the public already may have 
about the roles of the researchers and those of the health care providers as has been 
discussed in more detail earlier.  
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3. Communities: 
It could be argued that through their participation in the trial communities deserve to receive 
benefits at the end of the trial. The communities sometimes contribute to the trial through 
the use of its health care professionals or its equipment. Hence the community carried some 
of the burdens of the trial and therefore deserves a fair share of the benefits at the end of 
the trial (Gbadegesin and Wendler, 2006). Justice of reciprocity certainly agrees with this line 
of argumentation. Since the community has participated in the process, then it deserves to 
receive a fair share of the benefits at the end. 
Considering the arguments presented earlier regarding post-trial access, it can be seen why 
this approach does not satisfy the requirements of fairness or justice. It is inconsistent, may 
be applied in only a limited number of trials, and is impractical. Furthermore, it emphasizes 
the confusion that surrounds the distinct roles of physicians and researchers. With this 
viewpoint in mind let us now present the arguments to support post-trial benefit and how it 
would help developing countries to a greater extent.   
Post-trial benefits: 
The fact that it is cheaper to perform trials in developing countries than in developed 
countries compels sponsors to move their trials to developing countries. In doing so the 
sponsors take advantage of the unfair circumstances that exist within these countries to 
advance their own interests. This does not mean that the interaction has to be unfair. We 
can ensure that trial participants and their communities are not exploited through the 
assurance that they receive a fair share of the benefits as a result of their participation in any 
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given trial. Since we have argued earlier that post-trial access does not satisfy the 
requirements for the assurance of fairness of reciprocity, we need to find other methods to 
ensure the fair benefit of trial participants and their communities.   
There is no doubt that trial sponsors invest a lot of money into clinical trials with the aim of 
gaining benefit at the end of their venture. They claim that these trials are costly and risky 
(Trouiller et al., 2002). Yet, this goal of making a profit does not imply that only the sponsor 
should benefit from the trial. Other parties who have helped the sponsors in achieving their 
trial goals must also stand to gain. Sponsors should share their trial profits fairly with those 
who helped them reach their goal. Hence we need to be clear about what fair benefits mean.  
Hawkins and Emanuel argue that fair benefit depends on three ethical conditions (Hawkins & 
Emanuel, 2008: 299). The conditions include: the research addressing a health problem 
specific or relevant to the developing country population, a fair selection of trial participants, 
and the trial having a favourable risk-benefit ratio. Two of these conditions will not be 
discussed here. The first one is the favourable risk-benefit ratio given that the assessment of 
harm has been presented earlier in chapter three and it was concluded that the potential 
trial participants and/or their communities should assess the acceptability of these harms. 
The second condition which will not be discussed here is the fair subject selection. Although 
this condition is very important, it relates more to the ethical appraisal of trial proposals. 
Therefore, this second condition relating to fair subject selection will be presented in more 
detail in chapter five when discussing the role of the RECs. The remaining condition 
presented by Hawkins and Emanuel will be presented here since it is relevant to this chapter, 
namely, the research addressing a health problem relevant to the developing country. 
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An example of research relevant to the health care needs of the populations is the study 
done by the institute of One World Health (iOWH). This institute is the first non-profitable 
research company wishing to develop new drugs and reuse old ones with global health needs 
in mind. The institute focuses on neglected diseases affecting poor people who cannot afford 
the expensive drugs. One success story realised by the institute's work occurred in 2004 
during a trial conducted in India and funded by a $10 million grant from the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation. The iOWH in cooperation with the Special Program for Research and 
Training in Tropical Disease of the World Health Organization assessed the benefits of 
Paromomycin for treating leishmaniasis, a deadly parasitic disease spread by the bites of 
infected sand flies. The disease itself causes 60,000 deaths per year in Tropical and 
Subtropical countries. Paromomycin itself was ignored for a long time because it had become 
an off-patent drug. After the trial was over, the Indian government approved the use of the 
drug and furthermore, endorsed producing it locally. This example proves that research 
conducted in needed areas can provide positive outcomes, and also shows how the road to 
success can include both the researchers and the local community. Such collaboration 
further strengthens the acceptance of the trial results because they are tailored to 
community needs. This example shows how directly addressing the health care needs of the 
developing countries through carrying out research aimed at generating either information 
about the illnesses affecting these areas, or treatments for the condition helps reduce the 
10/90 gap. Therefore, directly linking clinical trials to illnesses devastating the developing 
countries specifically will lead to improvements in the health care services and circumstances 
there. This necessarily involves training the local health care providers in the treatment of 
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the illnesses that affect developing countries’ populations, establishing health care facilities 
in some cases (either mobile or stationary) (Crossette, 2001) where none exist, and 
following-up the participant populations medically or otherwise for extended periods of 
time. By following these steps the health of the populations in the affected countries will 
improve and unnecessary deaths will be prevented.   
Having said that, we still need to specify the kind of benefit that would be expected in the 
post-trial period. We have presented earlier King’s classification of benefits to the trial 
participants, however, given that direct benefit has been extensively discussed earlier in 
several areas, we will only discuss collateral and aspirational benefits here. 
Collateral benefit: 
This kind of benefit refers to the benefits that the trial participants experience through their 
participation in the trial even if they do not receive the tested intervention. Such benefits 
may include but are not exclusive to intensified medical examination and testing as well as 
receiving medical care which may not be available outside the scope of the trial. It could be 
argued that these kinds of benefits are in fact short lived and only last while the trial is being 
carried out. However, even if they are short-lived, they still have a major impact on the 
participants and may be defined as collateral benefit due to the way humans view health and 
value it. These intensified medical tests and follow ups may improve the quality of life of the 
participants as well as their health. 
Based on the importance of health and how it is viewed Daniels argues that health becomes 
a special kind of good as a result of the unfair distribution of healthcare services and the 
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importance of health to individuals (Daniels, 1985). Therefore, someone’s need for treatment 
for an illness e.g. tuberculosis, is the same regardless of whether the person resides in a 
developed country like the United Kingdom or in one of the developing countries. The 
improvement in the health of the individual participant is priceless and certainly worth more 
than any monetary compensation they may be offered. This kind of benefit should not be 
excluded when benefits to the participants are being considered.  
Other means of increasing collateral benefit may include differential drug pricing and profit 
sharing. Without going into a lot of details regarding differential pricing, the application of 
this concept could solve many of the problems some developing countries are facing 
regarding the inability to provide certain treatments to their populations due to their 
expensive prices. The best examples are the pricing of the interventions used to prevent the 
transmission of HIV from mother to foetus. The failure of the provision of the agent to the 
population came about through the high prices attached to these agents. Despite the fact 
that the price was significantly reduced, the government was still unable to afford the agent 
and its price was still considered to be high. This meant that the local government remained 
unable to make the proven intervention available to the population in need.  
Aspirational benefit: 
Aspirational benefit refers to the benefits that are experienced by the community and future 
patients as a result of the study. Such benefits may include capacity building or training of 
health care professionals. This kind of benefit usually focuses on building local health 
capacities or purchasing equipment which may be considered as essential for the health care 
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system. Some developing countries lack so many essential factors for providing even the 
most basic health care services for their populations. There is usually a lack of health care 
facilities, shortage of essential medication and necessary medical equipment, and sometimes 
a lack of training of health care providers. Hence, in some cases, the researchers/sponsors 
may be required to purchase certain equipment, or to build health care facilities whether 
mobile or permanent in order to be able to perform their trial within developing countries. 
They may also need to train local health care providers and researchers on how to detect 
certain condition, test for them, and treat them. Usually at the end of the trial, these 
equipments and health care facilities are left for local use. This is a benefit that the 
community and future patients may benefit immensely from. Furthermore, the knowledge 
gained by the local health care providers and researchers will help in the better management 
of their patients and may generate more local research.  
It is important to emphasize however, that despite the availability of different kinds of 
collateral and aspirational benefits, there is no shared international standard regarding 
fairness when it comes to collateral and aspirational benefits. (Pogge, 2002). Hence instead 
of anticipating the local needs by REC members within developed countries, local assessment 
of the anticipated post-trial benefits would be a more appropriate method to adopt since 
local community members are expected to have a better insight into local needs. This local 
assessment could be done through a negotiation process between the local representatives 
and the researchers/sponsors. Local representatives could include the REC members (with 
emphasis on the importance of lay members within the committee), the community leader, 
or the concerned potential participants. A negotiation step is extremely important between 
 160 
 
the representatives of the local community and the researchers/sponsors. Several scenarios 
may be born through this negotiation process. One of these scenarios is that unreasonable or 
exaggerated demands are made by the local representatives. For example, the local 
community may demand the establishment of shopping malls or commercial residence 
buildings. In such cases, the negotiation process is extremely important. Both parties can 
discuss these terms and come to an agreement that is acceptable to both. On the other hand 
the researchers may offer the local community certain benefits which may be at a much 
lower level than what they could actually offer. In such a situation, the local community may 
accept these terms not because they represent the local needs but rather because of the 
existing local setup. Their analysis may be that some benefit to the community may be better 
than no benefit at all. In these situations, although benefit is being offered to the local 
community, the interaction itself may still be defined as a mutually advantageous consensual 
exploitative interaction. Hence these interactions should be prohibited based on the strategic 
intervention argument presented earlier in order to promote better alternatives. In cases 
where an agreement cannot be reached between the two parties, either of them may 
withdraw from the interaction.     
All the conditions that apply to individuals making informed decisions regarding a trial should 
apply to the community as well. They have to receive enough information regarding the trial 
and their decisions have to be free from coercion or external pressure. The question that 
needs to be answered is who should actually make such decisions for the communities? 
There could be a range of options, including managers of health services, politicians, and civil 
servants. Although these options may be available within developing countries, I argue that 
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the most appropriate local representative to be charged with this responsibility is the local 
REC. The makeup of these RECs with representatives from the public as well as members 
with scientific/medical backgrounds makes us believe, at least from a logical perspective, 
that these boards would be capable of negotiating realistically with the research team. Being 
members of the community, both the medical and lay members of the community, the REC 
members would have an insight into the needs of the local community. Furthermore, this 
assessment of local needs by RECs’ could incorporate the feedback of local health authorities 
or civil servants mentioned earlier. This is why it is extremely important to carefully select 
the lay members of the RECs to ensure that their level of education and knowledge about 
their local set up is acceptable. This point will further be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. The people involved in the decision making process may need further information 
regarding the kinds of benefits that have been experienced by other communities or 
populations. For this reason, Hawkins and Emanuel propose that a “publically accessible 
repository of all benefit agreements” (Hawkins and Emanuel, 2008: 303) should be 
established and be operated by an independent body such as the World Health Organization. 
Through this repository, benefits experienced by actual communities may be registered and 
they can be referred to by other communities in order for them to realize the kind and 
magnitude of benefits being discussed. 
Another form of independent body supervision to ensure fair benefit is presented by 
Ballantyne in what she calls the global research tax (Ballantyne, 2005). Ballantyne’s argument 
is based on two points. These include increasing benefits to the worse-off party in the trial 
and minimizing exploitation. Ballantyne begins by setting the boundaries that fall outside the 
 162 
 
scope of what sponsors are required to do. The first point she stresses is that sponsors are 
not required to perform trials at a loss; secondly, they do not have an obligation of 
beneficence to populations in developing countries. Thirdly, sponsors need only share 
benefits that arise from the trial itself and not those previously acquired. The aim of this 
approach is to ensure that while sponsors still benefit from carrying out trials in developing 
countries, the gap between the benefits of the sponsors and those less well-off is reduced.  
Ballantyne advocates imposing a global research tax which aims to maximize the benefits to 
the research populations and their communities while minimising benefits to the sponsor. 
She suggests that despite the implementation of a global research tax, trial sponsors would 
still benefit from their interactions with the participants and their communities. She justifies 
her calculation of benefit by comparing this approach with the next best alternative which is 
research being carried out within developed countries. Because sponsors can run trials faster 
and cheaper in developing countries it is more beneficial for them to conduct trials there. 
Statistics show that sponsors enjoy a 60% cost savings in clinical trial development by moving 
clinical trials from developed countries into developing countries (Ballantyne, 2005).  
Ballantyne uses the Global Alliance figures for tuberculosis drug development to support her 
position. According to the Global Alliance, the cost of phase III trials in the United States is 
22.6 million dollars whereas the cost of carrying out the same trial in Uganda is 8.2 million 
only (Global Alliance, 2001). These numbers mean that a net profit gain is anticipated for 
sponsors even when global research tax is set as high as 90%. This means that instead of 
sponsors performing trials on trivial drugs or repetition of similar trials, a more serious focus 
on intervention relevant to the developing countries’ populations will have to be established. 
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Applying the global research tax would mean a reduction in the pharmaceutical companies’ 
ability to perform marginal trials in some areas. The advantage to this step comes in two fold. 
The first is the reduction in the focus on what is known as “me too drugs” and then a shift to 
research in areas where cures are truly needed. Secondly, the tax paid will aid the 
communities in the developing countries to develop their health care services among other 
areas where improvements are needed. However, Ballantyne stresses that deciding on the 
most appropriate level of global research tax for all parties concerned warrants further 
examination. To be effective, this tax will have to be applied to all for-profit sponsors of trials 
because for-profit organizations are not expected to voluntarily give up part of their profit, 
especially when realising inconsistent profits and need for enhanced profit compared to that 
gained from the next best alternative.  The calculation of the tax should exclude the costs of 
the trial to the sponsors and tie directly to the cost of conducting the trial in developed 
countries. But, why should sponsors feel obligated to share their profits in developing 
countries when they are not required to do so in developed countries? The answer to this 
question lies in the unfair circumstances that already exist in developing countries. Hence, 
there is a need to maximise the benefits to those worse off in the interaction. 
“the notion of fairness to persons as such- according to which treating 
persons as such requires redressing , within limits, those morally 
arbitrary disadvantages that significantly impede their flourishing” 
(Buchanan, 1990: 234). 
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The main idea behind the global research tax is that it has to maximise the benefits to those 
worse-off in the interaction. Ballantyne’s approach although creating additional expense for 
the sponsors, still allows for an expected margin of profit compared to gains from trials 
performed in developed countries. From another perspective imposing a global research tax 
would broaden benefit to the community by fulfilling other basic needs outside of health 
care services. Some developing countries lack proper sanitation, clean water supplies, safe 
food sources etc. Therefore the benefit to the community could happen through improving 
access to these basic goods rather than focusing on health alone.    
The weaknesses with Ballantyne’s global research tax approach come at several levels. On 
the sponsors’ level, it could easily be seen how trial sponsors could redirect their trials to 
other locations where no such demands for taxation are made. If sponsors can still perform 
their trials in other areas where they are allowed to keep all of their profit, then surely this is 
what they will do. Hence as a precautionary step to prevent this selection of locations, trial 
sponsors should be asked to truly consider the cost of performing trials in developing 
countries. When this is done, and it becomes clear that the sponsors would still be at a profit 
even after the global research tax is deducted then perhaps sponsors will be encouraged to 
perform more trials within developing countries. Furthermore, to try and reduce such a 
resistance from pharmaceutical companies against performing trials in developing countries, 
persuasions benefits could be provided to trial sponsors in order for them to agree to 
perform trials within developing countries and pay the global research tax. One example of 
such persuasive benefits may take the form of extensions on patency rights which translate 
to extended benefit. Furthermore, the application of a global research tax would exclude the 
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hesitation the researchers may have in choosing the locations where their trials will be 
carried out. It would be better for the sponsors to perform their trials within developing 
countries focusing on health care issues relevant to that population, and at the same time 
reduce the cost and increase their profit. Hence a shift is created where only relevant trials to 
developing countries’ populations are performed which at the same time benefit the 
sponsors of the trials.   
On the other hand, Ballantyne assumes that the benefit provided to the authorities within 
the developing countries would be directed to the good of the general populations. This is 
not entirely true; some governments may use the extra income for the purchase of weapons 
or for the support of certain groups within the society. Hence, although the intention is to 
maximize the benefit to the worse off, this may still not take place in reality. In order to solve 
this issue, an independent not-for profit agency could be assigned with the responsibility of 
allocating these funds for example the World Health Organization. This would ensure that 
the goals of the global research tax are taking place rather than going in different directions 
especially in the cases of corrupt governments.   
With these extra conditions, fair benefit ensures that (Hawking & Emanuel, 2008: 303): 
1.  The participants are selected for scientific reasons; 
2. Trial poses few net-risks 
3. There are sufficient and long lasting benefits to the population and their community 
4. The population determines the level and kind of benefit to be provided by the 
researchers 
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5. The repository offers the population a chance to compare and assess the benefits 
being offered to them.   
Fair benefit also makes sure that all the benefits that the community may enjoy are 
considered and taken into consideration and that decisions regarding this matter are made 
by the population or community concerned.  
Post-trial benefits take on a wider perspective of the form of benefit that the trial 
participants or their communities may enjoy after the trial has ended when compared to 
post-trial access. There are several reasons for demanding post-trial benefits in the 
communities hosting the clinical trials. First of all, the community accommodating the trial 
endures some costs and needs to gain in return for its interaction with the sponsors. Most 
importantly, post-trial benefit takes on a wider perspective of the benefits the trial 
participants should receive as well as their communities may enjoy as a result of their 
participation within the trial. In addition to considering direct benefits, it also includes 
collateral and aspirational benefits. Fair distribution of benefits between the sponsors and 
the communities represents my second argument for supporting post-trial benefit. 
Conclusion: 
The chapter has focused on post-trial benefits to trial participants and their communities 
from two different perspectives; a post-trial access and post-trial benefit. The post-trial 
benefit approach broadens the spectrum of acceptable benefits to trial participants by 
considering several other forms of benefit including direct, collateral, and aspirational 
benefits. Furthermore the chapter introduced a global research tax concept with the aim of 
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increasing the benefits to the trial participants and their communities which should be 
monitored by an independent authority.  
To ensure exploitation is minimized and outcome fairness achieved once the trail is 
terminated, participants and their communities have to receive a fair share of the net 
benefits gained from the trial. Sponsors have no obligation to provide the proven 
intervention to the trial participants because they do not fulfil the physician role normally 
required to act in the best interest of the patient. However, this does not mean that the 
sponsors have no duty whatsoever towards the trial participants. They must still respect the 
trial participants and minimize harm to them.  
Post-trial access has been shown to be impractical and to view benefits to participants from a 
very narrow perspective. We have shown that this approach is problematic for several 
reasons. Even when there is a will to provide proven interventions to participants, the 
sponsors are unable to do so directly because of local authorities’ regulations and 
requirements regarding drug approval and marketing. Also, the introduction of the proven 
intervention within the country where the trial has taken place does not rest in the hands of 
the sponsors themselves.  
On the other hand, post-trial benefit takes on a much broader perspective of benefit and 
looks at it from a fair benefits point of view. If we view health as a basic good for humans 
without which people are unable to flourish, we can then argue that since trials aim at issues 
related to health, then it is these potential participants and their communities that have to 
decide on the kind of benefit that should be provided to them. Both the populations and 
their communities carry some of the burdens of the trial, the participants by accepting the 
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risks of the trial and their communities through the use of resources and health care 
providers. Admittedly there are different kinds of benefits available as options to both the 
participants and their communities. We have divided the benefits into direct, collateral, and 
aspirational. We have argued that in order for the benefits gained by the participants and 
their communities to be defined as fair, the participants have to be selected based on 
scientific reasons and not convenience to the sponsors or vulnerability of the potential 
participants; there have to be sufficient and long lasting benefits to the population and their 
community. They must be given the opportunity to negotiate the level and kind of benefit to 
be provided by the researchers/sponsors. The repository offers the population a chance to 
compare and assess the benefits being offered to them. This negotiation process ensures 
that both parties come to an agreement prior to the initiation of the trial regarding the 
anticipated post-trial benefits to the community. At this stage if any unreasonable or 
excessive demands are placed on the research/sponsors or alternatively if the benefits 
offered by the researchers/sponsors are not acceptable to the local community, both or 
either party may decide to withdraw from the interaction.  
Furthermore, we have discussed Ballantyne’s global research tax as a method of increasing 
aspirational benefit. This approach requires the collection of a global research tax from all 
for-profit sponsors. This tax should then be placed under the supervision of an authority, the 
United Nations or the World Health Organization for example, in order to ensure that this 
money is spent on the improvement of health care within developing countries. 
In order to maximize the benefits to the trials to developing countries populations, a post-
trial benefit approach needs to be adopted instead of the narrow post-trial access approach.   
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Chapter Five: RECs and the Prevention of 
Exploitation 
Introduction: 
Discussions in earlier chapters led us to conclude that exploitative interactions need to be 
prohibited, even mutually advantageous consensual ones. This should be done in order for 
non-exploitative interaction to be promoted. Furthermore we need to ensure that social 
value is present especially when trials are intended to be carried out in developing countries. 
What has not been presented so far is who should take on this responsibility. This chapter 
will focus on that issue by discussing RECs. A comprehensive analysis will be presented 
regarding REC’s roles and responsibilities as well as their formation. The chapter will argue 
that local RECs should be given the responsibility of assessing trial proposals. This is not due 
to the lack of experience of RECs within developed countries nor is it an attempt to abolish 
the discrepancies between the decisions of different RECs. I think these discrepancies will 
continue to exist considering that RECs are urged to focus on social value despite the fact 
that they may all, in the end, receive the same training required to become members of 
RECs. The reason for calling for local review rather stems from the lack of insight of distant 
RECs regarding the local needs within developing countries. Local RECs have the knowledge 
regarding social value and acceptable benefits to the local society. This being said, it has to 
also be emphasized that certain changes to the local RECs need to be implemented. They 
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need to receive more training regarding ethical appraisal of trial proposals and their makeup 
needs to be changed to constitute a majority of lay members.  
Admittedly RECs are among the first groups of people to review research proposals prior to 
their initiation. Other groups may include the researchers and the sponsors of the research. 
However RECs have the responsibility of ethically assessing trial proposals.  
From a historical perspective, establishing independent RECs provided a necessary measure 
for ensuring research participants’ authority in deciding whether to participate in any given 
trial. The aim was to protect those potential participants from unnecessary harm and or 
abuse. The need for stricter controls arose not only in response to the few trials corrupted by 
mistreatment of trial participants or their lack of consent that became publicly known but 
also through whistle blowers. Perhaps the two most commonly known to have caused 
dramatic changes in research ethics after the Nuremberg are the publications of Beecher and 
Pappworth who have accumulated and published information about unethical research done 
in the post Nuremberg era (Harkness et al., 2001). Beecher for example presented 
information relating to twenty two studies as evidence of unethical behaviour. To him this 
form of behaviour did not form the exception but rather widespread practice amongst 
researchers. Through these publications, the public, RECs, and regulators of research 
involving human participants saw the failure of the existing review process and that it was 
not performing as well as we thought it was in the prevention of exploitation of trial 
participants.   
There are many different settings within which RECs exist. Not-for-profit RECs reside within 
academic institutions, universities, or governmental agencies. Generally these RECs are 
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viewed as less problematic than their profit-driven counterparts because it is claimed that 
they run independently from the institution and the members volunteer to perform their 
responsibilities as members of the review board. On the other hand there are for-profit RECs. 
The majority of review processes taking place today especially in the United States are 
carried out by RECs set up and funded by pharmaceutical companies (Bekelman et al., 2003). 
Although these RECs generally hold the same structure as not-for-profit REC's, their 
attachment to for-profit organizations brings their independence under the spotlight. 
Pharmaceutical companies often hire a contract research organization (CRO) to conduct a 
trial. The CRO usually takes care of the clinical trial from every aspect including participant 
recruitment and ethics review. This is evident from the fact that in 1994, 63% of the clinical 
trials were carried out within academic institutions compared to only 26% nowadays 
(Lemmens and Elliot, 2006). For the purposes of the discussions within this chapter however, 
this distinction between for-profit and not-for-profit committees will not be further perused. 
Rather the discussion here will focus on the issue of which REC should review trial proposals 
intended to be carried out in developing countries, an REC within the sponsoring country or 
the one within the developing country itself.  
Most well established, well recognised and organised RECs reside in developed countries. 
These RECs have made substantial headway towards establishing standards for research 
involving human subjects. REC members have the ability, through their experience in 
reviewing trial proposals, to prevent harm and exploitation of trial participants. Trial 
proposals have to be submitted to an independent REC and its approval has to be sought 
prior to the initiation of the trial and recruitment of trial participants into the trial. Obtaining 
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this approval has become one of the essential steps in getting a trial started. In fact, some 
countries have made this approval process a legal requirement for trial initiation (Varmus et 
al., 2003). In the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom Ethics Committee Authority (UKECA) is 
responsible for establishing, recognising, and monitoring the ethics committee within the 
country (Alberti, 2000; Tully, 2000). The UKECA requested the National Research Ethics 
Service (NRES) to establish a central advisory committee. The main role of this central 
advisory committee is to aid RECs in delivering consistent and fair decisions as well as 
providing guidance and training to REC members (National Research Ethics Advisors’ panel). 
In the United States, Federal law requires that researchers obtain REC approval before 
conducting a trial. However, this only applies to federally funded and regulated trials. 
Privately funded trials do usually solicit some type of review and approval however it is not 
legally required. In addition, United States regulations permit the transfer of oversight 
responsibilities between RECs meaning that a multicentre trial may maintain a centralized 
review (CFR, 2010). 
The International Council on Harmonization defines the independent review boards or RECs 
as a “group formally designated to protect the rights, safety, and well-being of humans 
involved in a clinical trial, by reviewing all aspects of the trial, and approving its start-up” 
(ICH, 1996: P4). These boards emerged at different time points within different countries. For 
example, in the United States RECs were first established in 1970 (Law & Society association, 
2007) whereas in the United Kingdom they gained official status only in 1991 (Williamson et 
al., 2000). Since their establishment, RECs have been interpreted to perform different 
perhaps sometimes contesting roles. On the one hand RECs are required to ensure the 
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welfare of the trial participants through the assurance of adequacy of enrolment of human 
participants within the trials, their protection, and their safety. This step also assures the 
potential participants that someone other than the research team has reviewed the trial and 
found it acceptable for humans to be enrolled into the trial. The aim is to protect potential 
participants from unnecessary harm and/or exploitation. On the other hand, RECs are also 
required to ensure that potential participants exercise freedom of choice. This is done 
through the assurance of existence and exercise of informed consent and warrant research 
participants’ authority in deciding whether to participate in any given trial. These roles will be 
discussed in further detail later on.  
Informed consent will not be further discussed here given that it has already been discussed 
in chapter two. This chapter will focus on RECs, their roles and formations. Furthermore, the 
issue of discrepancies between different REC decisions will be discussed, how and if it can be 
prevented, and how exploitation fits into the role of the RECs. 
The role of review boards: 
Since their inception, REC responsibilities have expanded to include the protection of 
potential participants from unacceptable risks by ensuring participants understand the 
consequences of their participation, and maintain decision whether to participate (CIOMS, 
1993). To this end, the REC’s role in protecting potential participants in advance and through 
periodic monitoring is highly emphasized (Moodley and Myer, 2007).  
Many experts have proposed criteria for RECs for assessing research proposals.  Emanuel and 
colleagues proposed seven essential requirements that define a general framework to use 
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when evaluating the ethics of clinical and epidemiological research (Emanuel et al., 2000). 
These criteria include: social and scientific value, scientific validity, fair subject selection, 
favourable risk-benefit ratio, independent review, informed consent, and respect for 
potential and enrolled subjects. The suggestion of these guidelines came with the aim of 
providing clear guidance to different REC members located within varying geographical 
locations to assess trial proposals in the same way. Some have gone as far as requiring that a 
uniform standard should be followed in the review process, with exception given to local 
perspectives regardless of the trial location. Voo and colleagues state: 
"While procedure mechanisms should be allowed to differ between 
and within countries, ethical standards that pertain to universal human 
rights and welfare should be consistent."(Voo et al., 2008: 108) 
Similarly, some countries such as Malaysia and South Africa have implemented the Good 
Clinical Practice (GCP) guidelines (DOH, 2000). The GCP first published in 1995, is a set of 
World Health Organization guidelines for steering the design, conduct, performance, 
monitoring, auditing, recording, analysis, and reporting of clinical trials (WHO, 1995). These 
guidelines have become the industry standard and adherence to them assures accurate and 
credible reporting of results, as well as protection of the rights, integrity, and confidentiality 
of trial participants (Petryna, 2009). This approach as well as the formation of the NRES in the 
United Kingdom is an attempt to bring different RECs under one set of guidelines or 
standards (Edwards et al., 2004). However, even with the implementation of similar 
guidelines across borders by different RECs, the decisions reached by these different RECs 
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may still differ significantly. To see how this may be the case, a presentation of how RECs 
may prevent exploitation will be presented. 
Given that the main roles of RECs is seen as the assurance that trial participants are enrolled 
into the trial only with their consent (Garrard and Dawson, 2005) and the protection of 
potential trial participants from harm, we need to establish first how these roles are linked to 
exploitation.  
RECs and procedural unfairness: 
From a procedural perspective of unfairness, RECs are required to ensure that trial 
participants are given the freedom to make a choice regarding their enrolment into a trail 
and that they receive enough information that will aid them in their decision making process. 
This is indeed one of the areas where RECs are sometimes accused of focusing their attention 
on. This accusation holds that REC members address the wording and content of informed 
consent forms and information sheets without properly scrutinizing other ethical issues 
associated with the research proposal such as risks to the participants (Macpherson, 1999; 
Kass et al., 2003), or participant selection criteria. Although RECs must very carefully assess 
the kind and amount of information released to potential participants, this should not be the 
only issue drawing attention from REC members. If it did, then the existence of RECs is not all 
that important as “a special research information officer” trained at scrutinizing such 
requirements could replace the whole REC (Garrard and Dawson, 2005: 420). Therefore the 
assurance of procedural fairness is one of the methods through which RECs may ensure that 
potential trial participants are not exploited through their enrolment into any given trial. 
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RECs and outcome unfairness: 
The second perspective of unfairness comes through the focus on the outcome of the 
interaction. In order to prevent unfairness and hence exploitation of potential trial 
participants, RECs need to assess whether the potential trial participants and their 
communities will receive a fair share of the benefits anticipated from the trial. This 
protection from unfairness is achieved through the assessment of the requirements put into 
place for the evaluation of the ethical appraisal of clinical trials (Weijer and Anderson, 2001; 
Lansang and Crawley, 2000). Emanuel and colleagues proposed seven essential requirements 
that define a general framework to use when evaluating the ethics of clinical and 
epidemiological research (Emanuel et al., 2000). These criteria are summarized in the 
following points: 
1. Social and scientific value 
2. Scientific validity 
3. Fair subject selection 
4. Favourable risk-benefit ration 
5. Independent review 
6. Informed consent 
7. Respect for potential and enrolled subjects 
Clearly these criteria offer guidance to researchers on all matters of ethics when conducting 
studies involving human participants. However, certain alterations to these requirements are 
in order. Hence each one of these criteria will be presented and discussed separately. 
Furthermore, certain additional points need to be considered which directly affect the ability 
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of RECs to assess unfairness. These include conflict of interest and proof of registration. Each 
of the criteria presented by Emanuel et al. will be discussed separately with justifications 
given to each alteration made to the original criteria proposed. However, both the 
assessment of harm and informed consent will not be presented here since they have 
already been discussed in detail in the chapter two. 
Social value: 
Although Emanuel et al. combined social and scientific value in one requirement; only social 
value will be discussed here. Scientific value will be combined with scientific validity and will 
be discussed as one requirement separately. 
 Although social value has already been presented through the assessment of harm in 
chapter two, a more detailed analysis will be provided here. To ensure that social value 
receives proper consideration during the review of a given proposal, RECs must first 
determine who will most likely benefit from the trial results and thereby determine whether 
certain populations need to be enrolled into the trial. Emanuel et al. describe four conditions 
that benchmark social value in a trial (Emanuel et al., 2004). First of all, it has to be 
determined who will benefit from the trial results: the community from which participants 
are recruited, the host country population, or a different population altogether? As discussed 
earlier, the direction of the benefits of the trial to other populations is not problematic in and 
of itself within research given that any research result may benefit populations either 
geographically distant from the participating population or may benefit future populations. 
However given the circumstances within developing countries; social value has to be ensured 
 178 
 
in order for sponsors not to take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the potential participants 
and the lack of health care services within these settings. In cases where the benefit is 
anticipated to be directed at the potential participants or their communities, the level and 
kind of benefit needs to be assessed to ensure that the potential participants receive a fair 
level of the anticipated benefits. Secondly, the potential trial value to prospective 
beneficiaries should be established. Each population or community ranks health care 
priorities differently and this in turn depends on the local setting. For example, a community 
suffering from a treatment resistant strain of tuberculosis may put discovery of therapeutics 
designed to fight this illness as their top priority. Another community may not rank this 
research goal with the same urgency. Thirdly, trial results should reach members of the 
community in order to maximize social value. The results should not be hidden away in 
journals and health care provider recordings. This action gains momentum when the trial 
itself becomes part of a health care development plan within the concerned community. 
Fourthly, the REC needs to also assess whether the conduct of the trial would undermine the 
existing health care system within the community. In some cases, even socially valuable 
research which has the potential of compromising the already compromised health care 
system may not be justified or approved by the REC. 
On the other hand, in trials where all the benefits are expected to be directed at different 
more well off, perhaps distant, populations, the REC needs to question why the 
researchers/sponsors want to carry out their trial at this given location or to recruit this 
specific population.   
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Furthermore, REC members need to assess the aspirational and collateral benefits which may 
be generated from the trial and not only the direct benefits to the trial participants. They 
have to ask about equipment, health care facilities, and training of local health care providers 
during the trial and whether these will continue to exist after the trials. Also REC members 
need to ensure whether other forms of social benefits may be provided by the 
researchers/sponsors outside the scope of health care services. 
Scientific validity and value: 
The assurance of scientific validity of trials is an essential requirement for an ethical trial. I 
will address this specific point from two different but interlinked perspectives. The first one 
focuses on the issue of scientific validity and value and the other one focuses on the concept 
of equipoise.  
There are many reasons why scientifically invalid or valueless trials should not be permitted. 
Some of these reasons include the diversion of limited resources to trials which will not 
generate any new information and at the same time expose trial participants to harm 
without the existence of potential benefit to future populations. However despite this being 
an important step in the review process, the REC does not seem to be the right authority to 
perform the task. Scientific validity links to the REC’s mandate. However, scientific validity 
and ethical review seek to answer a different set of questions. Scientific review and the 
assurance of scientific validity and value assess the scientific quality of the trial, the ability of 
the research to generate new knowledge, the appropriateness of the methodology used in 
the trial, sample size, use of randomization, population stratification, sources of bias and the 
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ability of the trial to achieve its objective (Black, 2001; Emanuel et al., 2000; Schlesselman, 
1982). Scientific review committees therefore, typically consist of clinical scientists, medical 
doctors, safety mangers, regulatory affairs professionals, and statisticians (Federman et al., 
2002). This combination of specialties makes it easier for the scientific review teams to 
properly consider and analyse the trial proposals from a purely scientific perspective. 
Separating the review process in this way ensures that only scientifically valid research 
receives ethical appraisal. Some trial proposals appear ethically sound on the surface, but 
may in fact be scientifically invalid or valueless. For example the research may fail to 
generate new knowledge or may simply repeat conduct of a previous trial. The Office of 
Protections from Research Risks (OPRR) states that: 
“A proposal without scientific merit can on the surface appear to be 
ethically acceptable, but the fact that it will not produce new or usable 
data does not justify the use of human participants regardless of the 
level of risk.” (OPRR, 1993) 
Scientifically poor or invalid research gives no benefit to the community and therefore should 
be limited, as should trials investigating previously answered questions because such practice 
may deny participants proven interventions, or place them at risk without anticipated benefit 
to them or to future populations, or both (Savulescu et al., 1996). Scientifically bad or poor 
science may result in the wasting of resources, exploitation of participants, publication of 
misleading or false information leading to the promotion and introduction of ineffective 
treatments as standards of medical care, or the overlooking of effective ones (Savulescu et 
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al., 1996). Carrying out any form of research which lacks scientific value may indirectly harm 
future populations. For example, the publication of misleading information may lead 
researchers to shy away from performing future research in the same field, and may also 
establish wrongful conclusions concerning the research area. This shift in future research 
priority can indirectly harm the community as well as future patients. Valueless research also 
wastes scarce resources that ultimately should be reserved for beneficial trials (Coughlin and 
Beauchamp, 1992). Enrolling participants into valueless research exposes them to harm 
without foreseen benefits.   
Some argue, as Hunter does, that the scientific analysis of a trial proposal should not be the 
responsibility of the REC members as is the case for the NHS ethics committees (Hunter, 
2007). Hunter supports his position by emphasising that most of the REC members do not 
have the expertise to carry out scientific review. Also, performing this role puts an extra 
burden on REC members. Scientific validity review entails understanding and rationalising 
highly technical details, which the REC members may lack capacity to do properly. I agree 
that scientific review should be delegated to another committee specifically concerned with 
the assessment of the scientific value and validity of the trial proposal. However, in order for 
this approach to be effective direct communication should be established between the 
scientific review committee and the REC. The scientific committee has to provide the REC 
with detailed reports regarding its scientific review, and the report has to be presented in a 
language comprehensible to the non-medically and non-scientifically oriented REC members. 
Some of the information that should be communicated may include the strength of the 
scientific design and methodology, the practical feasibility of the research design, the 
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probability of the trial meeting its goals, and the qualifications of the investigator to carry out 
the protocol (Federman et al., 2002). 
The anticipated results of such an arrangement are that RECs review only scientifically valid 
and valuable trials and at the same time avoid potential conduct of scientifically praiseworthy 
trials in unethical ways. Hence REC members use their time more efficiently and make more 
sound judgements. In the United Kingdom, this approach is used where NHS RECs are 
discouraged from assessing scientific validity of trial proposals. This structure ensures that 
another perhaps more qualified committee takes on the responsibility of assessing scientific 
validity and value. 
Another important aspect of the scientific validity review links to equipoise. It is crucial for 
any initial assessment of a clinical trial to study equipoise in relation to that specific trial 
proposal. In the traditional sense, equipoise literally means a genuine uncertainty existing 
within the medical community as to which therapeutic option is best for the patients. This 
uncertainty could reside with the individual clinician as suggested by Fried (Fried, 1974).  
Individual or theoretical equipoise refers to individual physician or health care provider and is 
considered by some as justified reason for a physician to request to perform a given trial. 
However, a physician rarely finds himself or herself in this situation because he or she usually 
has a preference for one intervention over another. The second kind of equipoise is known as 
medical or collective equipoise (Kuhse and Singer, 2006). 
This kind of equipoise refers to scenarios where the whole medical profession or a group of 
health care providers have a genuine uncertainty about which method of treatment is 
superior or better than the other. Clear and honest uncertainty as to which intervention 
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provides the most benefit to future patients’ well-being must be present before 
recommending clinical trials to help resolve uncertainty. Equipoise then plays a role in the 
initiation as well as continuation of trials evaluating the health outcomes of participants 
within the trial. This is what Kukla calls the traditional principle of equipoise: 
“In order to begin or to continue an experiment on human subjects, 
one must be in a state of equipoise with respect to the relative 
expected health outcomes for participants in different trial arms.” 
(Kukla, 2007: 171). 
Many arguments surrounding equipoise have unfortunately assumed that equipoise finds 
roots within the physicians’ duties towards their patients. For example Miller and Weijer 
both see equipoise as a conflict between the responsibility of a physician to benefit his or her 
patients, and the role and responsibilities of the researcher. These scholars state: 
"Equipoise has been presented as a way of resolving the moral tension 
between the physician’s commitments to the personal care of her 
patients on the one hand, and her commitment to a program of 
research on the other.” (Miller and Weijer, 2003: 93). 
Similar to Kukla’s views, Miller and Brody (Miller and Brody, 2002) claim that physicians and 
researchers have distinct roles. They see researchers as removed from therapeutic duty 
towards their trial participants and therefore insist that equipoise should not pose an ethical 
constraint on research. Chiong arrived at this same conclusion but through a different route 
of analysis (Chiong, 2006). He argues that because physicians never actually assume 
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“uncompromised patient-centred” therapeutic duty presumed to be in place, and in fact may 
make trade-offs that compromise their patient’s care, equipoise should not play a role in 
constraining research.   
However, both arguments initiate from confusion between the physician-patient relationship 
and the researcher-participant relationship. Equipoise is supposed to resolve conflict 
between the two. It requires investigators to act in the best interest of future patients, i.e. 
finding out which intervention proves better than the available alternatives. By doing so, and 
resolving any uncertainty, researchers actually help physicians to provide better care for their 
patients. Therefore, regardless of whether the researcher is a clinician or not, the aim of his 
or her research should focus on resolving existing equipoise for the purpose of advancing 
patient care. In an attempt to resolve the issues concerned with what she calls “traditional 
equipoise” Kukla offers a new approach to equipoise which she calls PE*: 
“PE*: In order to begin or to continue human subjects research, one 
must be in a state of equipoise with respect to whether or the extent 
to which the intervention being tested should be made accessible to 
the population that falls under the scope of the research.” (Kukla, 
2007: 180) 
Therefore, equipoise exists within clinical trials only when there is genuine uncertainty 
among the researchers as to whether the intended research would better serve the 
population it is recruiting, and furthermore this criterion is not limited to the participants 
within the different arms of the trial, or to clinical effectiveness. This very precise perspective 
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of equipoise takes into account the people concerned, which is an important consideration 
when dealing with any type of vulnerable population. This philosophy imposes upon 
investigators and reviewers the responsibility of investigating the most appropriate way of 
addressing the health needs of concerned populations within hosting developing countries. 
Admittedly, exceptions occur when using equipoise as a guiding principle in trial design and 
approval. For example, Kukla mentions two exceptions to the traditional view of equipoise, 
i.e. carrying out the trial in a population other than the one expected to benefit from the 
results, or implementing research with the goal of generating new information about an 
intervention rather than comparing existing ones. The newly generated information may 
influence further research, but may not benefit the community directly.  
The first of Kukla’s exceptions refers to carrying out a trial in a community when at the outset 
there is knowledge that results will benefit a totally different community or population 
rather than the local one. Kukla argues that her definition of equipoise may hold greater 
stance when the trial results can be generalised from the place of trial conduct to the other 
populations. However, equipoise fails when the trial results do not apply directly to the 
population intended to benefit from the study. The opposite situation where one can 
generalise trial results from the study group to the one intending to benefit from the trial 
means that the population participating in the trial falls under Kukla’s definition of equipoise. 
However, satisfying equipoise in this case does not automatically imply an ethical trial. Kukla 
emphasises this point: 
“Satisfying PE* should not be researchers’ only ethical concern.” 
(Kukla, 2007: 193) 
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The second exception to equipoise where the research aims to generate new knowledge, 
does not present a breach of ethics as long as the research refrains from violating all other 
ethical requirements e.g. lacking informed consent. Kukla therefore, suggests that equipoise 
on its own does not dictate whether a trial is ethical, but rather represents one of the criteria 
considered when reviewing a proposal. Kukla's first argument relating equipoise to 
generalisation of results between populations however ignores an important point. All forms 
of research including clinical trials have the common goal of generating new generalizable 
knowledge. Selecting potential participants therefore relies heavily on factors other than 
generalisation such as ease of access to the population, and perhaps lack of regulations. Trial 
focus should therefore consider equipoise concerning involved populations. Equipoise also 
links to the concept of social values however social value has already been discussed in detail 
above. 
Hence scientific validity and value review of the trial proposal should assess not only the pure 
scientific aspect of the trial but should further allow for the analysis of the existence of 
equipoise as well and should be done by the scientific review committee. Hence the scientific 
review report should include details about equipoise as well in order for the REC members to 
assess the proposal as a whole.  
Fair subject selection: 
The REC has to scrutinize and determine the reasons underlying the selection of the trial 
participants. This precautionary measure ensures that trial participants get selected based on 
scientific justification rather than reasons of convenience tied to lack of regulations, less 
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stringent ethical review, or lower risks of litigation (Moodley and Myer, 2007). So, trials 
recruit participants with the aim of improving health care services, or finding a better 
medical intervention. A problem frequently encountered in trial conduct is the recruitment 
of participants for reasons other than scientific advancement and social value, such as cost 
lowering for sponsors, lack of regulations, taking advantage of participants' vulnerabilities 
etc. RECs need to ensure that the objective of the trial justifies performing the trial within the 
chosen community. Several factors sometimes compel researchers to carry out trials within 
developing countries for example the prevalence of the illness within that region alone or the 
need to find less expensive but effective treatments for conditions affecting these 
populations. Individuals should not enter into a trial simply to appease sponsor anxieties in 
obtaining the required number of participants, or when lack of regulations undermines the 
safety of the participants. This point is certainly stressed in some international guidelines 
where vulnerable populations may only be recruited once an anticipated trial benefit to 
participants has been firmly established, or when trial execution depends on enrolment of 
these vulnerable research subjects. 
Independent review: 
Although this point is certainly a crucial point in the assurance that the clinical trial is ethical 
and has received ethical appraisal from a party other than the research team, for the 
purposes of this chapter it does not provide much guidance since we are using the guidelines 
to identify aspects which should be scrutinized by REC members during their review of trial 
proposals. Hence this requirement will not be discussed any further. 
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Respect to potential and enrolled participants: 
When it comes to respect, RECs have to be very careful regarding the meaning of respect 
which they have to focus on. There are many different accounts of respect (Feinberg 1975; 
Hudson 1980). One of the simplest is the distinction that has to be made between respect as 
behaviour and respect as an attitude. In the first, the respect for something or someone 
stems from the avoidance of breaching limits or boundaries, for example a driver not 
exceeding the speed limit on the road. On the other hand, respect as an attitude refers to the 
expression of our feelings towards the respected object, for example respecting a person. 
RECs need to focus on the second kind of respect which requires some preconditions. 
Respect is most broadly defined as the respect owed to all people regardless of any other 
factors e.g. characteristics or social status. Some writers have argued that certain conditions 
must exist in order for respect to be fulfilled. To begin with, the respecter must be a person; 
secondly, the respected person has to be seen as valuable independent of the respecter’s 
desires or goals, and thirdly, the respect cannot be devoid of reason, the person we respect 
has to have certain characteristic which make us respect that person (Cranor, 1975). Yet 
there are arguments that state that respect is not an option but an obligation, it has to be 
done (Wood, 1999). Perhaps the most influential discussions about respect have mainly 
revolved around the Kantian perspective on this issue. His main argument concerning respect 
is that persons are owed respect because they are rational beings (Kant, 1785/1996).  
The respect owed to those rational individuals, according to Kant, is unsurpassed and 
unconditional because they have an intrinsic worth or dignity. It is because of this dignity that 
they are not to be used as mere object. Since this point has been discussed at length in 
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earlier chapters, it will not be presented again here. The unconditional requirement for 
respect is built on two main features, that of their ability to determine ends and their ability 
to act autonomously (Wood, 1999; Korsgaard, 1996; Hill, 1997). The ability to set ends is 
based on the person’s capability to use rationality and reasoning to make a decision. On the 
other hand the ability to act as autonomous individuals relates to their ability to make 
choices freely that will fit in with their future plans and therefore life.   
Through Kant’s writings, many writers have stressed the importance of respect for autonomy 
and this respect can be divided into negative or positive respect. From the negative 
perspective, respecting a person comes in the form of not interfering with their decision 
making process by not coercing them or manipulating them for example. On the other hand, 
positively respecting a person’s autonomy comes from encouraging the individual to make 
his own choices and allowing him to control his life.   
Potential participants garner respect by having a stance in providing social benefit from the 
results of the trial. Also, researchers should respect participant confidentiality and inform 
them of any adverse events that may unexpectedly occur during the clinical trial. Participants 
should also feel free to withdraw from the trial if needed, and should not be forced or 
coerced to continue their participation in the clinical trial. All these points have been 
discussed in detail in chapter two; the emphasis here is on the REC members ensuring that 
due respect owed to the trial participants is ensured.  
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Conflict of interest: 
Conflict of interest is the suspension of primary interests for the sake of secondary interests 
(Thompson, 1993). Conflict of interest can be viewed from two perspectives: the conflict of 
interest of the REC itself through its members and the conflict of interest of the researcher 
and their team. From the perspective of the REC, the conflict may involve the whole REC or 
the conflict may exist through an individual member of the REC.  
When it comes to conflict of interest of whole RECs two issues need to be considered, those 
relating to the overriding power held by the sponsoring country or agency and the other 
relates to the conflict of interest of the REC in relation to its affiliation with an institution.  
The overriding power held by sponsoring countries when conducting trials in developing 
countries raises a concern from two perspectives. First of all, Sponsoring wealthy nations or 
companies sometimes donate large amounts of money to either the governments of the 
developing countries or the local institutions where the REC performs its functions. This 
money helps support a developing country on several fronts or may help an institution on so 
many levels. A local REC may show reluctance in refusing a research proposal from such a 
developed country. This reluctance may stem from the fear that the refusal of a research 
proposal will lead to cessation of aid in other aspects or levels. Furthermore, some RECs 
within the United States charge pharmaceutical companies for the review of their protocols 
(Emanuel et al. 2006).  In gaining financial reward RECs’ decisions may become clouded by 
financial support and access to new drugs as well as prestige obtained when their institution 
conducts a study. RECs in the United Kingdom do not charge for their services thus removing 
at least a financial aspect from the conflict of interest framework. In addition, researchers 
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from the sponsoring country retain the upper hand when deciding how the research will be 
conducted and how the funds will be allocated (Whittington, 2004).  
The second kind of conflict of interest which relates to the affiliation of the REC to an 
institution relates more to the conflict of interest between advancing the interests of the 
institution and their capability to advance their primary responsibilities. Some critics, such as 
Emanuel, suggest that although RECs cry independence, they are not totally independent. An 
attachment to the same institution from which the protocol is being reviewed creates 
conflict of interest. Reviewing trial proposals for colleagues inevitably introduces an element 
of conflict of interest according to Emanuel (Emanuel et al., 2006).  
In order to access whether conflict of interest actually exists within RECs, we need to be clear 
about their primary and secondary interests. The primary interests for RECs include as 
mentioned earlier the protection of the welfare of potential participants from harm and 
exploitation and the assurance of their safety. The secondary interests may include financial 
gain and professional recognition and status. Hence in situations of conflict of interest the 
REC may perform actions permitted by their roles but which may not align with the 
enhancement of the primary interests of that role (Jonsen et al., 2006). RECs within 
developing countries need to be aware about the potential for conflict of interest and how it 
may affect their final decisions. Furthermore, they need to have clear policies about the 
declaration of conflict of interest and how it should be dealt with. It has to be emphasized 
however that the existence of conflict of interest itself does not make the decision of the REC 
unethical nor does it mean that the person involved or REC will give in to the conflict of 
interest, although the temptation may be hard to resist. It is the motivation created by the 
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conflict of interest that may cause one to act in ways that contradict with accepted 
responsibilities and disregard other peoples' interests. These factors causing the conflict of 
interest for the committee as a whole may under some circumstances provide powerful 
enough incentive to influence trial approvals in both the developing (Edejer, 1999) and 
developed world (Emanuel and Steiner, 1995; Kelch, 2002). Individual members of the REC 
may have conflicts of interests when it comes to certain trial proposals through either the 
personal knowledge or friendship with the researcher, or through the involvement with the 
sponsoring agency. Both these relationships may cloud the judgement of the individual 
member regarding the ethical appraisal of the trial proposal. When such situations exist, the 
member of the REC has to declare the existence of this conflict of interest in order for the 
REC as a whole to decide whether to allow that member to be present during the discussions 
of that specific trial proposal or to exclude him or her from these discussions. REC members 
also need to realize the influence of the institutions, sponsors, and developed countries on 
their role and not allow it to interfere with their primary function. 
The other kind of conflict of interest relates to the researchers. The primary interest of the 
researchers is the performance of research and the generation of generalizable knowledge. 
However secondary interests may also co-exist with the primary interests such as financial 
gain and academic recognition. Researchers could be paid up to $5000 per research 
participant recruited into a study (Benatar, 2002; Edejer, 1999). These kinds of figures instil 
strong motivation for recruiting trial participants and overlooking inclusion and exclusion 
criteria specified in the proposal. In such cases the researchers have to disclose the existence 
of the conflict of interest.  
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However, a simple disclosure may not be sufficient. Federman suggests that a committee 
other than the REC should handle the conflict of interest because its proper assessment 
demands more time and expertise than the REC has to give (Federman et al., 2002). 
Federman argues that: 
"Independent conflict of interest review by another entity within the 
programme is essential to ensure that such review is given appropriate 
attention, that any necessary conflict management plans are 
implemented, and that the relevant aspects of the review and 
management are communicated" (Federman et al., 2002: 82). 
Once the REC receives a conflict of interest report it has to determine whether the conflict is 
acceptable when compared to the protection of potential participants. The review of conflict 
of interest is not restricted to financial conflict of interest, and can extend to look at the 
researcher’s desire for professional advancement or scientific recognition. Furthermore, not 
all forms of conflict of interest should be prevented or be considered as unacceptable. The 
desire for professional advancement for example although it may be a potential source of 
conflict of interest may be considered as an acceptable form of conflict of interest. Given the 
academic settings today restricting advancements in professional status except with the 
presence of publications, it is no wonder that researchers, professionals, and academics 
strive to have publications under their name.   
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Proof of registration of the trial: 
Prior to the approval of trials, RECs should require proof of registration of the proposed trials 
from the researchers. This is done for several reasons. To begin with, the REC, while 
performing its ethical review, can ensure that no replication of the trial takes place within the 
scientific or medical communities. If all trials are required to be registered, then comparisons 
between the different trials and their repetition aids in better directing resources and 
approval towards trials that address original scientific questions rather than repeated 
science. As argued earlier, this becomes the responsibility of the scientific review committee 
which is communicated to the REC rather than being the direct responsibility of the REC. 
Furthermore, registration is sometimes confused with trial monitoring which is seen as one 
of the responsibilities of the REC. This task of continued monitoring is difficult to maintain by 
RECs mainly due to the lack of manpower and time required to keep up with the demand of 
this responsibility. Yet it cannot be denied that this issue is important for several reasons 
(Dickersin, 1992). Once a trial has been registered and approved, it can be monitored for 
indiscretions within the trial design as well analysis performance whenever necessary. 
Furthermore, continued monitoring may be done through the obligation of researcher to 
report adverse events and to provide the REC with regular update reports. 
Another form of REC monitoring involves following the trial results to see if they have been 
published or not. Occasionally trial sponsors decide not to publish the trial results because of 
negative outcome, or unanticipated adverse events or side effects that lead to halting the 
trial. Keeping on top of the publication status helps the REC prevent future researchers or 
sponsors from performing the same trial, or a similar one that could inevitably expose trial 
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participants to risks previously known, but hidden from the rest of the scientific community. 
Researchers have an ethical duty to produce broadly useful knowledge and answer research 
questions. If researchers or sponsors conceal results every time they find negative results, or 
the intervention proves highly risky, then they fail to uphold this duty. Furthermore, 
repeating the same trials over and over again means redirecting precious resources away 
from what may turn out to be more beneficial trials. Therefore, RECs should demand 
evidence of trial registration prior to approving any trial (Harlan, 1994). In the United 
Kingdom for example, sponsors could register their trials in the National Research Registry 
(Chalmers et al., 1995). Having said that, and even with the importance of monitoring of trials 
in the post approval period, the RECs do not have the authority to enforce publication of trial 
results even if they wanted to. There needs to be regulations regarding this matter and even 
then a separate entity needs to follow up this matter other than the REC. 
Therefore, from the previous discussions it has been shown that the main role of the REC is 
the prevention of unfair use of trial participants from both a procedural and outcome 
perspectives. The first one is established through the assurance that the requirements of 
informed consent are maintained. The second one is assured through the assurance of 
scientific value and validity which comes into play through interaction with another 
committee and the assurance of social value. In order to assess whether RECs are actually 
capable of fulfilling these responsibilities we need to focus on the formation of the different 
committees and then move on to discuss the discrepancies that might exist between the 
different RECs and whether these discrepancies can be justified or not.  
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The makeup of RECs: 
Within developed countries, REC committee membership, although differing somewhat in 
the total number of members, includes qualified professionals as well as representatives 
from the public. In the United Kingdom for example, an NHS REC is made up of seven to 
eighteen volunteers with one-third membership comprised of people who have no 
professional interest in research or have not been involved in research except as participants 
(NHS). In the United States, a typical REC consists of five members at minimum, including 
both men and women from different professions. At least one member lacks scientific 
background and another bears no affiliation with the institution (CFR, 2005). Other countries 
such as France, Germany, and Norway have taken a national committee approach (Edwards 
et al., 2004). On the other hand within some developing countries, review boards do not 
exist (Voo et al., 2008; Kirigia et al., 2005). In cases where they do exist, the number of 
members on a given REC within developing countries varies considerably from three to 
thirty-one with an average of eleven members (Kass et al., 2007; Nyika et al., 2009). Most 
REC members (56%) have scientific or medical backgrounds, for example they may be 
pharmacists, nutritionists, or social scientists (Moodley and Myer, 2007). In South Africa 56% 
to 62% of the REC members are white males who are either scientists or clinicians (Moodley 
and Myer, 2007). The representation of females on these committees lies between 18% and 
54% (Moodley and Myer 2007). Another study showed that these committees did not have 
any external members (Nyika et al., 2009). Public representation within these committees is 
very rare, amounting to only 8% in South Africa (Moodley and Myer, 2007). Other developing 
countries have established RECs or at least some form of ethical review process (Kennedy et 
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al., 2006; Effa et al., 2007). For example, Rivera in his work identified twenty RECs in Latin 
America (Rivera and Ezcurra, 2001) whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, Coker found ten 
countries that had national committees (Coker and McKee, 2001). The WHO Southeast Asian 
Regional office identified sixteen respondents with national RECs (WHO, 2002). South Africa 
houses approximately thirty-four local RECs, of which two are attached to private non-
academic institutions (Moodley and Myer, 2007). The oldest REC in South Africa was 
established in 1967 and the one in Zimbabwe became formally established in 1992 (Kass et 
al., 2007).  
From a general point of view, RECs in developed countries deserve credit on several fronts. 
For example, they maintain public representation on RECs so that consideration is given to 
public opinion about clinical trials. Those RECs are therefore, better equipped to handle 
public concerns locally at least given the number of public representation on these 
committees. The fact that these RECs include members not affiliated with the institution, 
from both sexes, and with different professional backgrounds, lends additional credibility to 
the REC’s operation. The different professional background and makeup of these committees 
means that a wider perspective of opinions feed into the evaluation process. This approach 
serves its purpose especially when the intended study is to be carried out within the 
developed country itself, or in another developed country with similar traditions, customs, 
and beliefs. Careful selection of REC members ensures that customs and concerns, cultural 
norms, and cultural beliefs of the potential participants are considered and accounted for.  
In comparison, when we consider developing countries, this representation of public 
concerns and points of views are not expressed within the REC. In 2001, the World Health 
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Organization Regional Committee for Africa expressed concern over how studies are being 
carried out in the region without undergoing any form of ethical review (Kirigia et al., 2005). 
Therefore, there are concerns regarding the capability of RECs within developing countries to 
actually represent public opinions considering their current makeup.  
Another shortcoming with RECs in developing countries relates to prior approval practices. 
Local RECs tend to approve a trial when it has already been formally approved in an 
industrialized country. This problem especially holds true for multicentre trials and has been 
discussed extensively by others (Butler, 2000; Wolffers, 1989). London states that: 
"It is not uncommon for developing country IRBs to be pressured by 
funders or researchers to approve the local arm of a multicenter study 
that has already met with approval in the fender's home country" 
(London, 2002: 1079). 
 This pressure London refers to may result from differences in power established among 
various parties involved in the process i.e. the funders, researchers, governments, academic 
institutions, REC members in both developing and developed countries, and communities. 
Other published papers have expressed concerns regarding the rubber stamping of trial 
proposals by local RECs without consideration being given to local issues particularly for trials 
receiving international funding. Kass in her writings refers to researchers who state that 
“outsider researchers, and politicians could interfere with the REC process” while another 
suggests that the “culture of corruption is prevalent in some parts of Africa, which could 
affect the integrity of the committee” (Kass et al., 2007). Perhaps the REC members believe 
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wrongly so, that since the sponsoring country is much more advanced and has more 
expertise in assessing research proposals, there is really no need for the local REC to look at 
the proposal again. Even if this assumption holds true, it does not mean that the exact same 
trial will benefit the developing country in the same way, or meet its health care needs. The 
local RECs perhaps also worry that researchers failing to obtain a speedy approval may simply 
take their funds and research elsewhere.  
Public representation on RECs: 
RECs, whether in developed or developing countries, strive to ensure that they meet the 
anticipated role related responsibilities. One of the roles of the REC is to ensure that the best 
interest of the participants is served or at least does not become overpowered by the best 
interest of the researchers/sponsors. To do this, and to ensure that the potential participants 
are treated fairly by the researchers/sponsors, social value should be considered by the REC. 
Although this could be done by REC members if the REC was made up purely of members 
with scientific and medical backgrounds, these members’ involvement within the scientific 
field, their professions, and affiliation with institutions sometimes blind them to some of the 
concerns that a lay person may have. If all REC members came from academic and 
professional staff also involved in research with human subjects, a potential for bias comes to 
the surface especially if we consider that REC members review proposals of their colleagues. 
Edwards stresses this point when she states: 
“A bunch of doctors who may also be close friends and colleagues is 
not independent enough and certainly not of investigators generally 
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who may all be clouded by the same zeal of scientific innovation and 
material progress” (Edwards, 2009: 149). 
Most scientists and professionals look for some form of recognition within the scientific 
society and hope to gain some advancement in their academic or professional status. Having 
research published under ones name or their institution is a great achievement and it is 
therefore, no wonder that all researchers, even those sitting on RECs want to encourage 
research in their own countries. Furthermore, although these professional members may at 
the same time be members of the public or community where the trial is intended to be 
carried out, their scientific or medical knowledge makes them down play or disregard the 
concerns of the public or to consider them as irrational, unrealistic, or unimportant. These 
settings do not mean that the best interest of the researcher/sponsor will take precedence 
over the best interest of the potential participants during the decision making process within 
the REC but rather that people from medical or scientific background tend to dismiss some of 
the concerns of the public based on their knowledge about the whole process as well as their 
field of practice. Kass argues: 
“Some of the potential risks/ethics violations or cutting of corners can 
be perpetrated by collaborating investigators in other countries 
because the incentives to them (status, publications, foreign travel) to 
get the data collected are substantial enough as to be coercive" (Kass 
2000, quoted in Macklin, 2004: 139) 
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It is no wonder then that these boards are sometimes accused of reflecting the researcher’s 
point of view only. To aid RECs in performing their required roles, it has become 
recommended, or mandatory in some places, that people from the public should become 
permanent members on RECs. The idea behind the introduction of lay members on RECs is to 
ensure that people other than the scientists or researchers have assessed the acceptability of 
the risks involved. The lack of public representation on RECs carries the risk of biased 
decisions being made by professional REC members only (Emanuel and Steiner, 1995; 
Benatar, 2002). Lay members represent the concerns of their community or culture. Within 
RECs which serve culturally diverse communities, the lay members themselves have to 
represent the various communities served by that REC. In addition and in order to maximise 
the impact of these voices on final decisions made by RECs, the number of lay members on 
the RECs has to be large enough in order for their opinions not to be ignored. Their concerns 
and decisions have to have an impact on the final decision of the committee as a whole. The 
question that remains to be answered is who these public representatives should be. Do they 
need to come from lower socio-economic levels to represent the concerns of the population 
within those classes of society or could we allow any members of society without much 
concern to their socio-economic status? The purpose of having lay members on the REC is to 
ensure that the perspectives of the potential participants and their concerns are considered 
during the review process. Their role is not to access the scientific value or validity of the trial 
proposal. They are required to assess the social value of the trial and assess the information 
sheets and informed consent forms. Appointing lay members from lower socio-economic 
levels could result in having members who do not have enough insight regarding the 
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concerns of the target population. Hence they may find it harder to fulfil their required 
responsibilities during the ethical appraisal of a given trial proposal. Those with higher levels 
of education may be better suited for this responsibility. For example, lawyers, ethics 
specialists, or even cancer survivors may be candidates to be considered as lay members on 
RECs. It is important to emphasise however that the focus of selection of public 
representatives on RECs should not be the level of education of these members but rather 
their independence from the institution within which the REC functions. This independence 
should be viewed from two perspectives; the first one is the independence from research. 
They should not be researchers themselves, or be related to any researchers. The only 
connection to research which may be permissible is their past involvement in research as 
trial participants. The second perspective of independence should be their independence 
from the institution to which the REC is attached. This independence should not exist either 
directly or indirectly meaning that the lay members should not be affiliated with the 
institution or be related to a member of that institution. Both these factors put together 
ensure that these members are not biased by their roles as researchers, connection to 
researchers, or their connection to the institution. 
As committees within developing countries stand now, the number of expert members far 
exceeds the number of lay members. Therefore, if there was ever disagreement between the 
two sides, the expert side would overrule. If the input of lay members cannot have an impact 
on the decision of the committee then the whole process becomes self-defeating. We need 
to ensure that the outnumbering of lay members on the REC does not occur or is at least 
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minimized. Therefore the makeup of the REC should be reversed with more lay members 
being present than professionals sine their input is crucial to REC decision.  
It is important to stress here that lay people’s perspectives should not only be considered but 
should have enough weight to shape the final decision of the REC. Hence, their presence as 
members within RECs is essential. In order to assess whether existing RECs in developed or 
developing countries are actually implementing this step, we need to consider the two 
settings separately.  
RECs within developed countries: 
To begin with, RECs in developed countries, especially the United Kingdom, have lay 
members on their committees which suits the purpose of reviewing research intended to be 
carried out locally since these lay members represent the concerns and perspectives of other 
lay members within that same setting. However, when these same RECs are required to 
assess research proposals intended to be carried out at distant locations, the role of these lay 
members needs to be questioned. It is important to remember that although humans share 
common concerns, especially those concerning health and perhaps education, different 
settings sometime bring about different priorities. For example, people who lack health care 
options may have very distinct priorities from those with access to more than minimal 
standards of health care. Furthermore, cultural, educational, and even religious differences 
put emphasis on varying aspects of health care services. How do the members of these RECs 
ensure that public interest, social, and cultural concerns are reflected within the review 
process?  
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Some RECs in developed countries have tried to manage these issues by instating a review 
member who is either knowledgeable about the culture of the hosting country, or who 
actually comes from that part of the world (Eckenwiler, 2001; Macpherson, 1999). This 
approach may prove to be inefficient. Maintaining expertise in each and every developing 
country concerned perhaps remains the biggest challenge to RECs because these countries 
form a heterogeneous group with different circumstances, conditions, cultural believes, and 
customs. Therefore it is impossible for one person to be knowledgeable in each and every 
population’s preferences within these countries. Furthermore, these so called “lay member” 
would have been residing in the developed country for prolonged periods of times and may 
relate more to the cultural concerns of the population within the developed country than the 
country they originated from. In addition these so called experts usually represent people 
with higher levels of education and income (NCB, 1999), meaning that these members likely 
come from higher and more powerful social classes within the developing countries (White, 
1999) and therefore, may not truly represent the concerns or needs of vulnerable 
populations recruited into the trial (Macpherson, 1999). In this case, participants' interests 
“filter through the eyes of consultants considered knowledgeable in participant affairs rather 
than by the populations themselves” (Lansang and Crawley, 2000). Furthermore, as argued 
above the use of single experts on RECs does not serve its purpose as a single member’s 
opinion or input does not have much impact on the final decision made by the committee as 
a whole.  
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RECs within Developing countries: 
RECs within developing countries have some problematic points that need to be highlighted 
as well. RECs within developing countries are mostly made up of members with scientific or 
medical backgrounds and rarely have lay members. Hence the same problems mentioned 
above regarding the exclusion of lay members from the review process and the problems it 
creates are reflected here as well. In addition to the lack of impact of lay members’ votes on 
the final decision of the REC as a whole ranks as another problem with the makeup of these 
RECs. 
If both setups have certain problematic areas when it comes to reviewing trial proposals 
intended to be carried out in developing countries, then we need to assess which setting 
would better serve the purpose of the review process. 
Who should review the trial proposal? 
The first option gives RECs in the sponsoring country the responsibility of ethical review, 
which makes sense because of the advanced experience of some RECs with these kinds of 
duties. However the problem with that approach is the lack of knowledge of the members of 
these RECs about the cultural concerns and beliefs of the target population. Although some 
committees have tried to overcome this issue, implementing this approach and allowing RECs 
within developed countries to review trial proposals intended to be carried out within 
developing countries, could prove very difficult. Finding someone knowledgeable in all 
matters concerning the diverse populations of developing countries could also prove highly 
challenging.  
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The second option gives the RECs within the developing countries that responsibility of 
assessing proposals for trials intended to be carried out within developing countries. This 
approach may be a much more acceptable one given the knowledge of the members within 
these committees about the local issue and the acceptability of the trial to the local 
population. Admittedly, this approach is also problematic considering, to begin with, the 
makeup of these committees as well as the lack of training of the members within these 
committees. However, with better training this difficulty may be overcome.  
The third option, which may be seen as a temporary solution, could require both RECs within 
the sponsoring country and the developing countries to review any given trial proposal. This 
could be a temporary approach until RECs within developing countries receive the required 
training. The approach however could mean a longer review process from the perspective of 
the researchers/sponsors and delays in the communication of decisions made by these RECs 
(McMillan and Conlon, 2004). The advantages of such an approach though could be that the 
more experienced REC within the sponsoring country ethically appraises the proposal and 
thereby ensures research adherence to ethical standards. Whereas the local REC within 
developing countries addresses the local issues and the suitability of the trial to the local 
needs. Furthermore, developing countries RECs may recommend certain alterations which 
could make the trial proposal more suitable for local application. Having this type of 
structure in place means that the researchers may have to deal with longer processing times 
and delays in initiating the research, but other advantages ensue.  
It has to be emphasised though that the ideal situation, and the one which I am calling for, is 
the review of trial proposals by local RECs within developing countries. Allowing local review 
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of the proposals can achieve two positive outcomes. First off, the review takes into account 
concerns of the community partaking in the research. This means that the trial itself is made 
more relevant to the health care needs of the community involved. Secondly, the RECs in the 
developing countries gain experience and competency through reviewing several trials. This 
increased level of skill among local RECs may benefit the researcher/sponsors as well. The 
local community's cooperation and the ability to recruit participants into the trial may not 
transpire without the help of local authorities. Establishing local trial support helps reassure 
participants that at least to some degree the trial will benefit their own health care setting 
and their community in general. 
Discrepancies in REC decisions: 
Still other accusations are linked to the discussion regarding the decisions made by RECs 
concerning trials intended to be carried out at distant (geographical or cultural) locations. 
This accusation is usually directed at the inconsistency between different REC decisions. It is 
noted that while some RECs may approve a given trial, another may request major changes, 
minor changes, or may reject a trial proposal all together. According to the NHS National 
Health Authority’s recently published paper concerning consistencies in REC review (NHA 
2014) there is a need to ensure that there is consistency between different RECs on two 
levels. The first one is the assurance that the different RECs are consistent from a procedural 
perspective and the second is the assurance of a consistency of content. The procedural 
consistency the document refers to is the assurance that different RECs not only follow the 
same ethical principles, but must also have similar structures and process. This means that in 
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order for us to ensure that different RECs are consistent we need to ensure that their 
structures are the same, they have roughly the same number, the member’s expertise are 
the same, and they have access to the same information. On the other hand the consistency 
in content refers to the concept that REC needs to be consistent about the decisions it 
makes. An REC needs to make broadly the same decision when faced with a similar proposal 
in the future for broadly the same reasons it has used in the first instance. Although I agree 
with the second kind of consistency referred to by the NHS, I do not think that procedural 
consistency will eliminate the different decisions between RECs especially when considering 
geographically distant RECs. To clarify this problem, it will be viewed on two levels, the first 
one is the discrepancy between decisions of different local RECs within the same country or 
region and the second one focuses on the discrepancies between RECs within geographically 
distant countries. The first kind of discrepancies which focuses on differences between RECs 
located within the same geographical region or country but within different regions may be 
explained by the existence of minorities within a given region, cultural belief, or different 
interpretation and judgement of the proposal by the different members of the REC. The 
existence of these differing beliefs or customs will undoubtedly influence the decision of the 
REC. However the bulk of my discussion will focus on the second kind of discrepancies 
namely those between RECs within developed and developing countries.   
Two papers have reported disagreements between RECs within developing countries and 
those located in developed countries, (Mfutso-Bengo and Taylor, 2002; Love and Fost, 2003). 
Other reports have shown differences in the way documents are reviewed concerning the 
two settings (Hyder et al., 2004). It is not surprising that these differences occur as different 
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countries have different policies or regulations, but there are other factors which may lead to 
these discrepancies. Ideally, ethical review of trial proposals should cover all the important 
ethical issues relevant to the proposal. There are certain circumstances where a given REC 
may accept the approval of another REC from an ethical perspective with special attention 
being given to issues regarding local implementation especially in multicentre trials intended 
to be carried out within different locations of the same country or different developed 
countries. However, special regard to this point should be made when the trial approved by 
an REC within a developed country is intended to be carried out in developing countries. This 
discrepancy between the decisions of different RECs may be justifiable despite the fact that 
consistent criteria are being implemented within the review process. The discrepancy itself 
may be due to several reasons other than the criteria being used. Some of these reasons 
stem from unfortunate circumstances, or what I would call correctable sources of 
discrepancies, which deserve to be improved and resurrected. However, it has to be stressed 
that even once these factors are corrected the discrepancy between the decisions of 
different RECs may still fail to be unified. This is because it is the second source of 
discrepancy which is more important. These reasons are seen as justifiable grounds for the 
differences in the decisions among different RECs. The first group of these reasons will be 
discussed initially. 
Correctable sources of discrepancies: 
The sources of discrepancies between different RECs’ decisions may be traced back to 
reasons that once corrected may lead to the reduction of these discrepancies, or so it is 
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argued. One of these reasons could be related to the amount and kind of training the 
members of the REC receive. The lack of expertise to ethically assess research proposals 
represents a problem associated with RECs in developed as well as developing countries 
although the issue itself may exist on a larger scale within developing countries. According to 
several studies this problem mainly stems from insufficient training among REC members. 
For example, in one study in Tanzania, 49% of REC members reported having never received 
training in ethical review of health care research (Ikingura et al., 2007). Another study which 
looked at twelve African RECs revealed a lack of training among members and proposed this 
dilemma as one of the major challenges faced by the REC members in those countries. In 
Africa, 38% of REC members have never embarked on any formal training in the field of 
research ethics especially in the clinical area (Nyika et al., 2009). Hence if REC members 
within developing countries receive training regarding the ethical appraisal of trial proposals, 
the discrepancies between different RECs should be a rare occurrence. However this 
conclusion is misled since even when REC members receive training, it does not mean that 
the discrepancies in the final decisions between different committees will necessarily 
disappear. The kind of training the REC members need revolves around the ethical appraisal 
of trial proposals and the procedures and policies that govern the review process. Indeed 
some writers have even presented the idea that in some cases the training of the members 
may actually increase the discrepancies between the different RECs rather than reduce it. 
Edwards et al. present such an argument. They state: 
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“Indeed it may be that training increases differences, by making 
members more confident, more reflective and more inclined to see the 
issues from a variety of points of view” (Edwards et al., 2004: 414) 
The broadened knowledge of the trained members about the principles and polices that 
govern their roles and the expectations attached to this role may indeed make the 
discussions among the different members more intense and may lead to further 
discrepancies among and between different RECs rather than unify them.    
Another issue which may impact on the decision of the REC and may also be related to the 
lack of training of REC members is the conflict of interest which may influence the decisions 
of these committees. Some trial sponsors provide financial remuneration not only to the 
researchers but also to the institutions which approve their trials (Benatar, 2002; Edejer, 
1999). These amounts could be very high and if REC members are not aware about the 
potential of conflict of interest and the powerful influence it may have on their decision, may 
lead them to approve trials which do not necessarily serve the potential participants 
interests. This situation may exist in both the developing (Edejer, 1999) and developed 
countries (Emanuel and Steiner, 1995; Kelch, 2002). 
Other than training, mechanism of function of the REC may also have an effect on its 
decision. How the members interact with each other, the kind of discussions that take place 
and the general harmony between the members is another factor that causes different 
committees to reach different decisions. Furthermore, the simple existence of different 
people or members on different committees may be another reason for the different 
decisions. Individuals, regardless of receiving the same kind of training, may still reach 
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different decisions even when it comes to the same issue. How these individuals perceive the 
information and analyse it is different as is the case between any two or more people. This 
difference in decision making processes does not only occur within RECs. Scientific review 
board members may also disagree on specifics of trials despite the fact that they may come 
from the same backgrounds. It is important however to emphasise that the differences in 
decisions between different RECs be it at a local or international levels do not necessarily 
lead us to define these differences as being bad or morally problematic.  
Justifiable reasons for discrepancies: 
There are other reasons which may be the cause of the discrepancies between the decisions 
of different RECs. However, these reasons do not relate to the training level of the members 
or functionality of the REC. These discrepancies refer to the consideration of local issues 
which include cultural acceptance of the proposed trials to local needs. I have argued earlier 
that in order to ensure that potential participants are not exploited, the REC needs to assess 
the social value of the trial and the level of benefit to them. In order for this duty to be 
fulfilled, RECs need to make certain that exploitation does not occur or is minimised by 
ensuring that any given trial is acceptable to the potential participants’ culture and that the 
trial will be socially valuable to them or to their communities.   
Social value comes in several forms and relates to how the trial will benefit the hosting 
population or community. Some cultures may not find it acceptable for certain practices to 
take place within their communities or the concepts within the trial themselves may be 
difficult to comprehend by the concerned potential participants. To ensure that social value 
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receives proper consideration during a proposal review. We have presented in chapter three 
Emanuel et al.’s conditions for the assessment of social value within a trial (Emanuel et al., 
2004). These included the determination of who will benefit from the trial results; the 
potential trial value to prospective beneficiaries, the target population’s access to trial 
results, and the fact that the conduct of the trial should not undermine the existing health 
care system within the community.  
The assessment of social acceptability and value of a given trial proposal to the community is 
best done by the people who come from these areas and understand the culture and belief 
of those people. The members of the REC who are mostly equipped to do this task are the lay 
members of the community who represent the general population. I have argued earlier that 
the numbers of these members have to be large enough in order for their comments and 
decisions to have an impact on the final decision of the REC. It is not enough that their 
concerns or fears are expressed and then ignored during the decision making process. We 
have also concluded earlier while assessing the makeup of the RECs in developed countries 
that having a single expert member to represent a community in developing countries’ 
culture is not enough to be representative of the target population for several reasons. 
Therefore, the best approach is for trial proposals to be reviewed by local RECs. 
Given that local lay members review trial proposals and have a say in whether it is acceptable 
to the local community, discrepancies between RECs, especially those from developed and 
developing countries are inevitable even if the same criteria for ethical review are followed. 
The source of this discrepancy is the social interpretation of how valuable the trial is to the 
community where it is intended to be carried out. This is a justifiable source of the 
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differences in the decisions of different RECs. If this point is taken into consideration, then it 
becomes clearer that even if we suggest uniform review processes and regulations between 
and among all RECs, the discrepancies in the decisions reached may not be affected by such a 
step given that cultural and social concerns are taken into consideration and are the main 
reason for these differences.   
Allowing local review of the proposals can achieve two positive outcomes. First off, the 
review takes into account concerns of the community partaking in the research. This means 
that the trial itself is made more relevant to the health care needs of the community involved 
and certain changes which will make a proposal more applicable locally will be 
recommended. Secondly, the RECs in developing countries gain experience and competency 
through reviewing large number of trial proposal. This increased level of skill among local 
RECs may benefit researchers/sponsors by the assurance of participants that the trial will to 
some degree benefit them and their communities and therefore improve the local 
community's cooperation and recruitment of trial participants. 
Conclusion: 
This chapter has focused on the role of RECs in the process of prevention of exploitation. It 
was argued that local RECs should be given the responsibility of ethically assessing the 
acceptability of any given trial which will be performed locally. It has also been emphasised 
that the discrepancies between decisions of different RECs may be justifiable especially if we 
consider that social value is an important criteria in the ethical assessment of trial proposals. 
Reviewing research involving human subjects has always been a thorny topic and is especially 
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complicated by bad publicity related to research studies where subjects have been exposed 
to unnecessary harm or exploitation. The members of RECs should consider the welfare of all 
subjects on equal footing and protect them from potential harm and exploitation regardless 
of where they reside. The prevention of exploitation stems from two main areas. The first 
one stems from the assurance that the trial is fair to the potential participants from a 
procedural perspective. This is achieved through the proper review of how informed consent 
is to be obtained from the potential participants and what information they will be given to 
aid them in their decision making process. The second measure for the prevention of 
exploitation is the assurance of the social values of the trial to the community where it is 
intended to be carried out i.e. outcome fairness.   
RECs come in different sizes and exist within different geographical areas and cultural 
settings. There are several accusations which RECs are accused of and they include the 
existence of conflict of interest and the focus of the members on the wording of the 
informed consent form rather than the communications process between the researchers 
and the potential participants. RECs are also accused of not paying enough attention to the 
social value of the trial to the local community, but perhaps the most important issue that 
deserves more attention is the representation of the voices and concerns of the public in the 
decision of the REC. Due to the widespread shift in performing trials within developing 
countries, RECs within industrialised countries are required to assess the acceptability of 
those trials to be performed on other less well-off communities. The RECs in sponsoring 
countries often have enhanced expertise and knowledge when it comes to ethically 
appraising trial proposals. Despite the fact the RECs within more developed countries may 
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have longer experiences at ethical review; their understanding of the local perspectives of 
the distant populations may not be optimal. This issue has been reconciled by most RECs in 
developed countries through seeking opinions from experts aware about local cultures and 
dilemmas. Yet this may be very difficult to perform in reality because of the diverse nature of 
beliefs and customs among developing countries populations. There may be difficulty in 
finding an expert in all of these cultures. In addition there may be difficulty in finding suitable 
representatives from each and every developing country. The most problematic issue though 
with such an approach, no matter how admirable it is, is that it can prove impractical due to 
the diversity of cultures and beliefs within developing countries. More importantly it needs 
to be emphasised that having a single expert on a committee made up from several other 
professional experts means that although the concerns of the public may be considered and 
heard by the committee, the voice of that expert does not have any effect on the final 
decision of the whole committee. 
RECs in developing countries also have many problems starting from the composition of RECs 
extending to their lack of experience and training. They do however; hold a better awareness 
of local issues and the acceptability of the trial in their own setting. Yet most of these review 
boards are made up of professional scientists or people with a medical background. This 
approach means that the public’s concern regarding any given trial renders the decision of 
the REC to be labelled as unrepresentative of the community. This relates directly to the fact 
that they are all professionals meaning that they can in some situations review the trial 
proposal from their professional perspectives rather than from the common local man’s 
perspective. To ensure that the concerns of the average person within the community are 
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taken into consideration and affect the decision of the committee, two things need to be 
done. The first one is that lay members should be present on RECs. The second point is that 
they should make up the majority of the members. This approach ensures that the final 
decisions made truly represent what the public wants and not only what the professionals 
think should take place. Taking this point into consideration either on a local or an 
international level means that REC decisions may continue to be different and still not be 
considered as being problematic. If the public concerns are the main reason for these 
differences in decisions between and among RECs, then these different decisions should not 
be viewed as being problematic to either the researchers/sponsors.  
We have also stressed the importance of local REC’s making certain changes within their 
makeup to allow for more public representation on these committees and the need for these 
local committees to perform the ethical review of trial proposals intended to be carried out 
within their local community. This will not only allow them to take into consideration the 
perspectives of the potential participants but will also mean a broadening in their experience 
and capability in performing ethical reviews.   
The take home message of this chapter is that despite the discrepancies in the final decisions 
made by different RECs, this fact alone does not mean that the decisions made by each REC is 
not rational or wrong in nature. We have to emphasise the fact that the true aim is to have 
more lay members on RECs than professionals. This needs to be done to ensure that the 
voice of the public which is represented in their points of views or comments is not 
overpowered by the positions or opinions of the professional members of the committee.   
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Chapter Six: Conclusion: 
The thesis has recommended some new ways of thinking about the problem of exploitation 
in relation to research in developing countries.  One of these concepts was the necessity to 
return to the essence of informed consent through the focus on communications rather than 
the legality of the form itself. Secondly, the acceptance of the possibility of the replacement 
of individual consent within some societies by that of the leader with certain precautions 
being taken into consideration as to whether or not community consent truly represents the 
choices and best interests of the community members. Furthermore, the adaptation of a 
broad post-trial benefit approach which includes a wide range of benefit not only to the trial 
participants but also to their communities. Fourthly, the concept of global research tax was 
endorsed and its importance emphasised. Finally, the recognition and acceptance of 
discrepancies between RECs within developing and industrialized countries was presented 
with an emphasis on the need to pay attention to the selection and makeup of these 
committee to include a majority of lay members rather than the current setup. 
Over at least the last decade, the interest in the performance of clinical trials within 
developing countries and recruitment of participants from these counties has dramatically 
increased. Hence a lot of accusations were made against the sponsors of these clinical trials 
accusing them of exploiting the population of developing countries for their own benefit. It 
was necessary to examine this concept and come to an answer as to whether these trials 
were in fact exploiting their participants. In order to do so, the normative meaning of 
exploitation was used throughout this thesis. Exploitation was defined as the unfair use of 
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one person (or a group of people) by another. To truly understand what exploitation means 
we focused our discussions on what unfairness entails and looked at it from two different 
perspectives which have formed the basis of our discussion and analysis of exploitation. The 
first perspective was a procedural one which focused on how trial participants are enrolled 
into the trial, how much information they are given, the assessment of their level of 
understanding of the information provided by the research team, and the factors that may 
affect the level of understanding of the potential participants. Although some developing 
countries populations may have low levels of education and hold different beliefs regarding 
the causation of illness, it cannot be concluded automatically that informed valid consent 
cannot be obtained from these individuals. Nor could it be assumed that their levels of 
understanding of the information being presented to them cannot reach an acceptable level. 
Informed consent is best viewed as a process that takes place between two parties, the 
researchers and their teams and the potential participants. Labelling any consent as being 
"informed” demands that each party fulfils certain requirements. Researchers are required to 
ensure the competence of the potential participants, disclose certain information to them, 
ensure the potential participants understand the information presented to them, and ensure 
that the potential participants give their consent voluntarily. Some of the information the 
researchers must disclose to the potential participants include but are not exclusive to the 
purpose and duration of participation, the risks involved, freedom to withdraw from trial 
without penalty, available compensation of research related injury and the availability (or 
not) of post-trial access.   
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Although disclosing this information gives trial participants a fairly comprehensive overview 
of the trial details, it does not in-and-of-itself guarantee that the potential participant will 
actually understand all the information presented to them. Each participant has his own 
bench mark of required information needed to make an informed decision. Therefore, it was 
proposed that research teams should adopt an individualised approach when disclosing 
information to participants. It is the researcher’s duty to make sure that potential 
participants actually understand the information presented to them. In order to do that, the 
researchers have to ensure that the potential participants are in the right mindset. They have 
to be in a deliberative mindset rather than an implementation mindset. This is an important 
step to undertake because it has been shown through empirical studies that potential 
participants tend to overestimate the chances of therapeutic or direct benefits to themselves 
and under estimate the risks involved if they are within the implementation mindset. Hence 
it is more important to focus on the validity of the participants’ consent rather than how 
much information should be disclosed. Although achieving this goal means devoting extra 
time to potential participants and perhaps using local health care providers or patient 
advocates to ensure the proper translation of information is achieved, it can still be done and 
its importance should not be overlooked. 
Perhaps a more problematic issue facing developing countries regarding informed consent is 
the higher importance given to community or tribal consent in lieu of individual consent. This 
approach may be seen as an aiding tool to the researchers as tribal or community leader 
consent by itself may enhance the recruitment of trial participants into the trial. Although 
this approach may differ from the method used in western countries, it does not mean that 
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the approach itself is wrong. Individuals within some of these developing countries’ may view 
the provision of their individual consent as disrespectful to the community leader and may 
face negative social consequences from the community if they do so. To ensure that the 
community in general receives enough information about the trial without the researchers 
necessarily violating the community order, public meetings could be held between the 
researchers, community leaders, and community members where general essential 
information about the purpose and goal of the trial are presented to the community as a 
whole. Admittedly there may be situations where individual potential participants may 
decline participation in the trial and relay their choice to the researchers. Is these cases, 
these potential participants could be excluded from the trial based on scientific or medical 
reasons. In other cases the community leader may not give permission for the trial to take 
place within that community. In such cases it would be very difficult to recruit individuals into 
the trial as individual consent has no value within these societies and researchers are 
perhaps better off relocating their trial to another community or country.   
The second perspective of viewing unfairness is from an outcome perspective. The 
assessment of whether an interaction is exploitative or not is assessed based on how the 
parties are anticipated to gain at the end of their interaction with each other. Within any 
interaction between two or more parties, the outcome may include the parties not being 
affected, being harmed, or benefiting from the interaction. Given that trial benefit or harm is 
assessed prior to the interaction taking place, we have decided to look at each one of these 
outcomes from an ex-ante perspective; meaning that we will assess the anticipated 
outcomes based on the initial status of the individuals involved within the interaction. Trial 
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participants are rarely unaffected by their enrolment into the trial, hence the no effect 
option was not discussed. The participants may be harmed by their interaction with the 
researchers. Wendler’s criteria were used for evaluating the risk-to-benefit ratio which 
includes three steps: (1) identifying the net-risk intervention, (2) assessing the net-risk 
intervention, and (3) assessing the net cumulative risk. It was also emphasised that the 
potential participant is the only person truly capable of assessing the acceptability of the 
potential risk. The level of harm could range from being minimal to serious. However, 
regardless of level of harm the assessment of the acceptability of the anticipated harm 
should be left to the potential participant given that different people accept different levels 
of harm. Therefore, even high risk trials may be allowed under the right circumstances and 
the importance of participant’s autonomy and informed consent should be ensured through 
the process.   
The anticipated benefit, on the other hand, is assessed from a different perspective: post-
trial access and post-trial benefit. Post-trial access refers specifically to the provision of the 
proven intervention to the trial participants once the trial has ended, whereas post-trial 
benefits include other benefits which the potential participants and community may gain 
once the trial is over. Most of the arguments demanding post-trial access stem from the 
confusion between the roles of the health care providers and the researchers. Health care 
providers are supposed to act in the best interest of the patient because of the physicians’ 
fiduciary responsibility towards their patients. Researchers on the other hand operate under 
a totally different set of rules. First of all, not all researchers are physicians meaning that the 
physician-patient model cannot be applied in all cases. Secondly, the aim of performing 
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clinical trials is to generate new knowledge aimed at improving the health of the general 
populations or future patients. The focus therefore falls on the whole community (either 
those suffering from a given medical condition or those belonging to a certain geographical 
region) rather than the individual patient. In this sense, the researcher-participant 
relationship is at best a morally contractual relationship which terminates after the trial has 
ended.    
Researchers stand to gain from their interaction with the trial participants in many different 
ways. They may receive academic recognition for their work, get their research published, or 
gain financially. Sponsors of the trial also gain benefits most likely in a financial form through 
the marketing of their trial product once proven effective through the trial. Trial participants 
or their communities may also gain from their participation in a given trial.  
The benefits that the trial participants stand to gain are numerous. These benefits were 
divided into direct, collateral, and aspirational benefits. Direct benefits include the perhaps 
most obvious benefit to the participants themselves which is the improvement in their health 
status. Collateral benefits come about as a result of the exposure of trial participants to 
extensive medical testing and follow up. This by itself may lead to the improvement in the 
health status of these individuals. Furthermore, given the importance of health to human 
beings and its view as a special kind of primary good, the improvement in health is a priceless 
goal to achieve regardless of any other benefits that the trial participants may gain during 
their participation in the trial. Aspirational benefits are the benefits that the community or 
future populations may enjoy such as the establishment of health care facilities, availability 
of equipment, or training of local health care providers.  
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Still despite the fact that the trial participants may benefit through their interaction with the 
researchers, the interaction itself may still be labelled as being exploitative and cases may 
exist where these interactions may justifiably be prohibited even when both parties involved 
stand to benefit from the interaction. Although several reasons are sometimes used to 
defend the prevention of mutually advantageous consensual exploitative interactions 
between the researchers/sponsors and the participants, most of them have been proven to 
be weak and unjustified. These arguments ranged from issues of degradation, to the 
expectations of trial participants, to instrumental use of the trial participants by the 
researchers/sponsors. Rather, the approach adopted for the justification of the prohibition of 
mutually advantageous consensual exploitative interactions was the strategic intervention. 
This approach basically requires the prohibition of exploitative interaction in order to 
promote better interaction for those who cannot do so for themselves.  
Furthermore, post-trial benefit was introduced and how to best ensue that trial participants 
and their communities benefit fairly from the trial. To ensure a fair share of the benefits 
reaches the concerned individuals, the trial needs to address an issue that is important to the 
community where it is to be carried out i.e. it has to socially valuable. Trial participants 
should be recruited for scientific reason and not for reasons such as convenience of the 
researchers/sponsors.   
In addition to the improvement in the health of the individual participants, whole 
communities may gain through the training of local health care providers, the establishment 
of health care facilities, and other forms of capacity building.    
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To enhance other forms of collateral benefit, Ballantyne’s idea of implementing a global 
research tax was adopted. Using Ballantyne’s approach ensures that part of the sponsor’s net 
profit gets redirected to maximize benefits to the less well-off within the relationship. 
Finally, the role of the RECs in the whole process of exploitation of trial participants was 
discussed. Perhaps the most experienced RECs existing today are located in developed 
countries. These RECs have gained wider experience in the field due to the sheer number of 
trials they review on a regular basis, and also because their members are well trained and 
knowledgeable about issues that come under heavy scrutiny during a trial review. Problems 
occur when these RECs within developed countries are required to evaluate trials intended 
to be carried out in distant developing countries. Here the REC may not be fully aware of the 
issues considered unacceptable by the local population. Although some RECs make an extra 
effort to understand local population perspectives by consulting an expert in the field or 
someone who originally comes from that region, this approach does not always work in 
practice because of developing countries’ diversity as well as the lack of influence that one 
person has on the final decision of the REC. Trial proposals should be reviewed by local RECs 
within developing countries with the structure of these boards being revised to include more 
lay members than professionals. This is an extremely important point to consider given that 
most professionals tend to dismiss some of the concerns of the public due to their 
professional roles despite them being members of that same community. The most common 
accusation directed at RECs is the discrepancies in the decisions made by different RECs. This 
was not seen as a problematic issue especially when considering the input of lay members 
and consideration of local issues and concerns that feed into the final decision of the REC. 
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These differences may not even disappear with more training of the REC members. In fact 
the differences may increase with this training. The point is not the eradication of all 
differences but the increased consideration and input of the public and community 
concerned.  
The whole aim of focusing on a broader perspective of post-trial benefits and the social value 
of the trials to the concerned communities is to improve the current existing conditions 
within developing countries. By better training of local health care providers, availability of 
health care facilities and equipment, and focusing clinical trials on socially relevant health 
care issues, the 10/90 gap will be reduced. This can be achieved through the increased 
expenditure on research aimed at the discovery of treatments for illnesses devastating these 
areas. Through the performance of these trials other benefits may be gained such as the 
establishment of health care facilities and the provision of equipment by the sponsors of the 
trial. This provision of several kinds of benefits and the focus on social value mean that the 
trial participants are not being exploited by the researchers/sponsors. On the contrary, by 
the insistence on these issues, it is ensured that the populations of developing countries are 
recruited into trials for their populations’ or community’s anticipated benefit.  
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